Many Department of Defense and CENTCOM analysts are putting the chances of an Iraqi "civil war" at 60-70 percent. However, this civil war would be more like Bosnia in the early 1990s. That is, the majority of Iraqis (Kurds and Shia Arabs) trying to kill or drive out the minority (Sunni Arabs). The Sunni Arabs are well aware of this, and more of them are openly lining up with the government.
And if you define civil war this broadly, Iraq has been in "civil war" for virtually all of Saddam's rule (and you might go back several centuries while you are at it) with either the Shia or Kurd being targeted (or both) by the Sunnis. Indeed, under this definition, our invasion in 2003 didn't stop the civil war, it just changed who has the ministries and heavy weapons and hence gets to be called the government of Iraq.
So I can't take seriously the idea of worrying excessively about a "civil war." In one sense, it is here and always has been. In the other classic North-South sense, it just isn't going to happen.
But still, the question of what we would order our troops to do in case of open civil strife is important.
First of all, let me go back to objectives in Iraq from an old post in November 2004:
Look, we are not guaranteed of getting a real democracy in Iraq. I hope the Iraqis are up to building rule of law and democracy. They need to do this and all we can do is help. They sure as heck deserve freedom after all they’ve endured. But maybe we’ll just get a decent authoritarian government in Baghdad. Maybe, like Taiwan or South Korea did, Iraq will then evolve into a real democracy in time. Anything in the continuum of democracy to not-brutal authoritarian government will be an improvement over what we’ve seen.Even if we fail to birth democracy quickly, we can get it eventually if we keep trying. And simply stopping a minority from oppressing the majority and putting the majority in charge is progress of a sort, even if the majority exacts revenge for past mass murders. Not that I think that we will have to settle for less than the establishment of a democracy, but my point is that even if we reach for that and fail, a lesser result does not mean failure overall for the war.
Given what the old ways gave us, an effort to change the rules seems in order. I want to try for democracy in Iraq. But I’ll settle for 1970s-era South Korea.
So in this light, what should our military do if civil strife breaks out inside Iraq in earnest?
Going back to an early article of mine, we should not try to fight all sides to stop the war. This looks eerily like "peace enforcement" as defined in the early nineties. We intervened on the side of the Shias and Kurds by deposing Saddam and should not defend the Sunnis who have moved way too slowly to abandon hopes of a Baathist restoration and join the government. The Shias and Kurds do have reason to be impatient for some signs of goodwill after all the Shias and Kurds have endured as victims and as the government.
On the other hand, we can't support the Shias if their goal is to slaughter Sunnis and push them out of Iraq. We just can't. Even though impulses for revenge might be understandable given what the Shias and Kurds endured, it would be wrong to support punishment outside of trials under a proper legal system.
So, we must not side with the Sunnis; must not support Shia atrocities (the Kurds too, I suppose in theory, but they are more likely to take advantage of open civil strife to just pull out of Iraq than to join in the revenge campaign); must protect our troops and lines of communication and supply to Kuwait and Jordan; and must deter the Iranians or even the Syrians from invading.
In this light, we'd have to do several things:
--So we pull most of our units into brigade formations set for conventional operations centered around our major land bases and air bases. This is for se;f protection, to get out of the way of Iraqis fighting each other, and to have forces ready to fight Iranian conventional forces coming across the border.
--We identify Iraqi army and security units that are not going factional and continue to supply them. Anybody else that goes Shia or Kurd and joins in a real civil strife campaign is cut off from food and ammunition. This will slow down the fighting.
--We protect key bridges and choke points and do not allow any factional forces through. This is another method to passively hinder the fighting.
--We heavily patrol the major highways to Kuwait and Jordan. This keeps our supply routes open and preserves freedom of movement and also tends to keep the ethnic units from moving freely.
--We surge air power to the region to protect our forces and warn off potential invaders.
--And we work to convince the Iraqi government to control their factions in order to minimize the chance that continued fighting will cause still-loyal units to break. Loyal units will need to be sent carefully to protect key positions that keep factions apart without forcing these units to attack other forces that have devolved into militias, when the loyalty of the army units to the nation (as opposed to their tribe or religion) may be fragile.
And then we ride it out and then drive on after the fighting dies down, trying to bend the situation back to our favor. Full democracy might have to become a more distant goal as we support the majority in their efforts to end the terror and Sunni insurgency in the wake of a major ethnic/religious bloodletting. But partial victory is better than defeat. And partial victory allows for the chance that full victory comes later.
Wars have setbacks. This would be a major one, no doubt. But it would not necessarily be fatal if we keep our heads and don't panic. And for the record, I think the situation is not nearly as dire as the conventional wisdom states. I think we have a good shot at turning over security duties to Iraqis and creating a real if fragile democracy.
The job won't be over by far, but another crisis will be over.
