Is Russia preparing to turn against China?
This analysis of Russia's new National Security Strategy (NSS) is interesting through the lens of my view of Russia's policy of appeasement toward China. Let me pull out parts of that article and then apply my view of the basis of Russia's relationship with China and NATO:
Detailed provisions on Russia’s relations with the United States and the European Union have entirely disappeared in the 2021 version (unlike the previous NSS, which even contained a clause on a possible cooperation with NATO).
Against this background, Moscow’s relations with the two major Asian powers – China and India – are viewed more from pragmatic positions and designated as one of Russia’s foreign policy priorities. At the same time, the drafters of the NSS do not explicitly mention either China or India when talking about Russia’s struggle with the West for moral leadership and competition for the creation of an attractive ideological basis for the future world order. Thus, the RIC (Russia-India-China) triangle is seen in the Kremlin through a regional rather than a global lens.
There are other tidbits. Like this:
Relations with India and China are combined in just one paragraph in the 2021 NSS, while in the 2009 and 2015 versions they were treated separately, with China preceding India. This suggests that balancing relations with China is becoming increasingly important for the Russian political elite.
The attempt to avoid overdependence on Beijing dictates the way relations with China are characterized in the strategy. While describing the China-Russia strategic partnership, there is no mention of a “new era” (this term from Xi Jinping’s diplospeak has been used in bilateral documents since 2019). Cooperation with China is no longer seen as a “key factor in maintaining global and regional stability” – at least, this is not emphasized publicly.
And:
Russia consistently emphasizes that it is not a party to the territorial disputes in the South China Sea and does not intend to become involved in them. The same can be applied to a potential military conflict around Taiwan, which is apparently outside Russian strategic interests, since Moscow, as in the South China Sea case, is neither an actual nor a potential stakeholder.
And finally:
In the subheading of the NSS section outlining foreign policy objectives, the former formula “equal strategic partnership” is replaced by “mutually beneficial international cooperation.” This can be regarded as a downplaying of the strategic content of the network of partnerships. But Russian strategists probably had another point in mind: That the stability of strategic partnerships in today’s fluid world is no longer an axiom, but is to be proven through individual and carefully calculated transactions.
I have long viewed Russian policy toward China as one of appeasing a much stronger China in the Far East in order to protect Russia's Far East from Chinese absorption while Russia recovers from the collapse of the USSR. Large and important parts of the Russian Far East were taken by Russia from China in the 19th century, recall.
Russia's appeasement of China has been obscured by Russia's pointless hostility toward NATO. Although the ability to deny that appeasement has been shaken by the pandemic China unleashed on the world. Further, Russia has extended their 20-year policy of appeasing China for only five more years.
With that framing in mind, Russia's new NSS no longer has details on relations with America and the EU. Those states are largely included in NATO, of course. Is the lack of detail in order to give Putin flexibility to ratchet down the rhetoric and hostility directed at the West?
And does the increased emphasis on India and China as separate areas of interest telegraph a pivot to Asia where friendship with India--now closer to America--is to be restored to past levels? Possibly with an eye on containing China? After all, the emphasis on the relationship with China is no longer in the new NSS. If Russia is going to stop appeasing China by 2026, the ability to change propaganda to Russia's own people to prepare the ground for that shift is established.
Note, too, that Russia is clear that its current relationship with China does not include going to war at China's side over Taiwan or the South China Sea.
Finally, Russia is looking more at transactional policies. So if China is no longer a benefit to Russia, Russia could downgrade that status. While if America and Europe cut deals with Russia that provide benefits to Russia, that option is open, too.
To me, this seems like Russia is keeping its options open to repair relations with America and NATO. Which helps Russia get ready to face off against a potentially hostile China that sees a lot of former Chinese territory in Russia's Far East.
NOTE: I fixed what I hope was an obvious error in the first sentence. Although perhaps I was subconsciously channeling this view.
