As American and coalition forces race for the exits, the Taliban ramp up their attacks. Can the Afghan government hold?
How will the fight go without American air support? This article says the Afghan army is weaker than the one the Soviets left behind and that the air force back then was stronger.
I disagree. Tanks and all the rest for conventional battle were a waste. And the air force was a mini-Soviet force ill-suited to anything but high speed bombardment.
But this is a big issue on the ground:
Dozens of small outposts and bases have changed hands like this in recent months. With the police and regular army struggling, the government increasingly relies on its well-trained units of special forces. These commandos have often worked closely with NATO forces and, although they are thinly stretched, they have repeatedly proven able to beat the insurgents. They are rotated from hotspot to hotspot, pushing back militant offensives and retaking districts. Death tolls on both sides and among civilians are high.
I was very worried about our emphasis on Afghanistan commandos because they seemed to be used as reliable infantry more than as special forces. And since I expressed my worries, the government has not scraped up forces to seize the initiative. Instead, the government has steadily lost control of territory.
You may argue that the government has not lost critical territory. But eventually quantity has a quality of its own.
If the defensive lines are held by troops prone to breaking and running because they feel they are losing, the commandos may become too busy to remain effective and may struggle on that treadmill.
To make matters worse, how will the commandos fight more often without American air support? Can Afghan air support suffice? Can Afghan air support last? Who knows if foreign contractors will stay long beyond America's presence.
Effective air power to provide recon and surveillance, logistics, transport, medical, strike, and close air support is needed to defeat the Taliban.
One of the effects of effective air power is that it limits the ability of the Taliban to mass troops against small outposts and limits the time Taliban can afford to attack a target before they have to retreat and scatter to avoid air power intervening decisively in the battle.
How is losing that air power not a very dangerous and risky development for Afghanistan?
And if the commandos can't restore the line as the conventional security forces collapse faster, how will the commandos survive?
And this, from the Economist article, I am in full agreement with:
With the Taliban buoyant and forecasts from Washington looking sombre, military morale may be key. “It is mainly psychological now. If we can get through the pressure of this summer, then we will be fine,” reckons one Afghan diplomat. Mr Amarkhel agrees: “If our forces can last for two months, they can survive.”That's basically what I wrote at the beginning of the month.
Right now I'm hoping that the Taliban are burning fighters even faster and that this is their gamble to break the government's line troops before the Taliban exhaust themselves.
You'd think we'd provide air power to help that outcome along.
