We can't finely calibrate the outcome of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Help Ukraine defeat the Russians. Nothing else is safe.
I never rely on assessments like this:
CIA Director William Burns offered a stark warning to lawmakers on Capitol Hill on Thursday: If you don’t approve aid to Ukraine now, Kyiv could lose the war by the end of the year.
We did approve the aid finally. And the first shipment was approved. But this dragged on a long time and saying Ukraine could have possibly avoided defeat until the end of the year was too rosy. Even now, Russia is gaining ground in the face of Ukrainian shortages of equipment and troops. Ukraine has depth to trade space for time in order to preserve their troops. But eventually Ukraine has to go forward like it did in late 2022 but failed to do in 2023.
War is a contest of troops, the government, and civilians. I think assessments like the Ukraine one are too reliant on quantifiable factors like numbers of troops, weapons, and ammunition.
We assessed the Afghanistan government could hold the line for two years after our planned final departure in September 2021.
The Afghan government didn't last until we we departed.
We assessed that Russia would rapidly conquer Ukraine in 2022.
Ukraine held.
So when I see a statement that Ukraine could hold out through this year even without American aid, I doubt the prediction is accurate.
Oh, if the prediction rests on how long Ukraine's weapons and ammunition will last, sure.
But war isn't waged by stockpiles of ammunition and weapons. Troops fight wars. Governments direct and fund them. And civilians support them.
When soldiers have to fight and die for a losing effort, they may decide to flee rather than fight to the end and die in a futile fight.
When government leaders have to think of whether they will live or die when the enemy wins, they may flee or defect in order to survive.
When civilians have to sacrifice their money and family--and perhaps themselves--to resist an enemy that seems like it will win regardless of their sacrifice, they may check out of the war, deciding (rightly or wrongly) flight abroad or even defeat and occupation by the enemy is safer.
I think our materiel help is arriving in time to avoid Ukraine's defeat this year. The visible proof of America's support bolsters Ukrainian morale, too. But I don't know if this is enough to defeat Russia. Or if we're even trying to do that:
I've noted that issue of defining what our victory should mean. Indeed, I do think we have to be careful about how Russia is defeated. But don't dare assume Russia will lose this war as an excuse to believe we can calibrate Western aid to Ukraine to get the perfect sort of win we need before Ukraine actually defeats Russia. That kind of nuanced effort risks rescuing Russia and giving Putin the chance to win by even marginally tipping the trends of a war on the knife's edge in Russia's favor.
And don't pretend a partition of Ukraine over Ukrainian objections is the path to peace.
We cannot calculate how long friends--or enemies--can fight as if they are mere machines with known tolerances. Take Vienna.
UPDATE (Tuesday): Bleeding Russia to stop their advances is Ukraine's priority now that American military aid has resumed. But carrying out an effective counteroffensive is the next vital job.
Is the Kherson front the theater Ukraine can best exploit despite the problems of crossing the Dnieper River and sustaining the offensive in the face of Russian air power and counter-attacks? I've raised that front:
Is Ukraine ready to ferry assault forces--by ferry, boat, and helicopter--and build pontoon bridges to feed mechanized troops across the river? Heck, could Ukraine have built a submerged bridge already? Can Ukraine then defend the bridges from air attacks? The ATACMS certainly put more Russian air fields at risk. Can Ukraine hit the Kerch Strait bridge and put it out of action? Can Ukraine attack lines of communication to slow down Russian reinforcements that would react to that crossing?
If this is a possibility, the Ukrainian forces attacking south toward Melitopol would become a supporting force that could exploit a Russian withdrawal to cope with the Ukrainian offensive on the thinnest part of Russia's front. And that attack would disrupt the Russian rush to the Kherson front.
Ukraine is getting the longer-range ATACMS now (I assume because we are producing the replacement). So the deep strike portion of that speculation is here. And Ukraine will soon have F-16s as well as more air defense missiles. Will that be enough to defend bridges and ferries to sustain a counteroffensive? And protect advancing troops from Russian air attacks?
And is Ukraine getting the engineering assets needed to cross the river in force and build the bridges needed to move and supply its brigades advancing east?
I just don't see what else Ukraine can do given the fortifications in Zaporizhia province and the short logistics line of Russian forces in the Donbas. If not on the Kherson front, Ukraine's hopes rely on regime or state collapse inside Russia itself.
I know I'm getting way ahead of where Ukraine is. But Ukraine has to get there to win this war.
UPDATE (Wednesday): ISW speculates on the next Russian moves. And this:
Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov stated on April 30 that there have been about 20,000 Russian troops in Russia on the northern Kharkiv Oblast border and about 100,000 in total in the Kupyansk direction for the past 10 months and that Russian forces have replaced units that have lost their combat capability in the past two months. Synehubov stated that Ukrainian forces are monitoring possible Russian redeployments in this area and noted that Russian forces may be accumulating troops to storm Ukrainian positions. Synehubov also reiterated that it is too early to assess whether Russian forces intend to open a new front, presumably in reference to speculations that Russia may start an offensive against Kharkiv City in the summer.
Honestly, if Russia has significant numerical superiority over Ukraine, I've long wondered by Russia doesn't expand the front across the sitzkrieg border north of the Donbas all the way to the Belarus border. It's odd, isn't it?
UPDATE (Wednesday): In a related area of spending, TDI goes into the numbers:
From a practical point of view, it appears that Ukraine with western aid is outspending Russian by at least 50%. Of course, I am comparing here Ukrainian 2024 figures to Russian 2023 figures. In the long run, that means that Ukraine will win. More than likely, it will force Russia to increase it defenses expenditures by at least 50%, up to 6% or more of GDP. This is sustainable.
How to factor in purchasing power parity is difficult to determine in scope, he notes. And Russia has room to increase its spending--but only if its people will endure it. Will Western nation voters support increasing their own support to Ukraine?
This is something I've long recognized--if Western support continues:
You'd think Russia clearly has the edge with a 9:1 GDP advantage.
But Russia is under Western sanctions that will harm Russia's ability to go to war production levels. Russian Soviet-era stockpiles will run low in time--or reach the material and ammo almost more dangerous to Russian users than Ukrainian targets.
And Ukraine is being supplied by the West, which has an immensely greater GDP advantage than Russia's advantage over Ukraine. So you can't just count the value of the arms and services provided to Ukraine when comparing the economic advantage. You'd have to count the research and development and logistics value on Ukraine's side of the ledger that provides the weapons, supplies, and services.
The war goes on. Ukraine will do well in 2024 just to make up for the year so far when delays in American military aid gave the initiative to Russia.
The assumption that the war will drag on for years could be right. But after three years, either side could decide that the price it is paying isn't worth it to pursue victory.
UPDATE (Friday): This is nice (that may sound grotesque but in a kill-or-be-killed war, killing Russian troops is nice for Ukraine):
More than 100 Russian soldiers were reportedly killed when a volley of Atacms missiles hit a training base in eastern Ukraine in one of the highest single losses of Russian lives in months.
But individual successes like that pale in the torrent of Russian advances that can only be stopped with a sizable flow of men and materiel to Ukraine.
I thought opening the ammo spigot from America would at least allow Ukraine to shed the limits of their artillery ammo usage rather quickly. But that doesn't appear to have happened yet. Perhaps getting ammo from depots to the front doesn't have a much quicker time than ammo coming across the Polish border.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.