Let me review, at his challenge, the ten themes Scales set forth about future war in 1999. Mind you, it speaks well of him to predict the future and then stand by them when the future approaches. As he notes, predictions about future war shouldn't be about getting the future right, it is about not getting it too wrong to win.
I'll do them one at a time in separate posts. This is the fifth post. Let me preface this effort with my warning from my 2002 Military Review article (starting on p. 28) about the projected FCS that was the primary weapons system envisioned by those planning efforts:
Barring successfully fielding exotic technologies to make the FCS work, the Army must consider how it will defeat future heavy systems if fighting actual enemies and not merely suppressing disorder becomes its mission once again. The tentative assumptions of 2001 will change by 2025. When they do, the Army will rue its failure today to accept that the wonder tank will not be built.
The fifth theme from 1999 is:
5.Proliferate Precision and Distribute It Downward
Maneuver forces should be provided with the tools to adequately support an offensive strategy dominated by precision firepower on a distributed battlefield. To do this, ground forces at the lowest tactical level should be given the same relative advantage in precision firepower as that possessed by the air services today.
I hinted at this in my 2002 article on the FCS issue:
For long-range or beyond-line-of-sight firing, missiles should be part of the force. The power of today’s precision weapons is already breathtaking. In the future, separating missiles from the FCS makes the most sense for a networked force. Missile modules, each containing two or more missiles, could be dropped off in the wake of the advancing FCS unit or even scattered by aircraft along the axis of advance in the enemy’s rear areas. The FCS crew could control firing. For targets beyond the FCS’s area of concern, higher echelon commanders could plug into all FCS sensors and gain a complete view of the battlefield using unmanned aerial vehicles and air- or tube-delivered sensors.
I figured that it would be possible to separate the missiles from the armored fighting vehicle eventually, using a battlefield Internet that allowed individual FCS to call in fire from any missile module, using data from any surveillance platform.
I think I assumed maneuver forces could call in fire from any source, but that dropping missile modules in the wake of the advance or along the line of advance would provide more responsive fire support than distant air assets or artillery units. I think that because I've long wanted ground forces to have the ability to call in fire support without even caring who provided it. The fire support system would determine whether a nearby missile, a plane high in the sky, an artillery unit to the rear, or a ship at sea could best provide the effect desired in the time needed.
And in blogging, I wrote about how precision was being pushed down to lower levels, increasing the speed of maneuver:
All this precision being pushed down will speed up the tempo of operations (at the battalion level in that case), which will put a world of hurt on our enemies (although as this precision proliferates, we will eventually fight enemies with similar capabilities).
Indeed, organic precision firepower capability was increasing so much that in that post I wondered if the A-10 could be the last close air support plane needed. I'd kind of forgotten about that. I had a point.
Perhaps I've been too harsh on the Air Force for trying to kill the A-10. Although being the last plane doesn't mean it must be killed sooner than justified by technology.
Now I wonder if the Army would invest money in their armed helicopters if the Army had the responsibility for providing close fire support from any source while the Air Force becomes the Aerospace Force.
Really, if the Army has networked ground-based fire assets and armed drones, would the Army--in time--invest money in any large manned aircraft--rotary or fixed wing--designed to provide fire support for units in high intensity conventional warfare?
That would allow for lower cost planes for COIN or long-endurance gunships for supporting special forces, which don't face a tough air defense environment.
Theme four is here.
