Changing Course

Assad relies on the loyalty of his security forces to fight the increasingly violent opposition. He has some loyal troops and the secret police to do his dirty work, even though a large chunk of the army isn't loyal enough to be trusted in the field to shoot demonstrators. If the violent opposition expands, at some point he may have to risk putting less reliable troops in the field.

That risks allowing them out of the barracks where they can defect with their weapons. And worse for Assad, if the risk of defections has increased enough for even secret police to defect, what does that say about the Sunni Arab conscripts that might be asked to defend the Alawite regime?

At least a dozen Syrian secret police have defected from an intelligence compound in a restive province near Turkey, the first major defection reported within the security apparatus leading the crackdown on protesters, activists said on Sunday.

A gunfight broke out overnight after the defectors fled the Airforce Intelligence complex in the centre of Idlib city, 280 kms (175 miles) northwest of Damascus, and ten people on both sides were killed or wounded, they said.

If these guys can lose faith, who isn't at risk?

Does Assad stay the course and hope that the resistance breaks before his own security forces do? Or does he try something different?

UPDATE: Strategypage writes that Assad will hope the protesters break before his forces do:

The Assads are apparently willing to try and outwait the rebels. There are no indications the Assads are seeking sanctuary anywhere. Exile options are limited, with Iran being the most likely sanctuary. This religious dictatorship would not appeal to the secular (to Iranian eyes) Assad clan. So a fight to the death is shaping up, and it could get very nasty.

But his side is eroding faster now:

In northern Syria, a dozen members of air force intelligence defected to the rebels. This is unusual, as the military intelligence personnel are normally the most loyal to the Assads. The several thousand men who have deserted from the military so far have mostly been Sunni Arabs, who are over 75 percent of the population. Yet the minorities (Alawites, Druze, Christians) do not want to be on the wrong side of a civil war, and not every minority family prospered under the Assads.

Assad's allies are getting nervous that they are on the wrong side. And the (mostly Sunni) Arab League is not happy that Syria has sided with Persian (and Shia) Iran. It's an autocrat protection association, true. But when a member attacks other Arabs (Khaddafi) or sides with Persians (Assad), exceptions can be made.

I don't think Assad can afford to let the situation develop and hope for the best. Middle Eastern "politics" is for keeps, way too often. Losing could mean death. (Which is why establishing rule of law in Iraq is so important to letting election losers know that they can safely hand over power and try again within the electoral process.)I think Assad tries something different to change the game he is slowly losing. What that would be, I don't know. War with Israel or a Hezbollah Coup in Lebanon? Risk really massive killing sprees in a short time to squelch resistance before his army breaks and before Turkey can intervene? Does Iran seek a distraction in Iraq or Afghanistan or the Persian Gulf to aid their Syrian ally? Could Assad's chemical weapons arsenal figure in to this? As Strategypage writes, it could get "very nasty."