[The] nuclear mission has been underfunded and this has resulted in a shrinkage of billets for units and even those shrunken billets remain unfilled in many cases.
There is a shortage of security personnel. There is a shortage of maintenance people. There is a shortage of those who supervise the nuclear establishment and there is -- has been a very noticeable lack of nuclear expertise.
Over the years, the -- what has been the long-time practice during the Cold War and subsequent years of developing the theory and doctrine of deterrence has more or less disappeared not only from the Air Force schools, more generally from military schools, if -- the doctrine of deterrence has, to a large extent, been forgotten.
And we are dealing with a political condition -- as most of you know, the efficacy of the nuclear deterrent lies in the eyes of the beholder, and that influences both the -- those who are -- we are seeking to deter and more importantly, in a way, those whom we seek to protect.
Finally, with regard to our recommendations, we have a fair number of substantial recommendations for change in the Air Force. In particular, we have -- we recommend that the elements of the nuclear mission be brought together under a major command and that as a consequence that command will be able to interface with U.S. STRATCOM. We suggest that the Air Force Space Command be re-designated as Air Force STRAT and that it be held accountable for the efficacy of the nuclear mission.
Actually, this is hardly a response to Russia although the seriousness of the situation is highlighted by nuclear-armed Russia's recent mid-life crisis.
Let us hope that this new focus keeps nuclear war at bay. I'd rather have a world without nuclear weapons, given our conventional superiority. But if nukes are about, I'd rather we be able to deter as many people as possible from thinking they can take a shot at us and live to tell the tale.
