Monday, July 11, 2005

A Well-Rounded Navy

A little while back I wrote about the Navy building littoral combat ships (LCS) to go back to the high-low mix of World War II. Right now we have a lot of capital ships even though we call some of them "destroyers":

First of all, I want a fleet second to none. The fact is, we have that easily. So any discussion of our fleet must start with the fact that we could beat any conceivable combination of enemies at sea.

Second, prior to Pearl Harbor, our fleet had a half dozen carriers and a dozen battleships plus some cruisers and lots of destroyers in the surface fleet. We had few ships above 10,000 tons (the heavy cruisers and up) while the rest were 5,000-ton light cruisers and destroyers of less than 3,000 tons. One thing you have to remember is that the 55 "destroyers" of the
Arleigh Burke class and the 3 Spruance class that we still have weigh in at 8-9,000 tons. These ships are only slightly smaller than our 24 Ticonderoga class cruisers that tilt the scales at 9,600 tons. [These numbers are slightly different from the Strategypage numbers below.]

Our destroyers are really major capital ships and quite capable. It is a mistake to think that the terms are comparable from pre-WW II days. I thought that with all these capital ships masquerading as minor ships based on terminolgy, the Navy was prepared to build a lot of smaller ships and build up numbers fairly easily, relying on the cushion of our current heavy fleet.


Strategypage writes that we are going to build even smaller ships, littoral surface craft (LSC):

It’s a 1,600 ton (full load) catamaran that is 262 feet long, 72 feet wide and can operate in as little as 12 feet of water. Top speed is about 90 kilometers an hour, which is a unique capability for U.S. navy ships (especially of this size) and a major advantage in coastal operations. Even in rough seas (with up to seven foot waves), the ship can do about 70 kilometers an hour. This is partly the result of using a T shaped hydrofoil. The Sea Fighter has a crew of only 26, and room below and on the deck for twelve cargo containers. These containers can are called "mission modules" and hold weapons, electronics or robotic air, surface or undersea vehicles for jobs like mine clearing, anti-submarine warfare, destroying surface ships or delivering commandoes. The deck is broad enough to handle two helicopters. There is a dock in the rear for launching boats. The ship can stay for sea about eight days at time.

I like this trend very much. Back in April 1998, Army magazine published an article of mine, "Landpower Needed for Decisive Victory" (link to synopsis).

I had earlier tried to sell this to the US Naval Institute (and as a whine, they purchased two articles of mine in the late 1990s yet never published them--thanks a lot...) and for them emphasized the need for a balanced fleet. For the Army audience, I emphasized the problem of influencing events ashore even as the squadrons evolved into more balanced fleets with even a mercenary army organized to project our power ashore.

Even a balanced fleet that finally emerged was, with the local army we raised, only able to win a limited victory from the sea:

Preble's war ended on September 9, 1804, when Samuel Barron arrived. The new squadron was the largest and most balanced yet and included two American-built bomb vessels and nine American-built gunboats. Barron still lacked a ground threat to complement his powerful fleet.

To create a ground threat, the Americans raised a mercenary army around Mohamet Caramanli, brother of the Bashaw and claimant to the throne. The agreement reached between the Americans and Caramanli called for Tripoli to use tribute to pay America for the costs of the war! With some difficulty, the force advanced from Egypt and seized Derna after a march of 600 miles with the support of American warships offshore.

On August 26, 1805, the American Consul General arrived in Tripoli to commence negotiations. Terms were agreed upon on June 3, 1805. America agreed to pay $60,000 for peace and ransom for the POWs, but not the customary annual tribute.


Of course, now we have powerful American land forces engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. And our big-ship fleet dominates the blue water as no navy has ever done. Yet we still need a fleet able to enter the littorals and fight. The LCS and the LSC are necessary components of a balanced fleet to contribute to all war scenarios.