Wednesday, September 23, 2009

A War of Choice?

When did Afghanistan become a war of choice?

Wasn't Iraq the "war of choice" according to the anti-Iraq War side, while Afghanistan was the war we had to fight and win because al Qaeda launched 9/11 from bases there?

But times change. Iraq is won and the Left feels the itch to oppose the only war they've got to oppose.

So now we seek alternatives to defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Choices like this:

One alternative would emphasize hunting down Al-Qaeda leaders with unmanned aircraft and special forces, instead of building up troops in a village-by-village effort to shore up the Kabul government.


We'll really drop special forces into the middle of hostile territory with no friendlies nearby for backup?

Ahem. Just where will we base the drones? Plus, won't collateral damage to civilians lead to a lot of horrible stories as currently come out of Pakistan? And how did that striking from afar work in Iraq in the 1990s when we enforced no-fly zones over Iraq? That did seem to anger the global Left and Moslems.

But we have more choices! Like:

Another alternative, championed by influential Senator Carl Levin, calls for for concentrating on training and equipping Afghan security forces instead sending a large number of additional troops.


In theory this could work if we are prepared to fight at current casualty levels for many years to come to buy time for the current government to get strong enough. But I fear that this option would quickly become training Afghans as we set up a withdrawal schedule for our troops. If we are seen as running, few Afghans will side with us to defeat the Taliban.

Prior to the surge this was our strategy for Iraq. And while I think this could have worked in Iraq, it would have meant perhaps years of 2006-2007-level civilian casualties before the government of Iraq built up enough experienced troops to defeat the enemies. I wonder if we could have supported the Iraqi government that long with the Congress we elected in 2006.

McChrystal thinks we need more US troops to knock back the Taliban in order to buy the time to build up Afghan security forces. Given the current Congress, I think McChrystal has a better read on our Congress than those who think we'll support the Afghan government at current levels for years on end.

There's another choice:

A more radical alternative would call for withdrawing US troops altogether and treating the country like other "failed" states, retaining the option to carry out strikes against Al-Qaeda figures similar to a recent special forces operation in Somalia.


Huh. So we basically declare all of Afghanistan (and we'd have to add frontier Pakistan) a free-fire zone? Do I even have to argue against this on moral and practical grounds?

Thankfully we have more choices:

Some analysts have urged the administration to drop the idea of propping up the central government and instead cut deals with regional warlords to prevent a Taliban takeover.


There is some merit to this idea. But I'm not sure we can buy the right people enough of the time to keep Afghanistan out of the enemy column. It has a point by showing us that we don't have to prop up a weak and corrupt central government as our only means of stabilizing "Afghanistan."

Remember, we need to stabilize the territory known as Afghanistan and not the nominal national government of Afghanistan. We can shore up local warlords and provincial leaders (who should be directly elected and not appointed by Kabul). But we are more likely to get acceptable bought locals if we defeat the hard core Taliban.

And if we start to head for the exits, how long will our skittish NATO allies keep their troops in Afghanistan?

Mostly I want to know when Afghanistan became a war of choice. We've been told for years by the anti-Iraq War side--falsely--that we were distracted by Iraq from fighting the true necessary war in Afghanistan. But now that Afghanistan is the only war we have, suddenly it's let a thousand choices bloom:

Dropping the current strategy in Afghanistan would represent a dramatic break with military commanders and the administration's own policy, which Obama presented shortly after he came into office in February.


The administration is seeking ways to avoid the hard truth that we need to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. That should involve working with local provincial leaders and even warlords, but it doesn't mean we can avoid the dirty work of beating the Taliban to keep Afghanistan from becoming a haven for al Qaeda or a source of instability for nuclear-armed Pakistan.

The only choice involved is choosing to win or choosing to lose. What will it be, Mr. President?