Winning a War

The slow process of winning a counter-insurgency is bearing fruit in Anbar even as domestic opponents of the war ramp up their efforts to force us to retreat from Iraq.

About six months ago, I noted the agreement of Anbar tribes to work with us and fight the jihadis. This was a big break in the effort I've described in the past of protecting those who are pro-government, moving neutrals to friendly status, and moving enemies to neutral or friendly status.

An effective military campaign would help this shift--not kill off an enemy that can regenerate after losses just as we lose troops yet maintain our strength in Iraq. Military forces are a shield for efforts that deprive the enemy of the ability to reconstitute forces. That fall agreement was an example of this kind of non-military effort enabled by our military efforts.

Today, we can see how the impact of this non-military success is moving us toward victory:

By the fall of 2006 AQI had become the oppressor, careless in its destructive swath, while the American and Iraqi forces persisted with their mix of force of arms and civil engagement. When an AQI suicide car bomb attacked an Anbar market in November, killing a Marine and nine civilians, the Marine battalion commander and his Iraqi counterpart offered medical care at the local clinic for the entire town, including the first gynecological examinations many local women had seen. This was not an isolated event, and the people noticed.

With a war-weary population buoying them, 25 of the 31 Anbar sub-tribes have pledged to fight the insurgents over the past five months, sending thousands of tribesmen into the police and army. Led by Sheik Abu Sittar, who has called this an "awakening," the tribes believed they were joining the winners. ...

The real value of the tribes lies in providing specific information and recruits for the police and army. The tribes openly acknowledge that it has been the personal behavior, strength of arms and persistence of the American forces that convinced them to join the fight. "The American coalition is the only thing," Sheik Abureeshah of Ramadi said, "that makes the Iraqi government give anything to Anbar."

Six months ago, I was not discouraged that we hadn't militarily crushed the enemy in Anbar. Absent a campaign of genocide, military force alone wasn't going to do the job.

But what our forces in Anbar did do is buy time to move the people of Anbar province down that enemy-neutral-friend continuum that will dry up the enemy's ability to replace losses. Our forces fought well and honorably in a battlefield stalemate while the jihadi enemy terrorized the local population enough for them to finally abandon thoughts of Sunni Arab solidarity and side with our forces instead. That's where the real battle was won. And note that we couldn't have gotten the tribes to switch sides if we had tried to terrorize the people of Anbar in a misguided effort to be "tough."

This has started a virtuous cycle of having a better troop-to-enemy ratio, which helps provide more security in more areas, which makes people secure enough to provide more tips and recruits for our side among the local people, which helps us kill more of the enemy who have fewer and fewer replacements behind them.

We are winning this war.