Thursday, December 16, 2021

There is No Free Cyber Lunch

Cyber operations will be part of war but they will not replace kinetics in war. And cyber attacks could provoke a kinetic war.


Sure, the cyber domain is now a part of war:

But cyber operations are unlikely to be decisive on their own. For years, airpower enthusiasts were predicting that strategic bombing would replace the need for traditional ground operations. We’re still waiting. Airpower alone has never won a war (as distinct from contributing to victory). Events are normally decided on the ground. In the same way, future wars are unlikely to be decided in cyberspace alone.

The real danger of cyberwarfare is not that it will replace kinetic operations, but that it will incite them. The line between war and peace is reasonably clear when dealing with tanks, warships and aircraft, but it is grey when dealing with malware and online bots. If countries feel safer engaging in conflict behind the veil of anonymity provided by the internet, the risk of a catastrophic miscalculation increases.

I reject the idea that cyber will replace kinetics in close air support. Cyber domain operations are one more part of joint operations and not a replacement for any or all of the other domains of war. 

One day, like air power is a powerful factor in fighting for the sea or land, cyber power will be a powerful factor in fighting for the air, sea, and land. But it is too new for that level of influence.

The Israelis certainly demonstrated how kinetics can trump cyber warriors:

Israel’s response marks the first time that a country has used immediate military force to destroy a foe’s cyber capability in an active conflict.  

As I noted in that post about enemy hackers:

If you know where they are, just kill them. Dead cyber operators can't hack. Israel realizes this. Do we?

This is a reality I've frequently highlighted.

So while cyber can have an effect, my old advice remains valid--when you Twitter a king, kill him:

In the past I've noted that we can't get so caught up in the mystique of cyber-warfare that we forget that a JDAM dropped on an office building filled with enemy hackers is probably a more straightforward way of dealing with their offensive efforts than equivalent hacking back at them.

And don't think cyber attacks on the supply chain will avoid retaliation even if they seem like the perfect attack method (via Instapundit). If a country hurt by a severe cyber attack thinks their cyber operations to respond to enemy cyber operations are weak or judged ineffective in effects achieved, the cyber target will use kinetic means to retaliate.

And then the kinetics start exploding. Which we'll need luck to live through.