Transition Force

Ever since the Iraqi insurgents emerged, I've argued that getting Iraqis into the fight was the only solution and that adding troops would be counter-productive. I think that more US troops would be doubly harmful in that it would discourage Iraqis from doing the fighting, thinking America will shoulder the burden. And if the Iraqis don't fight it guarantees that we will need triple or more our current force level to fight a truly national insurgency instead of the localized Sunni insurgency. Afghanistan shows that victory is not just dependent on troop levels. If troop levels are the only measure for success, 18,000 American troops should be holed up in enclaves besieged by Taliban forces.

The Iraqi interim government recognizes that getting Iraqis into the fight is key to winning against the insurgents and terrorists. This article notes Prime Minister Allawi's thoughts:

"Rebuilding the army and the forces of national safety enable us to work on asking for the final withdrawal of the multinational forces from our beloved country according to a set timetable."

As haltingly as it has gone, the way home for our troops leads through an effective Iraqi security force. And despite the setbacks, we are making progress. We have to remember that we don't need American-equivalent Iraqi troops to win. Were the Baathist forces as good as US forces during their long rule? The troops we are training will be good enough--and better than the former regime troops I dare say:

With Fallujah shut down as a Baath Party/al Qaeda sanctuary, the fighting in Iraq has shifted to gang warfare. American intelligence efforts have identified dozens of different Sunni Arab gangs operating in different parts of central Iraq. Unable to get many Sunni Arabs to actively cooperate with them in most areas, the troops just go out and hunt down the hostile gunmen. In most parts of Iraq, non-American troops have a much easier time of it with cooperative Iraqis. But the Sunni Arabs will continue to actively resist until armed and determined Iraqis come in and shut them down.

American forces will still have a role in Iraq for years to come. As Iraqi forces become good enough to fight the insurgents, US forces will be able to pull into remote bases and deter the Iranians or Syrians from attacking Iraq. By providing this shield to external threats, the Iraqis will be able to focus on counter-insurgency without worrying about preparing for major combat operations. Only after the Baathists and Islamists are defeated can the Iraqis rebuild a regular military force to take over the external defense role of the US Army.

Two divisions with 7-8 brigades in a total force of 75,000 US forces should be enough in this role. Once the Iraqis build a regular army, we may be in the position to negotiate a basing agreement with the Iraqis for a small army force of a brigade and maybe a brigade set of equipment to aid reinforcements plus Air Force units to provide air cover until the Iraqis can build air defenses.

We will be in Iraq for a long time. We will not be fighting for much of that time when we look back. When these transitions take place is unknown but they will occur.