Friday, May 23, 2008

If You Strike a King, Kill Him

In regard to Iran (and other matters) I've argued that only ineffective military action against Iran would bolster the Iranian regime (see here and here). Really smash them up and that will surely undermine their hold on power.

Remember, bin Laden and Saddam welcomed American military action on the assumption that our military response would be ineffective. Bin Laden probably considers himself lucky to be living in caves compared to Saddam swinging by the neck until dead.

Apparently, some Iranian dissidents would welcome effective military intervention:

Emissaries from inside Iran have been meeting with Iranian exiles in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere in recent weeks to deliver this provocative message, which they claim comes from pro-U.S. dissidents at the upper-most levels of the regime.

“U.S. airstrikes must be powerful and sustained enough to break the myth of the regime’s absolute power and reveal the weakness of the leadership,” a former official who traveled outside of Iran recently said.

The United States should target the office of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as well as the headquarters of the Revolutionary Guards Corp, the offices of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and that of his predecessor and rival, Mullah Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Iranian sources say.

The goal should be to carry out sustained airstrikes over a 48-72 hour period that would “decapitate” the regime.

Such a strike would send a clear message to the Iranian people and to disgruntled officials throughout Iran’s faction-ridden government that the United States is serious about confronting the regime over its bad behavior in Iraq and is willing to strike the leaders responsible for that behavior, the Iranian sources argue.


I think the attack would need to last much longer and not be a shock and awe attempt at leadership decapitation. I've long since discarded the idea that even a four-day assault like Operation Desert Fox would be sufficient.

I don't discount that at some level of our effort (whether too little or too much force), sufficient Iranians might rally to the mullahs under attack to bolster the regime. But it is hardly a given as war opponents like to make out. Regime opponents might welcome an effective American attack on the regime.

And though my mind keeps telling me that we are not going to deal with Iran this year and instead attempt to cope with Iran and hope for the best, I keep remembering that President Bush doesn't like small ball.