India’s tanks do not have enough shells to fire, its air defenses are obsolete and its ill-equipped infantry can’t fight at night, the country’s army chief told the prime minister in a letter this month, an Indian newpaper [sic] reported Wednesday.
Each country has potential economic problems in building up capable militaries.
So the army has an interest in making its case that it needs scarce money at the expense of the navy and air force. On the stated problems, most countries have shortages of ammunition; our Army's air defenses are inadequate (because we count on the Air Force to do the job), and night-fighting is something we have excelled at because of training and equipment, but with training alone you can do a lot as the Japanese showed in World War II without a single night vision device more advanced than the Mark I Eyeball. Consider, too, that I think ground power is the least of India's problems given India's geography.
I looked at the US-China balance a while back and concluded China is in no position to supplant us as a global power. What about the India-China balance?
These Strategypage tables for South Asia and East Asia will be the basis here, as well. I don't think this chart has been updated in years, but I don't believe the overall balance has changed that much. Under normal circumstances it takes a long time to evolve up or down.
Let's start with India's ground combat power value. Strategypage calls it 2,290 points (including air power that can be applied to ground combat). India has to face a number of foes with that power. To their west is Pakistan. Once India's primary opponent, Pakistan is growing relatively weaker over time despite having nuclear weapons. So India needs less of their power to face Pakistan. Also, Pakistan's nukes mean that Indian objectives have to be limited lest they lead Pakistan to go nuclear to avoid losing big. The reverse holds true, of course. Pakistan can hardly expect to win big against India even if India's conventional military was on par with Pakistan's. Still, India should devote an equal amount of combat power (despite the fact that Pakistan can't focus all their power on India). Since Pakistan has 699 ground points, subtract that amount from India's total, leaving 1,591 ground points.
Burma (Myanmar) requires 202 points just to hold the line. In the past, I've thought that India could most easily use their land power to invade Burma and deny China an ally on the Bay of Bengal. But if our diplomacy can really help flip Burma, that need goes away. So as a compromise I assume India just needs to match Burmese total land power. So India is down to 1,389 ground points.
Bengladesh requires 92. Nepal requires 61. The latter aren't likely to be threats but need to be screened and that takes power. But call it half of each for the latter two, subtracting 79 from India and leaving 1,310 ground points.
Sri Lanka has 196 points but they are an island and unless India feels the need to invade Sri Lanka, this is a naval and air problem so say India needs only 10% to screen Sri Lanka. India is down to 1,290 points. Subtract a round 290 points for a strategic reserve and India has less than half of their ground power (1,000) to face China unless they want to strip power from other areas and take risks on those fronts. India might have to since China is the main problem. India's army would rather build up their ground power at the expense of the navy and air force, of course, but don't forget that without friendly air power, ground power is hammered by enemy air power. Ask any of our enemies over the last 70 years about what that is like.
But for the sake of argument, say India has 1,000 points of ground power to face China. China has 2,757 ground points. Ouch. Apparently.
But China has to face potential enemies, too. For this I'll assume that China needs 10% of their power to screen Russia. So China is down to 2,481.
Japan is mostly a sea and naval power, but since I did this for Sri Lanka, assume that China screens Japan with 10% of Japan's ground power. So subtract 52 leaving China with 2,429.
China has South Korea to consider. North Korea adds 688 to China's pool (I think this overstate North Korea's rotting army but I'll leave it as is) but South Korea has 920 ground points. Just to match South Korea, China needs to allocate 232 points to that theater. So China is down to 2,197.
Vietnam, which savaged a Chinese invasion in 1979 and rejected the lesson China wanted to teach, has 327 points. To be safe, even though Vietnam isn't as tough as their battle-hardened army was back then, I'd want double on the Vietnam border. So subtract 654 points from China. That leaves 1,543.
Taiwan has 449 ground points. If it is to be war with India, China isn't going to worry about attacking Taiwan, too. Yet without at least a somewhat credible threat of invading Taiwan, that frees up American and Japanese power too much. So let's say leave 400 ground points opposite Taiwan. Now China has 1,143 ground points to point at India.
And for South China Sea contingencies, I'll assume a nominal 100 points. So now China has 1,043 points to face India. I'll assume that China's larger physical size means they won't feel the need to have a strategic reserve from their active forces.
Let's see, who else is out there? Oh yeah, America. Despite our pivot to Asia, the pivot is mostly a naval and air effort. I'll assume that America's 10,000 ground points in the short run will only allow for 30% being directed to the Pacific. So that is 3,000 points. But perhaps half of that will be earmarked for defending South Korea. Remember, a forward defense to protect Seoul requires more ground power than a defense that can afford to trade space for time.
Figure we allocate 500 for South China Sea contingencies. And another 500 for defensive purposes on Guam or other locations to be on the safe side.
Mind you, if the fight drags on, assume we could put in another 2,000 ground points without risking our abilities to hold on the ground against threats anywhere else. But in the short run, we could have 500 points of ground power to toss into the fight in support of India. That support could take the form of sending troops into India for direct help or being directed at locations ranging from Taiwan to Hainan Island to the South China Sea to Vietnam, to Burma, which could force China to divert resources away from India to face a potential American amphibious threat. So subtract 300 from China's available power to be able to react to that threat. China is down to 743 points.
And I never did have the Chinese react to our South Korea commitment. China can't be everywhere and I have to believe they don't think we'd start something on the Korean peninsula in response to a Chinese attack on India. So they'll take a risk there in the face of American reinforcements placed on alert to go to South Korea and hope that their psycho-puppy's possible nutso reaction stays our hand.
Hey, with Australia working on an expeditionary army, some of Australia's 172 ground points could be committed to opposing China in the South China Sea region, most likely alongside our forces. Or they could go to India. Don't forget that Australia has recently sent troops to fight in both Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as in Vietnam when we fought there. So give China 50-70 more points to worry about. Not a lot but it adds up.
So India has, in this admittedly simplistic exercise, 1,000 ground combat points to face 743 Chines points along the common border. But don't get cocky, India. If China is the aggressor, they can pick the spot to attack and gain local ground superiority. India then has the task of either defeating that local attack or, if defeated in China's quick land grab, launching an attack into Chinese territory to have a bargaining chip before the threat of nuclear escalation compels India and China to end the fighting with the troops in place with whatever they hold, to wait for the diplomats to sort it all out. In theory, this also applies to Indian aggression to take Chinese territory.
What India doesn't have to worry about is being conquered by China. India has the best walls nature could provide to prevent that.
Anyway, this is the situation India faces. They face a Chinese ground force that in theory should be about equal overall on the border but which could generate local superiority to make a quick land grab before pressing for a ceasefire and avoiding nuclear escalation. Much will depend on the transportation network on both sides of the border to mass forces faster than the other side. It's a Kargil War scenario but without the luxury of spending the time to counter-attack. In Kargil, India at least had overall superiority over Pakistan, making Pakistani escalation unlikely as long as it was a localized war.
This is where Cold Start doctrine comes in. If it is a theory for destroying Pakistan's military, it is a recipe for nuclear war. But if it is used to quickly fight local wars and settle them before nuclear escalation raises its ugly head, India has something:
It is a doctrine designed to cope with the constraints against achieving victory that we faced during the long Cold War. It is designed to allow India to quickly gain a military advantage in a limited conflict before pressure to end the war out of fear of nuclear escalation kicks in.
Think Kargil in 1999. Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability kept India from escalating a localized battle into general war. And India was not, I think, happy with the situation that kept them battling on a narrow front without applying their full superior military capabilities. India in essence had to fight a Pakistani regiment that invaded Indian-claimed territory on terrain of Pakistan's choosing.
I'm not so sure now that this what the doctrine was designed for, but it can and should be used that way. India doesn't so much need their entire army modernized as they need the portion facing China to be capable (in training, equipment, logistics, and deployment) of resisting a Chinese land grab by holding what they have or being able to quickly counter-attack to restore the border or grab Chinese land that can be traded for what is lost. Note that waiting this long is nowhere near that standard.
And in a short war, gaining air superiority rapidly will be even more important to provide direct support, recon, and to isolate the battlefield by attacking enemy lines of communication and defending your own. Despite India's problems with their ground forces, India's air force needs to be the priority for spending. And India might be blowing that important decision. I'm biased but I think France is the wrong supplier given diplomatic considerations.
Further, India can take some comfort from the fact that if China does not lose ground to India economically, as long as fighting is in short bites, China won't be able to mobilize their superior economic capabilities to project power across the Himalaya Mountains. Nukes limit wars. Well, we think they do. But to be fair no two nuclear powers have gone at it, so who knows for sure?
In the broader picture, given that India's balance with China requires China to be tied down on many fronts, India should do all they can to make sure they support our efforts to knit together the widely separated opponents of Chinese expansion, in addition to their own efforts to pull Southeast Asia in their direction.
India surely as defense problems. Inferior air power is problem one. But I think I'd rather have India's problems than China's.
NOTE: I fixed an early typo in the numbers that threw off the math a tiny bit. The bottom line didn't change.
