Judging China's ability to conquer Taiwan requires a discussion of how much time does China get before judging that capability.
This author in Military Review doesn't think much of the idea that American land power should have a major ground combat role in defending Taiwan, as I broached in Military Review.
I think the author is right about the danger of stationing a tripwire brigade on Taiwan.
He is right that the logistics backing my suggestion are
currently inadequate, as I freely admitted.
And he is right that Army missiles are valuable assets to support the naval and air wars.
Another author in the same issue discusses past Army logistics efforts for large-scale operations
as a basis for recommending how to build the logistics for future large-scale
combat operations. Which for my suggestion, is great. I know little about the issue
except that in the past we have overcome logistics obstacles to enable
large-scale combat operations. So I assumed we could build the capability.
But I think the initially cited author underestimates China's ability to invade, in part by misusing the 3:1 rule.
And even properly calculated, does the 3:1 rule apply to the initial invasion to gain bridgeheads, which may take place against a Taiwanese army still in its garrisons rather than fully deployed to stop coastal and airborne landings? Or does the rule apply to conquering Taiwan? If your confidence that Taiwan can beat an invasion is based on applying the 3:1 rule to China seizing Taipei and conquering Taiwan, that is irrelevant to the problem of China simply seeking to get ashore and remaining there.
Again, as the premise my article rested on, China doesn't have to conquer Taiwan when they invade. China just has to get ashore and hold a bridgehead until it can get a ceasefire. That's why I suggested that the 3:1 rule might best be applied to what Taiwan needs to drive the Chinese bridgeheads into the sea.
If Taiwan can't eliminate significant PLA bridgeheads, Taiwan is probably doomed. Then China will have a launching pad for a future war that completes the conquest. I would have liked that aspect explored.
Still, I'm glad that the discussion of an Army role in the assumed INDOPACOM naval-air theater is now open.
