The signs of a build-up to a tipping point in Iraq where the enemy will collapse seem to be accumulating.
Consider these developments:
--Sunni tribes are increasingly fighting al Qaeda.
--Al Qaeda is increasing its attention to Afghanistan and Jordan at the expense of Iraq. (Strategypage). Remember that al Qaeda doesn't care about Iraq. They just want to kill Americans to defeat us somewhere. Much like the reason Al Capone (UPDATE: My friend Andy tells me this would be Willy Sutton. Oops.) gave for robbing banks (because that's where the money is), that is why al Qaeda fights us in Iraq--that's where the Americans are. No deep strategy to suck us in. Just opportunity. And as they lose in Iraq, they'd rather go elsewhere to inflict a defeat on us--to Jordan which is an ally and where Zarqawi calls home or Afghanistan where they miss their caves.
--US casualties are down tremendously in February after a decent drop in the last several months. (Strategypage)
--There is more talk of militias as a problem (when the enemy is not the main problem but forces that formerly were considered a short-term defense against the enemy, you know you are winning).
--There is more talk of fighting corruption. (again, when corruption and not the enemy becomes a focus, you know you are winning)
--Much of the talk of a "civil war" in Iraq really reflects the idea that with their growing strength, the Shias are getting restless that the Sunnis are not joining the government fast enough, and may unleash their new power on the Sunnis to snuff out the Sunni resistance.
At some point, these developments will likely lead to a sudden evaporation of most of the insurgency. But part of this collapse has to be a failure of the enemy to fight us as we would expect them (not the particular tactics, simply fighting at all). This will show that the enemy has lost hope. Then, we'll need to finally strike to roll them up for good while they are reeling.
Jihadis and, some deadender Baathists will linger on perhaps for many years, but the non-crime violence will drastically fall. The question is, of course, when this might happen. I'm giving up trying to predict that timeframe; though I think it will happen. But the enemy has the money and weapons to buy an insurgency even when they lack the numbers and followers to fight one. But for that money and the arms hidden within Iraq, this so-called insurgency would have been snuffed out by December 2003.
We've had drops in casualties before, like in February 2004 and February 2005, so maybe the enemy is regrouping. But with the other signs, this could be the real thing.
So what isn't the enemy doing that we think they should be doing if they were fully in the fight?