He has a point:
After over a quarter century of failure in demanding the very same concessions from Pyongyang, and relying heavily upon the same conventional strategy (more sanctions, threats of force and diplomacy on American terms), it’s time for the United States to change the policy. The longer U.S. political leaders continue to believe that denuclearizing North Korea is realistic, the longer it will take for the White House to craft a strategy to the problem that actually has a possibility of working: Cold War–era deterrence.
I've long been a believer that a problem restricted to North Korea can be handled by deterrence and isolation.
(That's from America's perspective, of course, since we won't care if Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan go nuclear as a result of North Korea's nuclear status. What China thinks of that consequence is another matter altogether).
But isolation has to mean isolation. The problem with deterring North Korea is that without true isolation, North Korea could sell nuclear technology or even nuclear weapons to Iran. China won't mind that. But we should care a great deal.
So if you can show me how we prevent a nuclear North Korea from leading to a nuclear-armed nutball-run Iran, I'm fine with containing and deterring North Korea.
And keep in mind that such a program to separate North Korea from their Iranian customer could be achieved either by securely isolating North Korea or by ending the mullah-run regime in Iran that is the only country in line for North Korean nukes right now.
Back when President Bush 43 named an Axis of Evil of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, I assumed it meant direct military action against Saddam's Iraq, the overthrow of the mullah regime by supporting popular unrest in Iran, and isolation and deterrence of North Korea.
I'd be more than happy to get back to the original assumptions I had back then.
