Franks preferred that the 101st Airborne Division take [Saddam International Airport], a dramatic move that would immediately put forces in Baghdad. Based on his experiences in Afghanistan, where special operations forces and air power had defeated the irregular Taliban forces, he believed the operators and other units with A–10 close air support could dispose of the Iraqi paramilitary forces in the southern cities. What Franks failed to account for, McKiernan pointed out, was that the special operations forces in Afghanistan had worked with organized resistance groups who were familiar with the terrain and could provide pinpoint targets and assessments, but there were no such linkages between coalition special operations and Iraqi resistance groups. McKiernan’s argument carried the debate. [emphasis added]
McKiernan was right. And the local allies could provide local security to the special forces teams, a significant factor alone.
This point fits very well with my frustration in the whole "counter-terrorist" versus "counter-insurgency" debate that was voiced during the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns.
The idea that you could separate the two is ludicrous. Effective counter-terrorism requires the pinpoint information that a large network of non-special forces can provide--in the initial Afghanistan campaign to overthrow the Taliban regime it was local allies; in Afghanistan and Iraq when our allies ran the government you needed the friendly troops (American, coalition, and Iraqi) to provide the information needed for the counter-terror special forces missions to go after the enemy insurgents and terrorists.
Otherwise "counter-terrorism" is just a euphemism for using air power (planes and missiles) directed by aerial recon against targets in a sanctuary.
