Putin bit off more than he can chew in Ukraine. His only hope is to negotiate deals with Ukraine, NATO, India, South Korea, and Japan to let Russia pivot to Asia to fend off Chinese threats to Russian interests in Central Asia and the Far East.
The war is clarifying and accelerating Russia's junior status in the China-Russian partnership:
Mr Putin's invasion of Ukraine, which has not gone according to plan, has weakened Russia. The Kremlin admits that the Russian army has suffered "significant losses", while Western sanctions are putting the economy under intense pressure. In the Russia-China relationship, it feels more and more that Russia is the junior partner.
In their meeting, Mr Putin conceded that China has "questions and concerns" about the situation in Ukraine. It was an unexpected admission, by the Kremlin, that Russia's so-called special military operation is causing some anxiety in Beijing.
Having burned bridges with the West and sparked an energy war with Europe, Mr Putin is attempting a pivot east (he's left himself little choice). He's hoping to reorient the Russian economy and find new markets for Russian oil and gas. It's quite a challenge.
"The hope is that this pivot will work and will have credible dividends for Russia. But I don't see this happening," believes Sergey Radchenko, a professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. "What Russia needs is ultimately in the West: its technology, its markets.
Russia is certainly publicly doubling down on its relationship with China:
Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of the national Security Council chaired by Russian President Vladimir Putin, described the “strengthening of comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation with Beijing as an unconditional priority of Russia’s foreign policy.”
But given the power disparity and the exposure of Russian military weakness in Ukraine, the "partnership" and "strategic cooperation" can only mean letting China call the shots.
How long can Putin let this go on without Russian paranoia leading to suspicion of Putin himself?
Years ago I noted an old assessment of Russian power:
Russia has ... three sources of weakness, inherent and irremediable--Poland, the Caucasus, and the Fleet. All these deprive her of immense sums of money and large masses of men.
And as I address in that post, expecially given Poland's impressive military improvement drive and membership in NATO, Russian focus on NATO as a threat certainly makes this apply; the Caucasus is certainly distracting Russia with its unrest and conflicts that Russia tries to police since 1991; and you know my view of the Russian blue water fleet waste of money.
Pivoting away from all three of those commitments--or as many as they can--would help Russia defend its Far East territory and position in Central Asia.
Already it seems as if Putin is hedging bets by making the Pacific fleet Russia's priority fleet. He can say it is to fight alongside the Chinese. But if NATO is the threat Putin has claimed, this decision is insane. Putin's decision only makes sense to obscure a pivot to facing China.
The only way Putin can survive is to argue that he must pivot from Ukraine to an even bigger threat from China. Putin could claim that the war against Ukraine was all about getting the West to pay attention to Russia's real security concerns--in the Far East and Russia's lost Central Asian territories.
And if the West plays along with Russia, we can flip Russia against China. Not that NATO would let Russia join it. NATO states barely on board defending new eastern NATO states against Russia are never going to extend NATO's border to the Amur River to face China. But you must admit, NATO has proven with its Ukraine policy that it is willing to help a friendly non-NATO state against territorial aggression.
America can keep another argument for Russia flipping just between America and Russia.
I speculated that Russia might be striking Ukraine trying for a quick win prior to pivoting to defend itself from China. Faceplanting in Ukraine doesn't change the need for that pivot even if it raises the degree of difficulty and the freedom to do it on Russian terms. Although tearing up Ukraine helps the pivot, Russia damaged itself to a perhaps dangerous degree in the process. And Russia is continuing to damage itself.
Will Putin--or Russia without him--seek this dramatic way out of Russia's increasingly horrible strategic position of a two-front war a continent apart?
UPDATE: While signing the documents for the illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory, Putin blamed Russia's woes on the West. Clearly Putin doesn't want an exit strategy. Perhaps his successor will disagree.
Russia has to decide whether the Fuck-Up Fairy is Putin's personal advisor or someone who rules Russia.
UPDATE: I'm not very worried about Putin's recent nuclear sabre rattling. Russia needed nukes to defend its long borders even when the leaders thought they had a good military.
The war against Ukraine both exposed Russian conventional weakness and wrecked what was there. Russia needs potential enemies (coughChinacough) to fear Russian nukes even more, now. So the nuclear rhetoric goes up.
UPDATE: Via reader Eric, Putin's speech shows he clearly has no intention of breaking the societal paranoia that Russia has about the West to address the real threat China poses to Russia.
When will China decide this reality-challenged frenemy is going to drag China down with it? When will China decide Russia has created too great of an opportunity for China to reclaim lost Chinese lands in Russia's Far East? And/or to supplant Russian influence in Central Asia?
UPDATE: ISW has its own assessment of the annexation/paranoia speech. Although I suspect the nuclear threats were directed at China more than at the West.
NOTE: Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
