Wednesday, March 20, 2013

Setting the Standard

This article on the big lesson of the Iraq War is quite possibly the most stupid thing I will read this year.

Rejoice, for the Iraq War was the last conventional war we will ever fight. It was the war to end all wars, it seems, according to the cited article via Real Clear Politics:

The old style of war was discredited in Iraq. Even if it hadn’t been, there’s no one left in the West who can afford to wage it. Another conflict on the scale of Iraq is unthinkable in the current climate. We might bomb Libyan air defences and (possibly) send guns to Syrian good(ish) guys, but major ground operations just aren’t on the table.

Iraq was the last big war the West is likely to ever fight. And, unfortunately for us, the rest of the world knows it.

He says that mechanized forces are obsolete, since the Iraq War proved that mechanized forces aren't suited to fighting insurgencies.

God, give me strength.

This is right after he lauds the ability of our conventional mechanized forces to crush Saddam's army. Pray tell, how were we to get to the insurgency phase without crushing the conventional foe?

And is the author truly so poorly informed about the military that he doesn't understand that different parts of the military have different uses? We have a full spectrum military that must face many threats. Funny enough, counter-insurgency forces aren't very good at hunting and killing submarines. They are also deficient in deterring nuclear attacks, let alone shooting down ballistic missiles.

Just because some parts of our military aren't the primary tool for a particular problem doesn't make them obsolete. After all, remember that armor actually is very useful in counter-insurgencies. Our Abrams were not useless once the major combat operations were over. They just need to be used differently. We even modified our heavy tanks to be more useful in supporting infantry in counter-insurgencies.

It's kind of funny, actually. After the Persian Gulf War of 1991, a number of so-called deep thinkers believed the Abrams was obsolete. Here's something I wrote about that for the tenth anniversary of Desert Storm:

It seems safe to emphasize rapid deployment, abandon heavy forces, and discount mere numbers of troops because of the most unfortunate lesson. We learned we are unbeatable. Braced for thousands of casualties to break an Iraqi army hardened by its long war with Iran in the 1980s, we were stunned by the apparent ease of victory. Although few would admit this if pressed on the point, the very fact that we are seeking a smaller, lighter Army and are willing to thrust it into combat piecemeal upon arrival in the theater is unassailable proof that we do assume victory.

And we assume other countries know this too and so will never challenge the Army on the battlefield. All threats are asymmetric now. This is wishful thinking. Victory in Desert Storm will not give us credit toward the next war. We have to fight each one individually because every future enemy will have chosen to fight despite our last victory. They aren't scared of us. They may respect our power, but they think they can win. We must respect that determination. The proper lesson is that a military equipped and trained for the fiercest foe is ready to win decisively against lesser foes; and that decisive victory can lower casualties if it ends the war quickly.

And then we fought the Iraq War. And ten years after that we have a National Post writer who believes the war means conventional warfare with heavy forces is over.

The Iraq War was not the last big war the West will fight. But if enough Westerners believe it was the conventional land war to end all conventional land wars, unfortunately for us, the rest of the world will attempt to exploit that belief.

Perhaps, if this thinking spreads, the Iraq War will just be the last big war the West will handily win. But that's different.