The effects of the Syrian Multi-War lingers on. Post-Syria Assad is the new reality.
After a decade of civil war, Syria continues to reform and reshape what is left of its armed forces. The latest move disbands most of the remaining reserve forces, especially reserve officers, including medical personnel, that were kept on the payroll even though they were on duty part time. Since 2018 Syria has been dismantling the conscription system that long served to provide most of the military manpower, including officers. ... Holding these elections legitimizes the return of Assad rule to most of the country. This has caused problems because fewer security personnel and lingering violence means "control" isn’t what it used to be.
After only four years of civil war the pre-2011 security forces (military and police) were gone, replaced by a few remnants and a lot of improvisations.
I discussed the destruction of the Syrian military and evolution into military fiefdoms in early 2016. It seemed like it telegraphed a post-Syria Assad reality in contrast to the usual question of what a post-Assad Syria would look like.
Assad does not run Syria despite holding out against the Sunni rebellion. Assad's forces holds core Syria but large sections in the north, south, and east are controlled by groups unable to overthrow Assad but unwilling to submit to Assad. Turks, Iranians, or Americans support these groups.
The Israelis can strike at will throughout weakened Syria at non-Syrian assets that Iran is trying to build there to wage war on Israel, on top of Gaza and southern Lebanon.
The Russians hold their bases and do what they must to keep Assad in power if not in control of all his territory.
Reforming and reshaping the Syrian military indicates that Assad does not consider it worth the effort to regain control of the outlying areas after the heavy losses to hold his current position.
But as I discussed in that 2016 post, Assad reigns over much of the
country that had devolved into military fiefdoms that ran their own
affairs in large part. How much of the military reform is intended to weaken those fiefdoms by buying tribal loyalties to him? Does this indicate that Assad is battling the military fiefdoms?
I still wonder if Assad can survive peace when his supporters who lost so much no longer fear victorious jihadis.
UPDATE: The jihadis in the northwest holding on under the Turkish shield. I just thank God we didn't support the then non-jihadi rebels a decade ago when Assad was at his weakest and risk "further militarizing" the conflict.
