PLA expeditionary forces include three airborne divisions, two amphibious infantry divisions, two marine brigades, about seven special operations groups, and one regimental-size reconnaissance element in the Second Artillery. The capabilities of these units are steadily improving with the introduction of new equipment, improved unit-level tactics, and greater coordination of joint operations.
More transport aircraft and amphibious warfare ships, too.
The specialized amphibious warfare ships are too few for an invasion, but not the whole picture:
The PLA has increased amphibious ship production to address its lift deficiencies; however, the Intelligence Community believes these increases alone will be inadequate to meet requirements. The PLA is also organizing its civilian merchant fleet and militia, which, given adequate notification, could augment organic lift in amphibious operations. Transport increases were accompanied by an increase of 25,000 troops, 200 tanks and 2,300 artillery pieces in the military regions opposite Taiwan, according to the latest fi gures from DIA. The increased troops and equipment in these military regions all appear capable of participating in expeditionary operations.
And of course, there was a major exercise to practice capturing Taiwan (as I noted here and here):
In August 2005, China and Russia held a combined forces exercise, “PEACE MISSION 2005.” The scenario was a UN-sanctioned intervention to separate combatants and restore order following ethnic disagreements in an imaginary country. Participants conducted off-shore blockades, paradrops, airfi eld seizures, and amphibious landings – all components of a Taiwan invasion plan.
At some point in the past, China had no chance of invading Taiwan successfully. Given current trends, at some point in the future China will have the ability to invade and win.
The question is when this point is reached. Could it be the summer of 2008?
