The U.S. 1st Armored Division lowered its flag this month in a ceremony that signaled the quiet return home of a unit whose tanks first rumbled onto the continent through Italy during World War II.
The Wiesbaden casing of colors ceremony also marked a milestone in the ongoing transformation of the American military. The sending off of the last division deployed in Europe at the height of the Cold War symbolizes the shift in favor of smaller, lighter units that planners say are better poised to meet today's threats.
But the question now being raised is whether the Army's plan to keep some 37,000 soldiers in Europe will survive growing budgetary pressures in Washington. There are increasing concerns in the U.S. Congress that the United States is footing too much of the bill for European defense at a time when some European countries have reduced defense spending.
"An alliance that is so dependent on one ceases to function properly," said Heather Connelly, director of the Europe program for the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "You are probably going to see more questions from Congress about getting that balance right."
U.S. troop strength in Europe peaked in 1962 at nearly 277,000 soldiers and was still at around 213,000 in 1989. Current plans call for reducing troops from about 42,000 today to the 37,000 by 2015.
Europe is still the most valuable real estate in the world outside of America in terms of economic, military (mostly latent these days, admittedly), and technological strength. Germany is straying from the West to secure Russian energy supplies. Russia is asserting itself again and pining for former imperial lands. NATO countries are seeking defense guarantees outside of the NATO structure as NATO is seen as less than reliable. Economic difficulties could break down the pan-European feelings of solidarity and reignite old rivalries that gave the continent a bloody history of wars before the Pax Americana. And Europe remains a valuable power projection point for American intervention in an arc of crisis from Morocco to Afghanistan, and a source of military assistance for such missions (less than we'd like but more than we'd have without them). Even Libya, as much as I worry that we won't win with our current strategy, shows that we can leverage Europe's atrophied military power. Does anybody think European NATO countries could do what they've done without our initial combat missions to suppress Libyan air defenses and our continued support roles?
How is it possible to argue we should abandon NATO and Europe to save paltry sums compared to what we've invested over the last century to keep the continent from being controlled by a hostile power? Do we really value so little what we achieved at such a high cost in blood and treasure that we'd walk away now after we've won and spread democracy through the former Soviet lands we've expanded into, and need only maintain a relatively small force to secure what we've achieved?
I'm not happy with our current plans for the Army in Europe (three combat brigades) and believe we are justified in keeping five brigades and a corps headquarters there to command them. Here's a more recent justification for the Army's presence in Europe.
