Saturday, May 04, 2013

Preparing for the Battle of Sansha

By purchasing 75-100 stealth F-35s, Australia will be able to take a leading role in shielding our forces projecting power north from bases in northwest Australia:

Australia announced a significant boost to its military air power on Friday, committing to buy up to new 100 Lockheed Martin Corp F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, as it shifts its focus back to the Indo-Pacific as China and India beef up forces.

After more than a decade of having forces first in Iraq, and then Afghanistan, Australia wants to focus on the military challenges closer to home, in line with U.S. President Barack Obama's 2011 "pivot" towards the Asia-Pacific.

This fits with Australia's geographic position between the Indian Ocean and Pacific theaters of our pivot to Asia. Australia should be strong enough to be a secure staging ground for distant American forces to rush to Australia to help defend them; and then move north or west with American forces, depending on the crisis.

Australian aircraft could deploy to Singapore--where there is another local partner with good air power and a valuable geographic position, Vietnam, or the Philippines, and make the South China Sea a death trap for any Chinese fleet that tries to operate there.

American Marines and Australian ground forces moved by American and Australian ships could then handle any ground elements that China puts on the small islands of the South China Sea.

But the Chinese are new to this navy thing. You just don't put your fleet in a city, do you?

UPDATE: Stu F. writes (and I'm glad I noticed the email went to the spam folder before I deleted it) that Australians are having deep doubts that Australian defense plans will be funded. I did mention my concern on that more recently, based on past information on the likelihood of Australia actually building and manning the submarines that Australia says it wants.

Stu notes this analysis which has a broader critique of Australian defense policy than just spending, but it does show that there is a gap between plans and funding prospects:

Prime Minister Gillard and Defence Minister Smith have publicly embraced a strong pro-USA policy at the same time as they have continued to diminish Australia’s military power. This is of such a magnitude, and follows on cumulatively from the Rudd cuts, that it has brought open comment by US officials and commentators. The Labor government’s support for the so-called US “pivot” towards the Pacific, and for talk of a form of temporary basing rights in Australia for US forces, seems aimed primarily at the domestic audience. Prime Minister Gillard seems to be reassuring the Australian public that regardless of what her government might be doing to the ADF, the USA is always there to backstop Australia’s defence. This is a desperate strategy of hope stemming from failed, short-term policies, and portrays Australia as the worst kind of ally.

The USA should be our closest ally as the nation which best shares our values, our geography, our history and many of our interests, but our sovereignty demands that we bring to the table a level of military capability that matches our economic power. In an alliance, Australia should be an effective partner, not a freeloader. The USA has many allies in the world who are freeloaders and it would be a strategic failure for Australia to put itself in that class, yet the Rudd–Gillard governments have put us well on the way to doing exactly that. If Australia had military capability of a credible level, on those occasions when US interests do not match ours, then Australia could make independent policy. That is the basis of sovereignty.

Australia needs to be careful about reducing their military power. We can't deploy our forces to a theater that is not secure enough to receive our forces and allow them to organize for a campaign north of Australia. And when America just had a war with Libya where we "led from behind" our allies, does Australia think they can defend from behind us?

There's no excuse for a prosperous country like Australia to not create a credible defense force. Good grief, Taiwan would pay good money to trade geographic positions with Australia, no?

And if countries closer to China see Australia unwilling to prepare for a real fight with China should things go wrong, they might start peeling away from the array of countries that could turn the South China Sea into a kill sack for the PLA Navy.

Another percentage point of GDP for defense seems like a good investment in that light, doesn't it?