“It is not strategically prudent, nor operationally viable to physically concentrate on large, close-in bases that are highly vulnerable to a potential adversary’s strike capability,” Indopacom’s commander, Adm. Philip Davidson, wrote in his report. “Distributed operations increase mobility and agility to ensure our ability to ‘Fight and Win.’”
Under the multiyear Indopacom proposal, $5.8 billion would be for offensive missiles and multiple radars, including a space-based radar; another $5.8 billion would be used to distribute forces around the region; and $5.1 billion would be for “logistics and security enablers”—a broad array that includes counterpropaganda operations, fuel storage, battle-damage repair facilities, as well as military aid for forces in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.
Since we left the Philippines after the Cold War, our military in the western Pacific has been concentrated in the Japan-South Korea area.
We are moving Marines out of Okinawa back out of easy reach of Chinese missiles and aircraft to Guam and Australia.
And our Navy is still working on operating out of Singapore with a small contingents of LCS.
But still we need more bases, as Davidson said. I agree.
And improving the logistics for moving around the theater is necessary if the Army is to expand its horizon's from the DMZ in South Korea, which I advocated in Military Review.
Our secretary of defense also spoke of the need for more efforts to support our diplomacy:
Esper has warned that Beijing’s expanding military threatens U.S. influence, and he’s called China his “No. 1 priority,” traveling to Asia last August to shore up U.S. alliances. But critics charge the Defense Department’s budget process is better organized to address the procurement priorities of the armed services than regional war-fighting priorities—except when it comes to Europe and the European Deterrence Initiative.
I've long warned of the need to be strong enough to keep friends and allies on the line facing China rather than cutting deals with China to get short-term but false feelings of security regarding the threat China poses to them:
[Neighbors of China] have to be confident that we have the power and determination to use it against China and to be confident that other potential partners won't stop absorbing some of China's power by making deals with China to ally with Peking. If these countries don't have confidence that we will help them, they'll cut a deal with China to protect themselves and turn away from us.
So we have to be careful about maintaining our power in the Pacific and maintaining our reputation for supporting allies and fighting until we win. If any nation, like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Australia, or Vietnam think that they can't count on us for effective military support, they'll withdraw from the potential balancing coalition against China. And once one country defects, the power potential arrayed against China will drop enough to perhaps push another country to defect and align with China rather than with us.
China is a threat, and we need the allies and infrastructure to resist Chinese expansion at our expense.
And yes, I still wish we'd renamed our command out there PAINCOM.
