Other than an annoying reference to the Iraq stabilization mission being "a mess" (which is just an anti-war buzzword by our war-time left that ignores that while the post-war was absolutely messy, we overcame the various messes and achieved a victory that few recognize), the analysis focuses on a very real issue with the North Korea problem:
The major question that has emerged from the Hanoi talks is what Japan will do now. Japan is the world’s third-largest economy. It has a stable and homogeneous population, a substantial military force and an enormous capacity to increase that force. ...
The Hanoi talks subtly shift that guarantee. The new U.S. position is that it cannot accept a North Korean nuclear program that threatens the United States. Implicit in that position is that it can tolerate one that threatens Japan. The U.S. nuclear umbrella is notionally still there, but the United States’ reluctance to engage raises the question of whether North Korea will be deterred. So, the U.S. nuclear deterrent still guards Japan – but can the guardian be trusted?
Add in regional resentment for World War II in Asia, Chinese claims on Japanese territory, and Russian occupation of Japanese territory since World War II, and you have a Japan that has to figure out what to do.
This differing perception of the North Korea threat has long been a problem, as I discussed more than a dozen years ago. Our efforts to stop North Korea before they could threaten our homeland ran into problems with South Korea because Seoul was already under threat of destruction from conventional and chemical weapons. Eliminating North Korean nukes would not eliminate the North Korean threat to cripple South Korea. Acting forcefully to prevent North Korea from being a threat to America just made it more likely that South Korea would lose Seoul to protect Seattle.
And until Japan was under threat, they could hope to ignore the need to arm up and kill the goose that laid their economic golden egg. But intermediate-range North Korean nukes made Japan more eager to get America to roll back the threat even if it risks South Korea.
We had the best position in this because of our distance:
We are least under threat from North Korea so far and want to stop North Korea before it can threaten us directly with nukes. We have the advantage that we may be able to build defenses to stop a small attack from North Korea at short, medium, or long range. We have the advantage of having lots of nukes and so can hopefully deter Pyongyang in all but the most delusional state of mind. We don't mind if North Korea collapses since we won't have to pay for it directly. We can live with a conventional invasion of South Korea since we are getting out of the way and South Korea can largely handle it with our air and naval power in support of their army. We are working on blocking North Korean nuclear and missile exports (including intercepting ships at sea) and are cracking down on North Korea's criminal enterprises.
We can also afford to play harder ball than our South Korean and Japanese allies. So other players who fear collapse or war or small attacks close by have to play along with us than they might like since we can push things much farther without any really bad effects hitting us--at least compared to the rest of the five.
With North Korea on the cusp of long-range nukes, we have the most ability to live with North Korean nukes as long as the nukes are short-range and threaten only South Korea and Japan. South Korea may not see much difference in the threat from nukes, but Japan sure does and has direct experience with being a target.
Funny enough, South Korea and Japan might find they can live with this situation since an America immune to North Korean nukes is more willing to deter North Korean use of nukes against Japan and South Korea by threatening nuclear use against North Korea.
And while I do worry a lot about whether North Korea can restrain itself from using nukes out of fear of losing them, we wouldn't face the worst consequences of that failure if North Korea lacks long-range nukes.
So what does Japan do according to Friedman?
The Japanese public is on the whole comfortable with its postwar strategy [of limited military power and reliance on American power]. But with the rise of China, North Korean nuclear weapons and a potentially aggressive Russia, it cannot remain so for long. As the U.S. puts pressure on its allies to carry their own burdens, the Japanese strategy is becoming increasingly untenable. It cannot undergo a serious shift until the public does, and that means there will be an internal political crisis over the matter. But public opinion is already shifting, and the Japanese will face their reality.
Japan will rearm. You'd think that this prospect would be enough to push China to reverse North Korea's nuclear program completely. But so far it has not. I can understand why Russia wouldn't mind a rearmed Japan since China is a bigger threat to Russian territory and most of Japan's defenses would be to resist the rising China.
Of course, I was completely wrong in that old post about my hopes that North Korea would collapse under our pressure, making the differing objectives irrelevant. But our pressure has not been consistent. Is it now consistent enough and harsh enough to make Kim worry enough to cave to denuclearization? Or to agree to abandon the ability to threaten the continental United States?
And how fast will that Japanese opinion take to shift when we are safe behind a thin shield and a deal that stops North Korea from developing ICBMs?
