I've pretty much always assumed that Iraq did not use chemical weapons on our forces in 1991 because we halted at the liberation of Kuwait. I had no idea that this was a question:
During the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam Hussein possessed large stockpiles of chemical weapons, which he had used frequently in his 8-year war with Iran during the 1980s. And yet Iraq did not use these weapons against the U.S.-led coalition forces, even as they soundly defeated the Iraqi army, pushing it from Kuwait. For two decades, the question has been, why not? Some American officials have argued that Saddam was deterred from using chemical weapons by ambiguous U.S. threats of nuclear retaliation and explicit threats of regime change. But information Saddam provided interrogators after his capture -- 10 years ago today -- along with newly released recordings of Saddam's meetings with his advisors, suggest otherwise. Saddam viewed chemical weapons as a final trump card, to be held in reserve to deter American or Israeli use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and to prevent coalition forces from marching on Baghdad.
Losing Kuwait--a new conquest for Iraq--did not threaten Saddam's hold on power. So it would have been foolish to use chemical weapons that well-trained and equipped American forces could have endured, and provoke a march on Baghdad to change the regime.
Although I'd like to add that our threat of regime change if Saddam used WMD is no different from Saddam viewing chemical weapons as his final trump card to prevent coalition forces from marching on Baghdad, no?
But the bottom line is that use of WMD would have doomed the Iraqi government--not saved it--in 1991.
I had no idea that this issue was in doubt.
It's nice to have that confirmed, however.
Of course, there is some grey area in any calculation about what exactly constitutes a threat to the existence of the state itself. With nukes, that uncertainty can be the difference between enduring a loss that is not so bad and letting the WMD fly.
