Air force leaders long insisted jet fighters could adequately replace the A-10 but ground troops and fighter pilots serving as [Joint Terminal Attack Controllers] thought otherwise. As useful as armed helicopters and UAVs are the overwhelming preference is for the A-10, an aircraft explicitly designed to provide the best ground support, especially against a heavily armed foe who is shoot back. The air force refused to consider developing a 21st century A-10 (because it would take at least fifteen years) and there were no other aircraft in service that even come close to duplicating what the A-10 can do.
The Air Force has a point that low-flying aircraft in an era of effective anti-aircraft missiles are in grave danger in the "brown skies" just above a muddy or dusty battlefield.
But the main problem is that the Air Force wanted to end the dedicated close air support (CAS) mission that helps make the A-10 so effective right now.
How good would the Air Force be at CAS if the mission was a side job for the main job of flying high in the blue skies controlling the air? How much of a priority would CAS be without any aircraft squadrons at all dedicated to CAS full time?
The effort to kill the A-10 was a symptom of the deeper problem rather than the plane itself being the problem.
Funny enough, the plane is very good for rescuing air crew downed behind enemy lines by providing cover for rescue helicopters. The Air Force should be happy to retain that capability--even if the Army loves the plane.
