Maan: Part 2

The article on the Maan operation notes the key roads going through the city. The article raises the question of why Jordanian armor was used. Well, if convoys of American armor needed to head north without being spotted, having Jordanian armor rolling around a sealed city means that anybody hearing anything will assume it is Jordanian armor deploying. And with the city sealed off, moving past at night means nobody will see us. Given past unrest, it is certainly easily possible that the crackdown is being conducted for the sake of the crackdown, but I still think we are deploying to eastern Jordan to invade Iraq from there.

All the more reason to invade from this direction since Saddam has apparently paid $3.5 billion to Libya to provide a refuge for Saddam’s family in case we invade or his subjects revolt successfully. A major effort out of the west complicates Saddam’s flight plans. If true, this is excellent news. When his subordinates notice he is leaving, telling them to fight on and he’ll "be right back," they will start doing the same to their subordinates. This could be real easy. I’m actually starting to gain some confidence—just a bit—that it really will be easy. If so, thus do we see the payoff of using overwhelming force. Scares the bejeezus out of our enemies. Even if this is just psychological warfare, if Saddam’s subordinates believe Saddam is poised to run, that is good too. Still, speed of violence is still necessary. Iraqis who showed little interest in defending Iranian territory seized in 1980, gained the will to resist when Iran invaded Iraq in 1982. We could see that same spirit if we are too slow to crush them. I doubt it though, since this isn’t 1982 and we aren’t Iranians. You need some confidence you might win to resist and outside the Special Republican Guards and special security/intelligence outfits, loyalty may be hit or miss. Most Republican Guards loyal, and some regular army loyal. The rest desert (with individuals and small groups defecting), stay in the barracks, or defect as units. But once word is out that Saddam and other higher ups are fleeing, kiss that loyalty goodbye.

So let’s see, one heavy division could advance out of eastern Jordan; another heavy division could slip out of Kuwait, be trucked west through Saudi Arabia, and then drive north along a road there into western Iraq to link up with the division out of Jordan (assuming that road north is sufficient to supply it); and fly in the 101st into H-3 after we capture it; then drive on Baghdad with the full corps and cross the Euphrates. Would Saudi Arabia help this way? They say no to aiding us. But we keep saying we’re satisfied with their level of assistance yet don’t say what they are doing. Makes sense they would allow us transit through their country while publicly sucking up to Saddam to avoid a volley of chemical-filled Scuds aimed at them.

Material breach is coming.

NOTE (Posted November 15, 2002): I meant to link to Andrew Sullivan to credit him with the Unabomber reference regarding the Iraqi letter of 'acceptance.' Better late than never...