If we wanted to have a debate on intervening in Syria to overthrow the Assad regime and enable regime opponents to take power, I think we could have a debate. Given how shell shocked we are even after winning the war in Iraq, I don't think we could see this through to the end, but we could at least debate the merits.
But I don't think President Obama would ever want to discuss the issue so plainly. After dithering for so long and watching the really bad rebels become the possible alternative to the existing bad guys in the palace, we are thinking of intervening a little bit more:
President Obama is preparing to send lethal weaponry to the Syrian opposition and has taken steps to assert more aggressive U.S. leadership among allies and partners seeking the ouster of President Bashar al-Assad, according to senior administration officials.
Although our "red line" on regime chemical use seems to have morphed into a "red zone" that Assad must clearly pass through before triggering intervention, we will have more time to see if too-little and too-late aid to non-jihadis can change the likely outcomes.
And if they fail obviously, we seem prepared to enter Syria through Jordan. I assume Turkey would handle the northern front. But if we intervene, in order to avoid seeming like President Obama's own war against a Baathist minority dictatorship with WMD capabilities that evolves into a counter-insurgency, we'll pretend we aren't intervening in the civil war in a repeat of our 1990s-era thinking on "peace enforcement:"
Our world is still in flux over six years after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and nearly five years since the breakup of the Soviet Union. The single main threat which the United States Army organized and trained to defeat--the Red Army--is no longer poised to slash its way to the Rhine. The Army seeks to redefine its role just as policy makers seek to send the Army on new missions under the umbrella term Operations Other Than War (OOTW). Yet the public resists OOTW because of the perceived failures of UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and the Somalia intervention. Rapid and overwhelming victory is expected by the public and PKOs are inherently lengthy, ambiguous, and restrained.
"Peace enforcement" has emerged as the type of OOTW that can reconcile the arguable need to refocus the Army from the Fulda Gap to OOTW and the public pressure for decisiveness and brevity. The idea of compelling combatants to halt a war with combat proven United States Army units seems to offer a new mission without compromising the combat edge that the Army has honed. Peace enforcement, however, as a mission distinct from peacekeeping, does not exist. Peace enforcement is simply a PKO with heavy weapons and better marketing. Inasmuch as peace enforcement is nothing more than peacekeeping, training the Army and deploying it for "peace enforcement" operations reduces the combat skills of the Army in ways that make it more difficult to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRCs).
While the debate over the role of the Army in a changing world must be energetically pursued, we must abolish the concept of "peace enforcement." It is a mythical mission that falsely promises that the Army can routinely engage in OOTW without suffering the deleterious effects of training for PKOs. We must not be fooled into thinking that we can simply change the name of PKOs to a tougher-sounding "Peace Enforcement" and avoid the trade offs in readiness to fight that training for OOTW entails.
No, we won't got to "war" in Syria. The excuse will be to secure the chemical weapons and production facilties of the Assad regime. Oh, sure, it would require a heavy air campaign to smash air defenses, ballistic missiles and gas-capable artillery, plus air support for ground troops, but we'll say it is just a counter-proliferation mission that is time- and scope-limited.
The problem is that the jihadis will automatically see us as invaders and enemies to be killed. So we'll have to fight them. And they are more numerous:
The growing power of Islamist fighters in southern Syria is causing alarm in neighboring Jordan, which backs rebels battling President Bashar al-Assad but fears those linked to al Qaeda.
Similar concerns among Syria's other neighbors, including Turkey and Israel, are complicating an already disjointed world response to the bloody turmoil at the heart of the Middle East.
Jordan has allowed limited U.S. military training of rebels on its territory. Some other fighters have crossed from the kingdom into Syria, although others, especially Islamists, have been intercepted and even put on trial.
And while non-jihadi rebels will likely greet us with flowers as we roll in, as it becomes clear that we won't directly help them as we focus on what is important to us rather than what is important to them, resentment on their side will build. We'll eventually fight more and more of them, too.
And if we actually complete the mission of securing WMD, will we then pull our troops out and risk the jihadis winning? Or will be keep our troops in for a new mission? When our left won't support their sainted president even if they mute their criticism, and most of the right is no longer in the mood to back the president in war as they were in Afghanistan (which the president is now leaving before finishing the campaign plan)?
I'd support victory while our troops are in combat and hope we win even if I think it is an error and if I think we are not fighting properly. We got lucky in Libya, I believe, and doubt we could be that lucky again (2012 SEP 11, excepted, of course).
No, better to stay out and cope as best we can from afar rather than start even a good plan that there is no way we can stick to until victory. Heck, the Israelis seem to want us to stay out of the way (now I can't find the article). Maybe we should just follow from behind, eh?
