Russia's operational pause ... sort of ... continues despite being formally ended while Russia degrades Ukraine's strength until Russia can resume a ground offensive. Ukraine shapes the battlefield for a real counteroffensive with deep strikes on Russia's command and control capabilities, and strikes Russia's artillery ammunition supply.
The map above shows my worry and my hope from early on. Neither has happened yet.
Russia failed to carry out an encirclement in the Donbas, although it did complete the conquest of Luhansk province at great cost. Russia's offensive, with everything scraped together for a narrow offensive in Luhansk province, has seemingly culminated.
Ukraine paid a heavy price, too, trading space for time. It has launched counter-attacks but has yet to begin a counteroffensive that could achieve decisive results. Can Ukraine do that before Russia repairs its ground forces?
As this analysis from the Dupuy Institute puts it (tip to Instapundit):
You either have the aggregated combat power to move forward against your opponent or you don’t. If you don’t, then you halt and rest. Of course, your opponent also gets to rest. Which army is in more need of rest, which army is receiving more new and modern equipment, which army is receiving more new trained troops?
From last week we see the two sides sparring for position:
Ukrainian forces have struck at least three Russian military sites in southern Ukraine as they intensified their counteroffensive in the region, while Russia maintained its shelling of towns and cities in the east, south, and center of the country.
The Russians have been pounding Ukraine for months now. Ukraine's effort is both new and small:
“Russian forward ammunition dumps are quite possibly the most unsafe places in any war zone,” explained an American army handbook published in 2016. Munitions were not stored safely, it noted, and many dated from the Soviet era, close to their expiry dates, creating “a tinderbox ready to explode”. “Priority targeting of these areas will cause a serious logistics strain on the Russian system,” it concluded. Ukrainian generals are now putting that theory to the test.
The Ukrainians are attacking key targets and not just supply dumps, using unguided rockets to pave the way for the GPS-guided rockets:
Can Russia defend, disperse, and conceal those targets? Can Russia destroy Ukraine's weapons inflicting the damage? Can Russia continue its firepower-intensive operations with successful coping mechanisms?
And if Russia can't cope sufficiently, can Ukraine exploit that success with an operational victory that destroys Russian units and liberates territory in large chunks?
Oddly, according to this ISW update, Russia's operational pause was prematurely ended. Formally, anyway. Is this political pressure from Putin on his military? Is it a "use it or lose it" decision in the face of Ukrainian attacks on Russian ammunition dumps? It certainly isn't because Russia has restored their ground forces to fighting trim.
And then there's the volksgrenadier volunteer battalions that Putin ordered formed to replace his army's losses. Expensive, ill-trained cannon fodder doesn't seem like a war-winning combination.
If Ukraine can't seize the initiative, Russia will eventually resume its offensive. Which may not be enough to conquer Ukraine. But it may be enough to solidify Russia's control of what it took this year. Which will allow Russia to recover and resume the war from more advanced position in the future if Russia is willing to endure the casualties again.
ISW updates continue here.
