The Winter War of 2022 Gets Diluted

I've repeatedly asked how thin the front lines are given that tiny Russian infantry assaults manage to infiltrate Ukrainian lines and slowly push the Russian invasion forward despite the heavy casualties that drone-led firepower inflicts on the Russian attackers. Is this a bug or a feature of Ukraine's war effort?

The war goes on. Although one ISW analyst said that with Russia leaning into Ukraine across most of the front that Russia has the edge on the battlefield. Not that things can't change quickly--for better or worse. But despite the high price Russia is paying, it has the edge at the moment. And despite a planned meeting between Trump and Putin in Alaska at the end of the week, Russia remains committed to defeating Ukraine. America must not give Russia what it can't achieve through brutal aggression.

This is noteworthy (RuAF: Russian armed forces; AFU: armed forces of Ukraine):

At present, the frontline is so thinned out that full-scale encirclements in the traditional sense are unlikely to occur again. Instead, the opposing forces are more likely to "slip" through each other’s positions. For example, regarding the attack in the Siversk direction, a researcher under the nickname Playfra writes that the RuAF simply drove past Ukrainian positions, then got lost and came under fire from the AFU. 

This example shows how extreme it is in one section of the front:

Gady also highlights serious personnel shortages on the Ukrainian side. In some positions, just eight soldiers are defending a 900-meter stretch of the frontline. Even with artillery and drone support, this is critically insufficient—it is no surprise that assault groups and even armored columns can pass through such positions unimpeded. Under normal conditions, a 1-kilometer [0.6 mi] section of the frontline should be held by around 250 troops (roughly 2 km [1.2 mi] per battalion).

It certainly explains why small Russian attacks are working to take land even if the price Russia pays is very high.

But it also suggests that the Russian claims of a juggernaut inside Ukraine able to plow forward despite losses is just a Potemkin Army, as I suggested some time ago:

I have strong doubts that Russia is managing to increase the raw numbers of its troops fighting inside Ukraine to continue its grinding offensive as long as it takes. Does Putin have a Potemkin Invasion Force? Would he even know he only has that?

If Russia had even a single motor rifle division in good shape it could penetrate Ukrainian lines despite the initial losses, overrun the FPV drone operator bunkers, and break into the Ukrainian rear areas to roll of the front or push deep. Air power (big and drones) and artillery could be concentrated to support the offensive. Crappier Russian units could follow in the division's wake.

What we are seeing in Ukraine is weird but expected, as I wrote a few years before the expanded invasion:

As I started out, we are witnessing a natural progression of thinning out the battlefield. Yes, future frontlines will have fewer troops per mile but the gaps in troops will be filled with firepower making it no less a frontline than the past when you had to have continuous lines of troops in trenches. Then there were platoon strongpoints with gaps covered my longer range machine guns and mortars--and eventually accurate and timely indirect artillery.

So I feel confident in saying that a future empty battlefield will still have frontlines.

The front is still there, but in Ukraine it is a broader No-Man's Land that extend behind both side's outpost lines. Lower troop density on the battlefield is a natural reaction to increases in firepower capabilities (including communications and reconnaissance), as Strategypage described:

Two centuries ago, you had nearly 5,000 troops per square kilometer of battlefield. The declined to 3,900 150 years ago, to 404 in World War I, 36 in World War II, 2.34 during the 1991 Gulf war, and today, it's down to less than two per square kilometer. Without sufficient space, modern combat units cannot realistically practice for war. Without that practice, more troops get killed the first time they do it for real, while being shot at.

Density is so low now that Ukraine's infantry is basically a forward observer force when on defense:

Not too long ago, Ukraine’s drones spotted targets for the infantry. Now the relationship is reversed: all along the 700-mile front line of Russia’s wider war on Ukraine, the infantry’s job is to spot targets for the drones.

And robotic systems are trying to make up for the shortage of infantry and cope with Russian aerial drones:

Ukraine is equipping their combat brigades with ground-based combat and transport robots in addition to drones. The ground robots come in different versions. Some are used for planting and removing landmines. Other drones advance along the ground while firing remotely controlled machine guns. These systems can fire accurately at moving targets during the day and at night. There are also drones for transporting supplies to the front lines and carrying casualties back to first aid stations and field hospitals.

While I don't doubt the front is thinly manned, I still wonder why Ukraine's front is so thinly manned in so many areas when a little thickening might stop the Russian infiltration. The Sumy front is an exception, it seems. 

It has been a long time since I've read stories about Ukrainian recruiting problems. I thought the problem was addressed well enough. If not, where are the stories? If so, why aren't there more infantry on the front line? 

My explanation is that I keep thinking if I was the god of Ukraine's war I'd be starving the front to build up a strategic reserve of units to throw into the war at the right moment when Russia staggers and culminates.  

And I am compelled to wonder if Russia is doing the same thing. Because, again, that's what I'd do if I was the paranoid, vodka-addled god of Russia's invasion.

Further, as Ukraine trades space for time with their thinly manned meat grinder, it builds a three-deep line of fortifications and obstacles to fall back on once the fortress belt of cities to hold can't hold. But if there is so little infantry, how can Ukraine hold that fortified line for long? Unless there is infantry to hold the line or ample reserves for counter-attacks to throw back penetrations, what use is this defensive line? 

I just can't accept that both sides are for the most part simply flinging whatever they organize into the frontline meat grinder. Yet that's what happened throughout 2022. Ukraine loudly built a reserve after that campaign to use in summer 2023. Ukraine both delayed the attack too much, giving Russia time to build fortifications; yet didn't have enough time to build units capable of advancing in the face of resistance. 

Has Ukraine learned it needs to take that time? And two years later, has Ukraine been able to quietly build that force? I'd like to think so. But maybe I need to accept that I am seeing an inability to launch a major counteroffensive. And nobody waging the war is able to do what I'd do even if they think like I do.

Still, part of me whispers that Trump's meeting with Putin could be intended as the ultimate justification for backing Ukraine if Putin refuses to end the war on anything but terms indistinguishable from a battlefield victory.

But if Putin refuses a deal can America do anything decisive? More sanctions and more weapons with Ukraine on the defensive isn't rapidly decisive--if that can even be decisive.

But a Ukrainian counteroffensive prepared for the last two years and learning from the failures of summer 2023 would be the best punishment for Putin failing to take an opportunity to truly end his invasion of Ukraine. 

I just don't know. We shall see. 

UPDATE (Monday): This seems overly optimistic for Ukraine:

While most Ukrainians are war weary by now, few want to abandon efforts to defend their homeland. Meanwhile the war has become one of attrition and the Russians are losing.

The Russians could break first and lose. But even if they do, Ukraine could lose too. Further, Russia still has the initiative. Unless Ukraine can regain the initiative at least on part of the front, Russia could win despite its losses.

UPDATE (Monday) This article on Ukraine's Kursk offensive a year ago has this interesting observation by the commander of Ukraine's military:

“Victories love silence. They are born in silence and prepared in silence,” Syrsky said.

Indeed. 

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.

NOTE: You may also read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

NOTE: I grabbed the image (before it apparently was removed) from The Dupuy Institute from a link now dead.