This is interesting:
"Secretary Tillerson engaged strongly with Staffan de Mistura about how do we move what has been going on in Astana, how do we move that over to Geneva where we can actually get the U.N. engaged on the way forward," Mattis told reporters on a plane en route to Finland.
Russia has backed peace talks in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, to end the Syrian civil war. U.N. Special Envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura announced that stalled peace talks between the Syrian government and still-to-be-united opposition would resume in Geneva on Nov. 28.
He wants the talks--moved to the UN from the Russian-sponsored talks that include Turkey and Iran in Astana--to end Assad's tenure. But is this just window dressing that allows the Alawite minority to continue to rule but without Assad in the front office?
I guess we are moving to support a federal post-Syria Assad rather than post-Assad Syria.
Which in many ways considering the state of the Syrian military has existed for a while.
The question is whether eventually our policy switches to a post-Assad post-Syria at some point.
I think we need to do that to avoid the problem of striking a king but not killing him--especially when that ruler has a lot of American blood on his hands from the Iraq War where he funneled in jihadi suicide bombers.
And we can add in the barracks bombing in Lebanon under Assad's father Hafez as a toll partly on his shoulders, too (Iran is the senior partner in that guilt).
A diplomatic deal would lessen the burden on Mattis to manage a quasi-war in Syria after ISIL is defeated. Which is appealing because moving directly to an anti-Assad insurgency is not in the cards.
You'll note that I long argued that the Syrian Kurds who are the ground core of the fight against ISIL wouldn't be the core of an anti-Assad force post-ISIL.
But a settlement could also result in Assad eventually regaining control of all of Syria--if rebels are demoralized and demobilized--or it could be the path to ratifying a fragmented Syria if the various power centers solidify.
I assume the key to guiding our post-ISIL Syria policy is to weaken Iran, who is clearly our main foe in the region.
UPDATE: From Strategypage:
Who controls Syria once ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) and other rebels are defeated? It is basically a showdown between Iran (which has been at war with Israel since the 1980s) and Israel (which does not want Iranian military forces on its Syrian border under any circumstances). Iran is also at war with Saudi Arabia and its Sunni Arab allies. Not surprisingly the Saudis and Israel have been cooperating more since 2001 because of this shared threat.
They say this is rearranging the chess board for the next war. Pretty much. I've long wondered what we'd do after defeating ISIL and hoped we were strengthening non-jihadi rebels to defeat the Assad regime and their Iranian and Russian patrons.
Is this a fight that Israel and Saudi Arabia will wage given the importance of defeating Iran somewhere?
UPDATE: You have to admit that if Iran wants to build an overland supply route to Lebanon to support their proxy Hezbollah, that the road is moot if Lebanon is no longer a playground for Iranian mayhem:
Saudi Arabia has opened a new front in its regional proxy war with Iran, threatening Tehran's powerful ally Hezbollah and its home country Lebanon to try to regain the upper hand.
We should all hope that this works. Lebanon could be a far better state that offers hope for real economic and social progress in the region if it can expel the Iranian-sponsored state-within-a-state that Hezbollah is.
UPDATE: Would a Saudi-Israeli alliance against Iran in Lebanon extend to Saudi support for an Israeli invasion to rip apart Hezbollah to exploit their 2,000 KIA in Syria on behalf of Assad and Iran?
UPDATE: More on the Saudi-Iran semi-hot war in Yemen.
And while having an Iranian outpost in Saudi Arabia's rear in Yemen is disturbing, don't forget the oil angle that Iranian dominance of the southern outlet to the Red Sea would provide Tehran's mullahs.
I've noted the oil export route problem in Yemen more recently.
Would the Israel-Saudi alliance include Saudi support for Israeli action in Lebanon while Israel provides support for Saudi action in Yemen?
UPDATE: Egypt has backed Saudi Arabia over Iran regarding events in Lebanon.
Egyptian diplomatic support would be important if Israel hits Hezbollah; and Egypt could contribute ground troops and amphibious warfare assets (that Saudi Arabia financed) for the Yemen fight in addition to diplomatic support for the Saudis there in the fight against Iranian-backed forces.
UPDATE: Syria declares victory over ISIL. Assad carried out my general advice to "work the problem" rather than give up in despair.
No doubt. America was the major factor in that victory. Sadly, America did not arm other rebels to replace ISIL in resisting Assad by the time ISIL has been defeated.
And even if Assad takes over the territory held by rebels, can Assad's forces tamp down an insurgency that could continue to resist Assad even when rebels lose their territorial bases?
Rebels still stand. If supported, can they carry on against the battered Assad military?
