President Bush's basic gut instinct about the need to do this is exactly right. His thinking that this could be done on the cheap, though, with little postwar planning, was exactly wrong. Partly as a result, this great moment has already cost America over $100 billion and 10,000 killed and wounded.
With reports out that Saddam planned his irregular war after Baghdad fell, I have to ask just what plan would have stopped that resistance? Until the reports of a Baathist plan emerged, the line of attack by the "no-plan" anti-war camp was that after we blitzed the Iraqis, the delay in getting troops spread out for security emboldened the Sunnis to resist when otherwise they would have just gotten with the program and not resisted.
Especially remember that after Baghdad fell the critics of the war were urging our troops to put on soft caps and mingle with the populace to show we were friendly cops.
The Baathists were set to resist and putting a bunch of troops on the streets would have just provided targets for the Baathists (excuse me, I need to go turn off Chris Matthews--I will never ever watch that SOB again) to attack.
The only plan of ours that could have undercut Saddam's plan was to hit him in the fall of 2002 before he could hide the money, the WMD, the arms, and the cadre to organize resistance in the Sunni Triangle. I worried in our long telegraphed year-long "rush" to war that we were giving Saddam that most precious commodity--time. And he used it.
As an aside, I don't think an insurgency was Plan A. I don't believe that Saddam planned to lose. I think he likely planned for an insurgency as a last resort, but his troop dispositions indicate to me that he hoped to stop us conventionally--at least long enough for his attorneys (France and Russia) to get him off on a technicality. Remember that the fedayeen seemed to be south and west of Baghdad where they could harass us as we headed for Baghdad. If Saddam had succeeded in getting a siege of Baghdad going, the foreign jihadis would have been useful in our rear areas tying down troops as we tried to take Baghdad without leveling it and suffering high casualties. Remember too that Republican Guard divisions tried to stop V Corps and I MEF as they approached Baghdad. If it was to be guerrilla warfare only, the RG would have dispersed and gone to ground. Concentrating to fight indicates Saddam thought he could beat us.
Note too that the regular Iraqi army cannon fodder was kept away from our line of advance. They were put on the Iranian border and along the Kurdish line. If Saddam had stopped us at Baghdad, these mediocre units--really only useful for killing civilians--would have been kept intact for the post-war. If I had been planning an insurgency as my first and only line of defense I would have shoved the regulars in the way of the invasion to be destroyed by the US (so they wouldn't defect) and inflict at least some casualties and impose at least a little delay. But no, they were kept to the rear so they'd survive to keep the Shias down.
Saddam planned a reasonable response to our plan. But he could plan for his post-war only because we gave him time. Launching the most telegraphed war in human history was the problem--not our lack of the perfect plan.
But hey, at least Friedman wants to win. I'll settle for that.
