As Long As We Let Them Die

Making deals with North Korea over their nuclear weapons ambitions is a fool's game--if we expect to talk the current North Korean regime out of nukes. But I don't assume we are screwing the pooch with the proposed deal.

Already, the North Koreans have announced different ideas about what America and North Korea agreed to. They say we'll talk about providing nuclear reactors that don't easily and directly allow for diversion to nuclear weapons programs. We say we said no such thing.

So North Korea already has a reason to violate any limited pledges they give on suspending nuclear programs--after they get the nutritional aid.

And since it seems unlikely that North Korea will abandon their nuclear weapons drive because their conventional military is rotting away every day, I have to suspect that the North Koreans have simply decided that either they have advanced enough for now to suspend activities; or they have other facilities that they don't consider part of the deal that can pursue their nuclear program; or they really are desperate enough to pause their programs to get food aid to pass the immediate crisis period.

So this deal won't solve the problem of North Korea.

But it might help with the ultimate solution. As I've long written, I'm all in favor of talking with North Korea. As long as we let their regime die.

I don't want North Korea to have nuclear weapons but their possession is not nearly in the same league as Iran getting them. I think the risk of containing North Korea is worth taking even as I think the risk of trying to contain a nuclear Iran is not worth the risk. And that's the worst case.

Even before North Korea gets nuclear weapons (at best they now have a nuclear device that North Korean scientists can partially explode in laboratory conditions), China will have more problems with North Korea getting nuclear weapons than we will. We are far from North Korea and have missile defenses both off the coast of North Korea on ships to hit missiles going up and back in the United States to hit any coming down.

China is close to countries like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan who might decide that they need nuclear weapons, too, if North Korea gets them. Is China really eager to live with nuclear-armed states that close to China? And if China simply increases their arsenal to cope, how will India react? And will other countries go nuclear once the genie is out of the bottle and the stigma of going nuclear is diluted with a rush for A-bombs? And what about Russia? They claim to worry about America when we have no interest in destroying Russia (we are happy with stopping with the Soviet Union's death). If China--close by, growing in economic and military power, and with old memories of Russian territory once being Chinese--gets a larger nuclear arsenal, I do believe one or two senior generals in Moscow will soil their armor.

And really, for us, there is at least the advantage of our friends going nuclear that China can no longer threaten us by asking are we willing to trade Los Angeles for Tokyo, Seoul, or Taipei?

Even our food aid might be OK. We say it will be in the form of nutritional supplements appropriate for small children and not basic food aid that can be diverted to the black market, the ruling class, and the military. And we say we will monitor the aid. If we do that, this doesn't violate my notion of talking while letting their regime die. We want to prevent North Korea from deciding that their position is hopeless so they might as well roll the dice and start a war. If food aid impossible or difficult to divert from children is part of the price we need to allow North Korea to continue to rot away without starting a war, I'm fine with that.

During the Bush administration I was not quick to jump on them for talking or offering limited aid as long as it was insufficient to rescue North Korea but enough to keep them from starting an expensive war. We'd win--unless North Korea got really lucky and early and heavy use of chemical weapons caused the complete collapse of the South Korean army--but it would be an expensive win.

So I'll keep an open mind on the deal. I just hope the big-brained practitioners of nuanced, smart diplomacy don't believe that they have found the secret that has eluded their predecessors for persuading North Korea to abandon nuclear weapons programs.

If our ultimate goal is to bring about the collapse of North Korea and our tactics are merely to prevent Pyongyang from rolling the dice on war with their remaining military capabilities until it is too late to exercise that option, I'm fine with talking and even some aid. We shall see.