Saturday, April 07, 2018

He Keeps Using That Word "Cannot"

Iran does not allow inspections at any military site that the IAEA wants to visit. This analysis that says Iran "cannot" block inspections ignores reality and the language of the Iran deal itself that Iran relies on to overrule any secondary documents the deal itself incorporates.

This is clearly wrong:

The IAEA’s authority to inspect military sites derives from Iran’s legally binding Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) as well as the Additional Protocol (AP) to the CSA, which Iran committed to apply as part of the JCPOA.[2] Like all other countries subject to CSA safeguards under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Iran cannot declare any site to be a sanctuary off-limits to IAEA inspectors. [emphasis added]

It is clearly wrong because Iran does declare sites off limits to inspection and the Obama administration echo chamber and many others continue to defend the deal, saying it is "working." They don't seem to have any problem with Iran's policy of keeping inspectors out of certain sites.

And the deal itself gives Iran a reason to keep inspectors away from sites where Iran can carry out prohibited nuclear activity, as I noted at the time:

At page 42 we get to access to nuclear facilities. The section starts out by saying access shall be requested "in good faith, with due observation of the sovereign rights of Iran, and kept to the minimum necessary to effectively implement the verification responsibilities" under the deal.

Who decides good faith, what doesn't interfere with sovereign rights, and what the minimum is? These sound like multiple grounds for Iran to halt inspections.

If we think there are unlawful activities or materials or undeclared facilities, the IAEA has to tell Iran the basis for the concerns and request clarification. No time limit is mentioned for getting clarification.

If the clarification doesn't resolve the IAEA's concerns--not our concerns apparently, just the secretive IAEA's--the IAEA may request access to the location and provide Iran with reasons in writing and make available relevant information. May? Not must? What is relevant? The name of whoever provided the information? The type of satellite that spotted something? Doesn't this just give Iran information to refine their ability to avoid detection?

On page 43, Iran can propose an alternative to site visits, which should be given due and prompt consideration! Seriously?

Come on. Iran can drive a nuke through those "good faith," "sovereign rights," "minimum," and "may" loopholes. And they will.

As a side note, it was absolutely insane to require inspectors to tell Iran just how we found out information that indicates cheating on the nuclear deal. That both allows Iran to correct flaws in their security and deters whistle blowers who might tell inspectors that Iran is cheating. Ah, "smart diplomacy" at work!

Why would related agreements apply when the deal itself clearly has language that conflicts with those related agreements? And why would our brilliant diplomats under that idiot Kerry have agreed to such language rather than mirror language in the side agreements themselves to prevent Iran from making--and enforcing--their argument?

Iran can and will continue to keep inspectors out of sensitive sites. And I don't see any sanctions "snapping back" on the theory that Iran "cannot" keep inspectors out under the horrible nuclear deal.

The Iran deal should be ended. And the argument that the deal foolishly granted benefits up front should not be the reason to keep it in place and shield Iran as it goes nuclear.