This author thinks that the amphibious ready group and its Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU, reinforced Marine battalion) should abandon forcible entry missions to focus on "strike (as a light carrier), raiding, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations, and special operations support."
He thinks the battalion should be slimmed down and split between the three ships of the amphibious ready group (ARG). This matches my raiding and advance base employment of Marine Expeditionary Companies (MEC) in this Proceedings article (membership required):
MECs also could carry out A2/AD missions. Prior to 1921, the Marines prepared “for the defense of advance bases and not for offensive landing operations.” Citing World War II experience, EF21 holds that the Marines must be capable of establishing and defending advanced bases while working with other services to “project power and control the sea.” This will allow the United States to “turn the A2/AD table” on an enemy by deploying weapons and sensors in a “network of numerous austere bases—by occupation or seizure—as a means of dispersing aircraft, missiles, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets” that deny an enemy the ability to operate in those waters and in that air space. Such advance expeditionary bases equipped with long-range strike, antiship, and antiair systems would function as “sea denial outposts.”
Such outposts—quickly established and abandoned as needed—could be used for forward arming and refueling points to support dispersed air operations ashore, making a transition between sea-based and land-based Marine air power truly seamless.
The author wants some offensive power with the ARG too, so the Marines can fight through opposition to reach the objective on the shore.
I addressed this in an old Joint Force Quarterly article (starting at pg. 38), in addition to wanting steaming prepositioning ships (SPS) in order to quickly get a full brigade of Marines on the ground after the MEU gains a bridgehead:
My graphics didn't make it into the published article. My notional MEBF had a surface action group (SAG) to provide firepower along with the ARG and MEU. SPS with the equipment for the balance of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade whose troops remained at their home station would allow for more rapid reinforcement of the MEU after it lands.
Although obviously in the early stage of the war when the struggle for control of the seas is in doubt, you can hardly sail the prepositioning ships with the ARG. I expanded on the SPS concept in this post.
As necessary as the Marine evolution is to support the Navy to gain control of the sea is, the Army will miss the Marines in land campaigns as the Marines lighten up and evolve to directly support the fleet. The Marines had been the most significant expeditionary force to accompany the Army overseas since the Korean War. No more.
