Tuesday, May 26, 2009

Point of Order, If I May?

I'm rather sympathetic to the frustration over attempting to deal with North Korea to end their nuclear ambitions. I tend to think there is nothing we could give North Korea to persuade them to abandon their nuclear weapons program.

But these two authors are way off in their solution, which is to abandon the six-party talks and go one-on-one to achieve a unified and friendly Korea:

If we decide to talk again, American diplomacy should expand beyond nuclear talks to begin preparing for the outcome it wants: a democratic, unified and eventually nonnuclear Korea. As Korea expert Andrei Lankov has suggested, America's new approach could include the opening of cultural, educational and economic exchanges with the North. Western experts should be encouraged to teach at North Korean universities; North Koreans should be allowed to study in the West; and the United States, Japan and South Korea should undertake cooperative economic projects in the North. The United States should also open more radio and television broadcasts from South Korea and the West. In short, Washington's diplomacy with North Korea should focus on measures that raise North Koreans' standard of living and exposure to the West. This would keep our focus on long-term strategic objectives. And who knows? Maybe a new American approach to North Korea will provide an added benefit: If China sees its prominence diminished in North Korean diplomacy, maybe it will finally have some reason to act more forcefully in disarming Kim.


I say we ask for a pony, too.

I mean, these are great goals. Don't get me wrong. I like them. But if I may be so bold, just how do we convince the North Koreans to go along? I mean, they famously dickered forever over the shape of the table to end the Korean War (well, a truce, but you get my point). Just how are we to get them to sign on to policies that we believe will lead them to become a unified and pro-American non-nuclear state?

So really, China will never face any dilemma over helping us lest we get a maximum gain at their expense because North Korea will never agree to any of this let alone the whole package.

Of course, I've long been in favor of squeezing the North Koreans until they implode, containing them and preparing to cope with either a surprise missile launch or conventional attack on Seoul. As far as I'm concerned, the talks are just a way to keep the North Koreans from striking while their military has any residual strength. Every day our side gets stronger, and until North Korea has nuclear missiles or bombs I'm fine with smiling and going through the motions of talking. Actual agreements just risk giving enough aid to put off the day of collapse beyond the day North Korea goes nuclear.

The problem is that we have to consistently isolate North Korea. Any lessening of pressure just puts off the day of collapse and makes it more likely that North Korea gets the bomb before it collapses. Yet we have had to give North Korea enough hope that they could strike gold with talks by not too openly putting the screws to them. I think we've done rather nicely so far the last 6 years or so.

Once North Korea has a nuclear weapon (and their successful test of a nuclear device does not mean they have nuclear warheads), the question must become under what circumstances do we strike North Korea's nuclear arsenal? And do we press on for regime change, too? In for a penny, in for a pound, and all that. Or can we continue to isolate them and deter them, still hoping for a collapse without a desperate nuclear launch that our missile defenses can't handle?

But if the goal is to put pressure on China, instead of this fanciful proposal, perhaps we should state that it will become our policy to help any entity that feels threatened by North Korea's nuclear arsenal to help them with both missile defense and their own nuclear deterrent. After all, if we're supposed to be so understanding of Pyongyang's fears of American attack despite 50+ years of not actually invading them despite our nuclear dominance, shouldn't the world (and China in particular) understand the worries of Japan, South Korea, Australia, and even Taiwan?

So far we've essentially shielded China from the logical consequences of their refusal to help disarm North Korea. If nuclear proliferation is going to happen despite our best efforts and China's interference, why should it stop with North Korea going nuclear?

Why not let China bear the biggest share of the resulting problem? And this path at least has the advantage of North Korea's full cooperation.