To the Shores of Hainan

I've suspected that our Marine Corps is highly unlikely to need the ability to assault enemy-held shores in division strength again. Which is why I've wanted them to make urban combat their primary focus rather than amphibious warfare. The amphibious warfare priority resulted from World War II in the Pacific and is hardly the reason to keep that focus for all time.

China may have given the Marine Corps a new lease on amphibious life:

Several smaller naval bases and navy air fields already exist on Hainan Island, but the new base is shaping up as a major facility, one capable of supporting a much larger fleet than China now possesses. India is particularly concerned because the Hainan base is close to the Indian ocean, and areas where the Indian Navy has long been top dog. Many other nations note the proximity of the new base to the Straits of Malacca, the busiest shipping channel on the planet.

I've long figured that a war with China is one that will have limited ground combat. Even if it should expand to the Korean peninsula, it would remain a peripheral theater. We simply don't have the ground forces to invade China in anything other than a raid.

The point is that ground forces would support air and naval forces. I've even thought seizing Hainan Island would be a useful mission to make sure we have a bargaining chip. But with China making Hainan Island more important for Chinese power projection, capturing Hainan Island becomes a mission more directly supportive of the air and naval war. And a major base would require a major Marine Corps effort to spearhead the invasion.

What is really puzzling is why China wouldn't just build a base on the mainland that would not be vulnerable to an American invasion. The island is not significantly closer to the Indian Ocean or points south than a base on the mainland. But the island is more vulnerable to our forces.