The United States and the government of Iraq are at war with a cluster of enemies: Al Qaeda in Iraq, affiliated Islamist groups, and determined Sunni insurgents who wish to overthrow the elected government. In addition, they face a number of "spoilers" who have played an extremely negative role so far and could derail progress if not properly managed: Shiite militias, criminal gangs, Iranian agents, and negative political forces within the Iraqi government. The distinction between enemies and spoilers is important. Enemies must be defeated; in the case of al Qaeda and other Islamists, that almost invariably means capturing or killing them. Spoilers must be managed. It is neither possible nor desirable to kill or capture all the members of the Mahdi Army or the Badr Corps. Dealing with those groups requires a combination of force and politics. Bad leaders and the facilitators of atrocities must be eliminated, but reducing popular support for these groups' extremism, coopting moderates within their ranks, and drawing some of their fighters off into more regular employment are political tasks. American and Iraqi leaders have been using both force and politics to manage these challenges.
The complicated nature of the Shia foes is important to appreciate, as I have tried to convey. Not all of of the Shia militias are Sadr's boys in the sense of being death squad killers. Indeed, I imagine most simply want to protect their neighborhoods. Fewer still are paid lackeys of the Iranian mullahs.
So defeating the Sadrists involves targeting the killer leaders, arresting and killing the killers, and peeling away the decent folks who only want to be left in peace and bring them into the tent. And doing all these things without alienating the Shias.
I should think that my calls for Local Defense Forces for the Shias would make sense given the success of Provisional Security Forces in Anbar (noted in this post).
