Great power competition has been the primary driver of the Pentagon over the past few years, but the Defense Department doesn’t get to pick the next war.
It is more likely that the U.S. military will be drawn into another conflict against an insurgent or proxy force, than it will end up fighting naval battles in the South China Sea or halting Russian armor in the Fulda Gap.
Sure, if you are talking odds, a big war against Russia or China is surely far less likely than a war that requires a counter-insurgency campaign at some point.
But remember that proxy forces that try to control land should be fought with conventional forces. If Ukraine had conventional army units ready to fight, they would have slaughtered the so-called "little green men" Russian troops without insignia sent into Ukraine who seized the transportation hubin Crimea to receive conventional Russian ground forces; and in the Donbas those Russian proxy forces control territory--the precise mission that conventional ground forces can deal with.
But what about the implication we should focus on the more likely mission? On the one hand, the call to remember the lessons of Iraq basically admits we won that war despite difficulties in adapting to the many threats. So that's good.
And I do want us to retain the knowledge of counter-insurgency warfare.
But in winning Iraq and gaining experience in COIN, we became "unbalanced" and so nearly a generation of troops lost the ability to fight another army. Or cope with enemy aircraft. We do need to focus on conventional combat to restore that capability.
And it is hard to forge the combined arms within the Army and bring in Marines, the Air Force, and the Navy for true "purple" operations.
So in the balance between preparing to fight conventional armies or insurgents, I favor the former. My view is that conventional combat is fast and COIN is slow.
If we send an army unprepared for COIN, the losing will take place over time and we should have the time to adapt. Really, any good soldier can be a counter-insurgent if led by officers who know how to plan a COIN campaign.
If we send an army unprepared for conventional combat, losing can be fast and decisive. A destroyed army can't be retrained to fight better.
So I'd prepare the Army to fight conventional battles while making sure enough of the officer corps retains the knowledge of COIN to adapt good troops for that fight if necessary.
And as an aside to the initial article's comment that Iran won the Iraq War--just ... no.
UPDATE: And one thing about preparing for COIN. When we think about it do we always think COIN takes place in a friendly country with only a small portion of the people siding with the enemy? Or do we think about how to pacify a largely enemy population?
