An online journal of commentary, analysis, and dignified rants on national security issues. Other posts on home life, annoying things, and a vast 'other' are clearly marked.
I live and write in Ann Arbor, Michigan. University of Michigan AB and MA from Eastern Michigan University. One term in the Michigan Army National Guard. Former American history instructor and retired nonpartisan research analyst. I write on Blogger and Substack. Various military and private journals have published my occasional articles on military subjects. See "My Published Works" on the TDR web version or under the mobile version drop-down menu for citations and links.
If China can gain sufficient military advantage over its neighbors, it
may convince them to accept its hegemony given the plausible
alternatives they will face. And the best way for Beijing to
operationalize such advantage is not to fight all its potential
opponents at once, but to pursue a focused and sequential strategy
against the antihegemonic coalition arraying against it, seeking to pick
it apart or short-circuit it.
The key for Beijing is to strike at the coalition’s center of gravity:
perceptions of Washington’s willingness to come to the stout defense of
those to which it has committed. Only if they believe Washington can and
will stand with them will Asian countries judge it prudent to take the
risks necessary to check Beijing’s ambitions. If they do not have this
confidence, they will fear being isolated and punished by China and thus
will likely cut a deal with Beijing. If Beijing can pick off enough
countries in this fashion, it could achieve regional hegemony without
having to fight World War III.
But for all those neighbors to be willing to stand up to China's power,
they have to be confident that we have the power and determination to
use it against China and to be confident that other potential partners
won't stop absorbing some of China's power by making deals with China to
ally with Peking. If these countries don't have confidence that we will
help them, they'll cut a deal with China to protect themselves and turn
away from us.
So we have to be careful about maintaining our power in the Pacific and
maintaining our reputation for supporting allies and fighting until we
win. If any nation, like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore,
Australia, or Vietnam think that they can't count on us for effective
military support, they'll withdraw from the potential balancing
coalition against China. And once one country defects, the power
potential arrayed against China will drop enough to perhaps push another
country to defect and align with China rather than with us.
The Pentagon’s efforts to improve U.S. force posture in the Pacific have
yielded a flurry of major agreements in recent months, with allies
motivated by China’s aggressive behavior to embrace the U.S. With new
arrangements, the Pentagon aims to spread what it calls “combat
credible” forces closer to Taiwan as a way to deter China from invading
the island and ― if deterrence fails ― win any resulting fight.
America's military power and geographic reach are the factor that can
weave the separate power capabilities of nations around the perimeter of
China into an effective proto-alliance.
Our absence from the region will allow China to divide and conquer.
Does a past 18th century war over Crimea have lessons for the Winter War of 2022? Well, it certainly reveals a Russian preference for destroying everything in its path.
The problem with using this framework to
analyze Russian and Western policies on Ukraine today is that Russia
has risked its entire ground forces in a fight that does not look like a
cabinet war for Putin, even if it really is--or should be--for Russia. And Ukraine is no mere passive province to be fought over. Ukraine wants to live.
Still, given Russia's switch from a parade ground occupation march to a firepower intensive war against Ukraine's frontlines and cities, this observation by Clausewitz is perhaps instructive:
He asserts, “It is uncertain whether the Empress Anna… wanted to conquer
Crimea, or just to devastate it… the latter made but little political
sense.” Despite this judgment, Clausewitz returns to the theme of
devastation again and again in the text, showing that the various
Russian armies, put the enemy territory, “under fire and sword,”
“destroy[ed] these areas,” waged, “a campaign of raiding,” and
“devastate[d] the peninsula.” Clausewitz eventually concluded that these
measures were essentially “preventative… namely as a means of
distracting and hindering the [Crimeans] so they could not,” take more
decisive military action. Modern Russian tactics, such as the strike
campaign against the Ukrainian power grid, have confused modern
commentators, but experts such as Justin Bronk and Michael Kofman assert
they have a similar goal: depleting Ukraine’s stocks of air defense missiles.
In other words, in both the 1730s and 2020s, Russia has used
devastation against civilian targets to cause chaos, diluting the
effectiveness of their enemy’s military response.
And there are other parallels with that 18th century war on how Russia wages war. I do worry
Russia will eventually learn enough to win despite repeated stumbles and
high losses.
Still, if the destruction is meant to dilute Ukrainian military effectiveness, the main source of Ukraine's military capability is abroad from Western supplies. With all due respect to Ukrainian skill and valor, that skill and valor would be displayed in a guerilla war east of the Dnieper River by now without the supplies. And Russia's firepower is not diluting Western support or Ukrainian skill and valor.
But despite my reservations on the article's application, by all means check it out. Depending on what Russia and
America decide, the Winter War of 2022 could go on. Then we might have more applicable lessons.
States have frequently embarked on military campaigns that failed to
achieve their objectives as quickly—and cheaply—as expected. For every
Spanish-American or Austro-Prussian War that seems in retrospect to be a
short, sharp success for the victors, there is a Crimean, Boer, or
Afghan War that those of us with the benefit of hindsight know grinds on
longer and presents a butcher's bill greater than planners and
politicians anticipated. In fact, history suggests that quick, decisive
victories are the exception rather than the norm. Yet, states continue
to plan and initiate wars with the expectation that they can achieve
decisive victories unreasonably swiftly. All too often, disaster
results.
The author undermines the premise by citing Afghanistan as an example of failing to get a rapid victory; but citing the Spanish-American War as one that
worked.
The Taliban (2001) and Spanish government's military forces (1898) were both defeated quickly. But
both victories featured long insurgencies (in the Philippines, for the latter) after the conventional win.
Further, arguing that Japan's decision to attack America at Pearl Harbor is an example of planning a short and sharp war ignores that Japan did not have that plan. Japan planned a short and sharp offensive to establish a perimeter in the wake of smashing our fleet, encompassing newly conquered oil resources. At that perimeter they believed they would exhaust American willingness to die to push through to Japan. Japan thought they had the advantage in willingness to die in a long war despite economic inferiority.
The Doolittle Raid prompted Japan to instead try to extend their perimeter to Midway Island, where the American fleet ambushed the much larger Japanese force. The carrier and pilot losses crippled the ability of Japan to hold their perimeter. And America was not put off by the casualties.
But even successful short, sharp wars (Desert Storm to liberate Kuwait, Iraqi Freedom to
overthrow Saddam, Enduring Freedom to overthrow the Taliban) just punch
your ticket for the next problem. A decade+ of confrontation with Saddam,
insurgencies and invasions by al Qaeda and Iran, and insurgencies,
respectively.
Heck, the classic short and sharp Israeli victory in the 1967 Six-Day War just evolved on the Egyptian front into the War of Attrition along the Suez Canal line. The short war solved a specific military problem--keeping the Egyptians from knifing into Israel. The war of attrition was hardly ideal. But it was a better military problem than a Sword of Damocles hanging over Israel's survival.
But by all means, one subset of the
issue is wrongly assuming a short and glorious war. Does anybody ever go home by Christmas? Leaders must guard against
that tendency.
The European Union (EU) fanboys (and girls) aren't saying NATO is to blame for European defense weakness. But they're saying NATO is totally to blame for European defense weakness. Sod off, swampies.
Ultimately, of course, the
perilous state of European armed forces is the fault of European
governments. But NATO’s role in bringing about this state of affairs
also deserves scrutiny. European defense is not in disarray because the
EU has “duplicated” NATO efforts. With the EU neutered as a defense
actor for the past two decades, European defense has been the domain of
NATO and its member states. The results speak for themselves.
NATO can coordinate and
integrate forces, pulling together units from different countries’
militaries and forming a cohesive organization that can fight
effectively. But it has proven incapable of integrating over 25
different European defense ministries and armament divisions.
But, the authors say, NATO has failed to integrate the defense ministries and armaments divisions of the European member states--a power clearly beyond what the alliance of free states can do.
Indeed, NATO should not be the super-ministry for subject defense ministries and their defense industries. That's a sovereign power that nobody should want NATO to have.
The authors blame NATO for the fact that Europeans in general falter in their defense efforts. But everybody knows that Europeans wouldn't contribute more to defense if the EU is in charge rather than NATO coordinating the efforts. Russia is finally doing that. But if the EU gets the power they'll take credit--and entrench their Brussels-based EU power.
Just because Democrats are suddenly and oddly determined to defeat Russia despite their late-Cold War "moral equivalence" nonsense doesn't make me oppose defeating Russia. Instead I say to the Democrats,
"Welcome to the party, pal." But how converted are they?
Ukraine continues to fight off the Russian offensives, inflicting heavy casualties on the Russian ground forces and in general humiliating Putin for failing to defeat Ukraine after a year of fighting--let alone crushing Ukraine cheaply in days.
I want to defeat the Russians. And the fact that Democrats are oddly enthusiastic about defeating Russia is not going to get me to wonder if maybe I should worry about the Russians losing or think maybe they're not that bad. Nor am I going to suddenly believe that Ukraine isn't pure enough to be worthy of our help.
Just like Churchill defended aiding the Russians after Nazi Germany invaded the USSR in 1941, if Putin invaded Hell I'd be willing to put in a good word for the Devil in Congress. The Ukrainians aren't perfect. But they want to join the West. And they are way better than Russians are.
The (partial) partisan divisions over helping Ukraine are interesting.
Democrats mostly seem to back Ukraine. And a good portion of Republicans oppose helping Ukraine too much. With "too much" ill defined and a strange faith in diplomacy with Putin.
I support helping Ukraine win. Am I backing Biden? I guess, if you turn down the lights and squint.
I think it is really the other way around. I'll say again that I
think Biden is accidentally supporting Ukraine. I think Biden was told
Ukraine would lose fast. I think the early war shipments of anti-tank
and anti-aircraft weapons were designed for a post-invasion Ukrainian
insurgency. The arms would be a relatively cheap way for Biden to show
resolve after needlessly losing Afghanistan.
But Ukraine and Russia didn't cooperate with that political
strategy. Russia effed up and Ukraine fought. Oops. Biden got trapped
into backing Ukraine. And I worry he's looking for an exit ramp.
I'm willing to get over being portrayed by Democrats as a horrible human for wanting to resist the USSR back then as the price of getting their support for resisting the Russians today.
Heck, I'm willing to overlook the odd fact that Democrats seem to own more Ukrainian than American flags.
So to Democrats, welcome to the party, pal. Don't go wobbly on me this time if Russia drags the war out.
President Volodymyr Zelensky has said Ukraine's counter-offensive against Russia cannot start until Western allies send more military support.
Hard to say. I lean to the latter at this point.
UPDATE: Is Zelensky's open determination to defend Bakhmut, which he says losing would discourage his people and encourage Russia, a ploy to feign a retreat that gets Russia to pursue--making the advancing Russian army vulnerable to a counter-attack that transitions to the counteroffensive?
America’s
top general said the city of Bakhmut has become a "slaughter-fest for
the Russians" and that Vladimir Putin’s forces are
getting "hammered" by Ukraine.
Zelensky already said Ukraine can't afford
to lose the city. Could we do anything else besides Ukraine renaming
Bakhmut to "Zelenskygrad" to get Putin to keep attacking until Ukraine's
counteroffensive?
From the "Oh, F**k" files: "The latest nutritional advice from the [Egyptian] state suggested cooking up some
chicken feet - a protein-rich part of the bird usually reserved as
scraps for dogs and cats."
The Black Sea grain export deal was renewed. The term is unknown. But Russia wanted 60 days. The West wanted 120 days. Will the West assume 120 days and dare Russia to stop the food exports?
Where is Code Pink during the Winter War of 2022? Usually they love despots America opposes and make their interest in saving those despots clear. And the media was all too happy to promote them. I assume the Code Pink hags oppose aiding Ukraine. But I'll guess that their enthusiasm is much less with a leftist administration in power. And I'm sure the pro-Democrat media has minimal interest in reporting on them.
I heard an analyst who seems to know what he's talking about say that while he doesn't think the risk of nuclear use by Russia against Ukraine is likely, one shouldn't say that Russia's nukes may not work or that Russian officers won't obey an order to fire nukes. I've certainly raised both issues. I hope I haven't portrayed that I assume they are true. But I think it would be high risk for Putin to order their use given how much Russia relies on them for Russian territorial integrity. Does he want enemies to think they don't work or that officers won't obey orders to use them?
Extending Ukraine's battlefield reach from the air. I suppose it is possible that Ukraine could use HIMARS and anti-radiation missiles on aircraft to suppress Russian air defense missiles to open a temporary corridor for other aircraft with extended-range air-to-ground weapons to strike the Kerch Strait Bridge.
Will Russia use tactical nukes against Ukraine? I can't rule it out. But those small nukes don't have the impact of the big city busters. I can't imagine Russia risking that. Don't conflate the two weapon classes. So using tactical nukes would fail to sufficiently frighten Ukrainians. Alienate the world. Maybe even anger China. And possibly convince the West that letting Russia win by using nukes will just lead to more nuclear-armed aggression in the future. America gave up most tactical nukes in favor of precision conventional weapons that do what we once needed small nukes to do. In my view the Western response would likely be to give Ukraine longer-range
precision weapons. That would reverse the tactical edge of Russia using
nukes.
The Philippines "reported a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy vessel, a China Coast
Guard (CCG) vessel, and 42 suspected maritime militia vessels, anchored
within 4.5 to 8 nautical miles of [Thitu island in the South China Sea]. The Philippines is lifting the curtain on China's subliminal war.
And ... "After finishing with the Philippines, Chinese maritime militia and
fishing boats apparently swarmed inside Vietnam’s exclusive economic
zone (EEZ) in the South China Sea, according to a Vietnamese research
organization citing vessel-tracking data." Will Vietnam draw a line in the EEZ?
Ukraine charged Wagner positions with M-113 APCs and a Dutch variant. Say what? M-113s are not designed for that. Egad, nothing should do that, really. If Wagner had anti-tank weapons they'd be smoldering hulks. Those systems are better suited to ferrying infantry safe from artillery fragments and machine gun fire to unload close to the enemy. Although I concede the Dutch vehicle is marginally more suitable for exposing itself to direct fire.
Putin and fanboys (and girls) of the USSR would like you to believe that Stalin defeated the Nazis. Stalin cruelly bled the USSR to feed the meat grinder. But Stalin didn't defeat the Nazis. And that's glossing over how Stalin enabled the rise of Nazi Germany and got Germany to wage war against France and Western Europe. And without the Western Allies, he could not have pushed the Germans out of the USSR. I suppose you could argue America and the Western Allies fought Nazi Germany to the last Soviet. But that's it. Also, let's talk Soviet rape culture. And Stalin's planned Holocaust of Soviet Jews before he died (was killed?). Also, ponder what Stalin considered doing with his Western-sustained military after all of us defeated Nazi Germany. Effing Communists are always and everywhere evil. Tip to Instapundit.
Bad China! "Secretary Austin underscored the United States' unwavering alliance
commitment with the Philippines and reiterated that the Mutual Defense
Treaty extends to Philippine armed forces, aircraft, and public vessels,
including those of its Coast Guard, anywhere in the South China Sea.
The two leaders condemned the PRC's gray-zone activities, which
interfere with the livelihoods of local Philippine communities and the
rights of other claimant states that seek to operate lawfully in the
South China Sea consistent with the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal ruling." About those gray-zone activities.
Sigh. Please, God, let this be satire. Tip to Instapundit.
Space Force: "The U.S. Space Force is seeking more than $1.2 billion in funding over
the next five years for a secretive 'Long Range Kill Chains' program to
track moving targets from space." This might be useful for you.
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida visited Kiev just after Xi visited Russia. It's a reminder to Russia that Japan has options to hurt Russia if Russia won't give back island territory Russia captured from Japan at the end of World War II. And it's a message to China, too, that Japan can bog China down in Ukraine if China escalates support for Russia.
Oh nos! That's so sad! "Crippled by war and sanctions, Russia now faces evidence that its already-struggling space program is falling apart." Not that our state space program is all that amazing. And now for something completely different:
Mission from God accomplished? "Iranian security leaders have announced in recent days that they will resume enforcing the mandatory hijab law with a confrontational approach."
Trump's behavior during the outrageous and dangerous political witch hunt by Alvin Bragg does not make me want to reward him over DeSantis or other Republican candidates for 2024.
From the "Well, Duh" files: "Russian servicemen who joined regional volunteer battalions over the summer of 2022 revealed that the Russian military command treats Russian volunteers like cannon fodder."
Collateral damage: "Russia rents [the Roscosmos space launch facility] from Kazakhstan and has fallen behind in rent
payments. In response Kazakhstan seized Roscosmos assets at Baikonur.
Russia is not getting foreign commercial launch business because of the
sanctions. Because of the Ukraine war sanction, Russia has less cash in
general and can’t even muster enough troops to threaten Kazakhstan."
Given the high cost of putting mass in orbit, it seems like a waste to bring the ISS down to burn up rather than salvaging it in orbit for other uses. We can't do that. It's still a shame.
Depleted uranium tank gun rounds are not nuclear weapons. They are very dense projectiles to punch through enemy armor. Those rounds are not an escalation of support--not that escalation of support is wrong given the fact that Russia is trying to conquer Ukraine. Oddly enough, all ammunition designed to kill has toxic side effects after use. Let the Russians complain. The bastards make actual nuclear threats.
The Israel-Iran Quasi-War goes on: "An Israeli missile strike destroyed a suspected arms depot used by Iran-backed militias at Syria's Aleppo airport Wednesday[.]"
The climate end is always nigh a decade away. And always will be. Scientists do the long science. Activists write the short "synthesis" report. Who "explain" it to activist journalists. Who filter and exaggerate the BS even more. Tip to Instapundit. And now for something completely different:
Americans don't need a "national divorce", whatever that means. Under federalism the states aren't supposed to be married--just friends with limited federal benefits. Honestly, the "sorting" by politics has been going on for decades, now.
That's nice. And possibly useful. But if Ukrainians with weapons weren't violently resisting the Russians, he and anyone remotely suspected of nonviolent resistance would be dead or in gulags by now. Gandhi had the good fortune to resist a democratic Britain weary of empire.
The Navy: "The shortage of dwell time and 2018 reduction in retirement benefits (by
about 20 percent), the increase in ideological instruction (to make
sailors less sexist and prejudiced), and a general loss of confidence in
senior leadership has reduced morale and the percentage of sailors who
remain in the navy, especially after they have re-enlisted at least
once." No worries.
Oops: "China struck a cordial tone in talks with the Philippines on Thursday,
seeking 'friendly consultation' to settle dispute as South China Sea
tensions rise and the US strengthens ties with its longstanding ally." The Philippines is getting results already. Manila won't be fooled, will it? Probably not.
Huh. India repelled a Chinese border grab because of "'...unprecedented intelligence-sharing' by the U.S. with India caught
'China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) forces off-guard' as they
prepared to launch their incursion. For '...the first time' U.S.
military intelligence officials '...provided real-time details to ...
Indian counterparts.' The real-time intelligence detailed 'Chinese
positions and force strength.'"
The Russians have an advantage in artillery firepower. But are the Russians firing it because Putin demands inputs he can read in reports? Or is there a measurable output? If measured in ground gained, the advantage isn't that apparent.
Huh: "A breakthrough that enables a human to guide a robot merely by thinking
could help troops on a future battlefield to communicate with a wide
array of sensors, vehicles, and robots—all while the enemy is looking to
intercept radio communications."
I'll not again that if America is such a "systemically racist" society, why didn't our society hold the line closer to slavery than to an African-American president? Odd, no?
"Could," of course: "Russia could have its most powerful and quiet nuclear attack submarines
on persistent patrols off either U.S. Coast in the next two years[.]"
Why more Americans don't recoil from being ruled by--or only told what is true or false by--"arrogant power-worshipping mediocrities" is beyond me. These mediocrities claim our enemies use our Constitution effectively. The real problem is that these mediocrities don't understand how Americans use our Constitution effectively. Laws intended to stop jihadi terrorists have been turned against Americans. I trusted Americans not to do that. I was wrong. I disagree with some of Taibbi's points. For example, jihadi "illegal combatants" don't deserve Geneva Convention protections designed for uniformed soldiers who do not commit war crimes as the price of those protections. That doesn't mean illegal combatants should be crippled by torturing them. But there's a big gap between denying jihadis Geneva Convention protection and torturing them. Still, the larger picture stands. And that's the vitally important part to act on now rather than quibbling over irrelevant details. Tip to Instapundit.
There are tax-calculating programs for federal income taxes. The government drafted all the tax laws. And the government collects data on all of our financial information. Why doesn't the federal government calculate what we owe and let us tell them if they got it right? Right now we play a long-distance game of bartering with a vendor over the price of a Persian rug, but face penalties for getting the price wrong.
If they can't prove dangerous climate change warming, they'll settle for making us feel warmer to justify making their mental health problems our problem. Via Instapundit.
He should be fired. Since he didn't have the decency to resign after the Afghanistan Skedaddle Debacle. Is he a traitor? No. I am not persuaded by the big wet kiss the author gave Milley. I have completely lost confidence in his ability to lead. His firing would only be a good start. Honestly, while I understood Milley's discomfort at the Washington, D.C. church photo op, the bottom line is that it was valid to show that the government had reclaimed the streets from rioters who tried to set fire to that church. The military is not required to remain neutral when rioting takes place. Also, I never worried Trump would stage a coup or try to stay in office with a foreign military clash. That threat was all in faux Resistance heads.
Sanctions aren't a silver bullet. But they help: "Russian leader Vladimir Putin likes to boast that Russia has managed to
cope with economic sanctions imposed by the West because of the Ukraine
War. The reality is different." Russia's military effort is being degraded; and in time the civilian economy may be harmed significantly.
The structure of combat exercises in the Navy usually took the form of focusing on individual skillsets and warfare areas—anti-surface warfare and anti-air warfare, and so on. But these things were not often combined in a true, multi-domain way. Instead, exercise and training certification regimes often took the form of a linear progression of individual areas.
The opposition forces were made to behave in such a way as to facilitate these events. However, a more realistic and thinking adversary would probably employ the multi-domain tactics and operations that are the mainstay of war at sea. But instead, the opposition often acted more as facilitators for simpler target practice it seems, which is why very high kill ratios were the norm. But more importantly, a steady theme that kept reappearing was that the opposition pretty much never won.
Good. I'd worried we forgot how to fight. That worry was before I read our training has been one-dimensional and scripted. And contrary to our assumptions, the Chinese are exercising more
realistically than we have been until very recently:
Now when it comes to the Chinese Navy, those public reports the Office of Naval Intelligence puts out paint a very different picture from what the U.S. Navy was doing.8 The Chinese Navy often trains multiple skillsets at a time, they do not always know the composition and the disposition of the forces they are facing off against, and they do not always know exactly what will happen when the event is about to go down. And not only did Chinese Navy combat exercises become increasingly intense, they were willing to impose on themselves certain warfighting fundamentals of friction that the U.S. Navy was unwilling to do.
So the new exercises over time could begin to correct the faulty structure of the Navy's combat exercises. That article notes,
however, that "the Navy doesn’t have a major, multi-domain standing
formation to act as full-time opposition for the high-end fight." That
author worries about maintaining this late commitment to difficult
exercises.
Maybe a Navy OPFOR could be made with modularized auxiliary cruisers to institutionalize tough training with a core force of ships and crews that simulate the People's Liberation Army Navy both afloat and simulated land positions.
Otherwise we may wonder what's wrong with our bloody fleet one day.
Do read that linked article. And see if your doubts don't camp out on your sofa, too.
Is the United States unprepared to fight China in the western Pacific? Probably. But trying to jam more American forces into the scarce land bases in the western Pacific is not a solution.
Want another big problem? The Biden administration continues to divide U.S. forces between Europe and the Pacific, further
weakening the already insufficient forces
available to deter or defeat China in a conflict over Taiwan. The U.S.
needs its European allies to step up so that the U.S. Air Force and Navy
can redeploy forces to the Pacific.
One, our European allies are stepping up. Slowly. But they are. And the truth is that America's military strength in Europe has dropped dramatically since the Cold War. Even Russia's invasion of Ukraine a year ago has reversed that decrease by only a tiny fraction. I addressed the notion that we defend Europe too much in this post on America's interest in defending Europe:
Six, if you think America shouldn't need nearly as much military
power to defend Europe from Russia compared to when the threat was the
USSR, well ... mission accomplished!
At the height of the Cold War America had lots of troops in Europe
with large numbers of tanks, artillery, and aircraft. In the seas
around Europe, the American Navy roamed to contain the Soviet navy and
keep lines of supply from North America to Europe intact. America's
troop level in Europe--even with enhancements to reassure NATO allies
while Russia is at war with Ukraine--is a tiny fraction of Cold War
commitments. Compare the 100,000+ American troops in Europe now--up from
80,000 in the month before Russia invaded this year--to the 450,000+
Americans in Europe in 1959, the peak year of troop strength there.
American naval and air power in Europe has declined, as part of the overall reduction. No doubt, if needed in Asia they will sail and fly that way.
Two [F-35] squadrons and a single air defense unit are not depriving
INDOPACOM of assets. There are limited bases in the Pacific for Army and
Air Force assets to battle China. They are crowded enough already.
Also, two missile defense destroyers had best not be the
difference between victory and defeat in the Pacific. One, they are needed in
Europe for mobile missile defense. Two, they can sail to the Pacific if
needed.
A classified Pentagon wargame simulated a Chinese push to take control of the South China Sea.
The Air Force officer, charged with plotting the service’s future,
learned that China’s well-stocked missile force had rained down on the
bases and ports the U.S. relied on in the region, turning American
combat aircraft and munitions into smoldering ruins in a matter of days.
I've long been wary of putting too much of our military power forward in too few bases. Survive the initial blow and then gather for the counter-attack, I say.
"Western countries, led by the United States, have implemented
all-round
containment, encirclement and suppression against us, bringing
unprecedentedly severe challenges to our country’s development," the
Chinese leader said.
To be fair, America helped China develop for
decades, even ignoring all the espionage.
And when China developed,
instead of mellowing out it got more expansively aggressive, suppressed
its own people with technology supplementing brutality, couldn't wait to stomp its boot on Hong Kong ahead of schedule, and accelerated its cultural genocide of
minorities.
All while stealing more and more economic, military, and personal data from America and the West.
So you're damned right we seek to suppress and contain the
China we got and not the China we hoped for.
And most of China's neighbors
feel the same way. Go figure.
Iran-backed Shi’a militants likely massacred unarmed Sunni civilians in Diyala on February 20. ISIS has not commented on the attack. Pro-Iran politicians accused ISIS of the attack, likely in an effort to obfuscate responsibility. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) arrested 18 suspects in the attack, though it is highly unlikely the Iraqi government will hold the perpetrators accountable. ISIS may use this attack to position itself as a protector of the local community. ISIS may do this by targeting local security forces, particularly Shi’a militias, to illustrate its capabilities to locals.
This is the kind of problem that can turn Sunni Arabs into jihadi supporters.
And if the government can't protect people, they will fall back on their group identities that will exacerbate the conflict:
The Iraqi government’s response in Diyala will likely fail to secure both Shi’a and Sunni communities against further acts of violence. Locals are expressing distrust in the ISF’s ability to bring the perpetrators to justice. The ISF will likely briefly arrest militia members before promptly releasing them. The Iraqi government has promised to investigate similar massacres, before failing to make arrests or release findings to the public.
Preventing Shia Arabs from killing Sunni Arabs helped engineer the Anbar Awakening to win the first round.
But we prematurely left in 2011, and without our presence to see the problem developing, ISIL convinced a lot of Iraqi Sunni Arabs--with some justification--that ISIL was their protector against revenge-seeking Shias.
Since our absence also made us oblivious to the deterioration of the Iraqi military leadership and the alienation of the Sunni Arabs once converted by the Awakening, we didn't even see the approaching rapid ISIL offensive/uprising that swept a collapsing Iraqi military out of western and northwestern Iraq.
Don't act as if 2,500 American troops "still" in Iraq is something alarming. American troops are "still" in South Korea, Japan, Germany, and Italy. Because it is worth it to defend a hard-won victory and keep new allies on our side fighting common enemies.
We can't say we made it to 20 years holding Afghanistan in the win column, can we?
Let's hold the line by stopping the Shia killers that Iran is encouraging or actually controlling--this stage is really a war against Iran inside Iraq notwithstanding the jihadi problem. We must also bolster Iraqi governance and military competence, and directly kill ISIL jihadis wherever we find them.
The Sunni Kurds were an important part of the Iraqi government's counteroffensive to defeat ISIL. Will the Kurds step up again? Or will the Kurds hunker down and try to keep their oasis of stability intact and let the rest of Iraq sort out this problem without them?
The nearly eight-year-old U.S. deployment to Syria to combat Islamic
State is still worth the risk, the top U.S. military officer said on
Saturday, after a rare, unannounced visit to a dusty base in the
country's northeast to meet U.S. troops.
And our Secretary of Defense in Iraq for the 20th anniversary of the invasion to overthrow the Saddam regime pledged to stay:
U.S. forces are ready to remain in Iraq at the invitation of the
government of Iraq. These forces are operating in a non-combat advise,
assist and enable role to support the Iraqi-led fight against terrorism.
This is a critical mission, and we're proud to support our Iraqi
partners.
Good. But don't forget promoting rule of law in Iraq to entrench democracy and expel Iranian influence. This Iraqi former member of parliament expressed the current problem well:
Al-Sheikh is keen to be, as he calls it, “fair”. Without US
intervention, he concedes, Iraqis would never have been liberated from
the former regime, but the job is unfinished.
*You could count this as round 4 or 5, depending on how you count the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the subsequent low-level No-Fly Zone conflict during the 1990s. Heck, maybe what is going on inside Iraq is really the Iran-Iraq War 2.0.