But taking a tool that is fundamentally about slowly grinding an adversary down and trying to convert it into a substitute for head-on military conflict would be a risky strategy. It could make regional allies and China question U.S. resolve; it could allow service leaders and civilian politicians to “punt” on important procurement commitments that are necessary to ensure credible combat capabilities in the face of China’s rising antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities; and it could lull the American public into thinking that there are relatively low-cost ways to resolve a military conflict with China victoriously—a combination that would be extremely unlikely in practice.
These are excellent points. I do think that blockade should be in the tool bag if there is war. We can absolutely carry it out and it would hurt China.
A blockade also assumes a total war. If China seeks a small goal--one that doesn't even directly attack American forces--will America really escalate to blockade of China? Is that credible? Will our allies accept it?
While a blockade can impose pain on China, it shouldn't be the only tool we rely on. And let me add that one of the problems of a blockade is that it might work. A blockade that wreaks havoc on a nuclear-armed state might prompt a response that seeks to end the havoc by unleashing a different kind of havoc on America or our allies to break the blockade.
Even short of that nuclear escalation, if we go to total war justification with a blockade, China might believe the effects are so great that they are fully justified in escalating the conflict from whatever localized dispute prompted the blockade to a major military campaign. They'll have the time to gear up for that, remember.
Long ago I noted that China was preparing to cope with an energy blockade. And overland energy import routes will help China cope, too, buying time.
Certainly, energy imports are just one aspect of China's overseas trade that is now critical for China's economy. So coping with an energy shortage is only one problem China must face if America blockades China. And as I noted there, China's inland alternatives require building military power that isn't available at sea.
Mind you, China doesn't want a long war. Their advantage is the initial stage before America can mobilize superior but globally dispersed power to the western Pacific. China wants a short war. And we shouldn't assume we know what China's objective is. China might gain their objective in weeks while we settle in for a blockade that lasts months, with the bad effects for America of a blockade strategy accumulating while China sits on their gains and digs in.
Yet is a long war really in America's interest? If we think that a blockade is an inexpensive strategy, how expensive will it be for America to embark on a massive naval and air power expansion to defend the perimeter of the blockade? Do you think China's massive ship-building capacity will remain idle while our ships strangle China's imports and exports?
It may be that while a short war is what China wants; America may need a medium-length war rather than a long war.
In that problematic long-war scenario, a distant blockade places allies on the other side of the line we are willing to defend. How long will they endure that position of being hammered or counter-blockaded by China?
Yet even if we win that confrontation, how long will it be before allies too close to China for America to defend start to rethink their alliance with America and cut deals with China?
I just don't think that our strategy should assume total war for any military confrontation. Isn't that kind of like 1914 Germany assuming that their war plan had to be to strike France first--which is a problem if France isn't involved in the initial crisis, no?
War with China would be a big effing deal. Don't even begin to think there might be an easy way to win it.
I guess there is a reason the article appealed to me. I guess I've given this more thought than I remembered over the years. Although one of the reasons for this recent article on using land power in the Asia-Pacific region was the problem in a China scenario of abandoning allies on the wrong side of our blockade line (page 102).
