I had saved post archives in my email before the old Yahoo!Geocities died. But years ago they seemed to be gibberish. A number were not available on the Internet Archives and I thought they were lost.
I recently checked my email archive of pre-Blogger posts and they were all legible. So I am restoring the gaps in my archives. Obviously all of the post permalinks are dead and artifacts of my ersatz-blog format back then. These were what I had formerly categorized as "defense issues."
"Overwhelming Ground Power" (Posted April 15, 2003)
The issue of the size and composition of a ground component of an invasion and the overall size of our Army and Marine Corps will be based on the just unofficially concluded Iraq War as a point of evidence. Both sides will use it. This is my take on it.
First of all, the size of the invasion force and whether it constituted overwhelming force is contested. The size of the invasion force was debated long before the war. Some favored a tiny force basically mimicking the Afghanistan campaign of special operations forces helping locals with a small amount of conventional forces to spearhead the advance. The inside-out strategy of heading for Baghdad first in an airborne attack was an extreme form of this strategy. Others wanted a near-replay of Desert Storm. We ended up with a British division, a large American heavy division, a large American air assault division, a huge Marine "division," and a couple parachute brigades. Plus Military Police and separate line battalions, presumably for security purposes. I wonder if in the battle between Franks and Rumsfeld (ok, I am assuming they tugged in the opposite direction for how many troops could go), at some point Rumsfeld put a cap on the invasion force, saying no more than three American divisions could be sent to Kuwait. (I'm also discounting 4th ID's cancelled Turkish front. I never considered it vital for the invasion and possibly counter-productive) If so, did the uniformed Pentagon then deploy enough Marines for more than two divisions into one MEF; put four heavy brigades under one Army division, and beef up the air assault division to get around that limit? (I'm assuming it was beefed up since it is often said it has 20,000 troops in it) And then the separate brigades and battalions don't count. Nor did the MPs. If so, we must make sure that we don't think we can replicate this war with three American divisions and one allied division as the heart of the invasion force. This certainly was a cakewalk by any stretch of the term but it was achieved with an iron fist and not a small force. We really had 2+ Marines divisions, 3+ Army divisions, and 1 British division. Again, I would rather have added a second Army heavy division in place of a Marine division-equivalent to guard against a setback in the main armored drive to Baghdad, but since we did not face such a setback I can't complain too much—I just hope the next time, should another war come, we send more heavy armor to provide us with a margin of error.
So, it is established to my satisfaction that we had overwhelming ground power. The second question we must ask is whether we can do this again in other circumstances. Yes, our superb air power could do this again in another war, but I think we must be very careful in assuming this size force could win as easily in a different country. We had overwhelming ground power in Iraq because we could keep most of our ground combat power up front. Despite all the press the supply line attacks received, they were gnats. They did not represent a true guerrilla war by the Iraqis angry with our invasion. We really did rely on the Iraqis wanting Saddam out so badly that they would not think of us as invaders. Had the Iraqi people felt we were invaders, like any other invading army, we would have had to strip substantial combat forces to garrison our rear areas. (Then, my idea of supplying through Jordan would have reduced the need for this by avoiding supply lines through populated areas) This restricts what our military can do since we invade a unified, hostile state at our peril. Firepower and speed can replace numbers but only if we do not face a hostile population. Police work is labor intensive. Keep that in mind when people suggest who should be next. If we face a united enemy, we may need years of work to undermine their loyalty to the regime to prepare the battlefield. Otherwise, we'll need more troops from our own resources or from allies.
So, like any other war, this war may or may not be a prototype of our future wars. They are all different and so it would be better to get used to that now.
Having established (again, to my satisfaction) that the overwhelming force used in Iraq may or may not be overwhelming in other circumstances, it is clear to me that the Iraq War should not lead to the conclusion that we can cut a couple Army divisions and scrap a Marine Expeditionary Force, placing all our trust in our awesome air power. We need at least as many troops as we have today at a barely acceptable minimum. Shoot, we need 40,000 more just to man the force structure. And we may need more support troops on active duty just in case rather than putting so many in the reserves. But most important, we must figure out what type of troops should be in our military. Transformation is supposed to create the light and lethal Objective Force. The Crusader is gone. That I don't mind, since Paladin is damned good. What does bother me is the impending demise of the Abrams and Bradley in a couple decades with nothing similar to replace them planned. The Stryker Brigade Combat Teams are the prototype of the lighter Army of the future, with the Future Combat System yet to be developed not much heavier than the Strykers, yet far more lethal and far more survivable. Yeah, right.
The Iraq War showed the value of our heavy armor in no uncertain terms. They mostly shrugged off RPG hits and kept going, smashing anything in their way. Even our lighter forces needed Abrams tanks. The Marines adopted them after Desert Storm. We airlifted some in to 173rd AB brigade this war. We left tanks to back up our paratroopers and air assault troops in city combat as the rest of 3rd ID marched north. Nor did time constraints prevent us from getting lots of heavy armor to the war. One reason for wanting lighter armor is to be able to airlift them into a war to repel an invasion with little notice. How often will this happen? I'm glad we didn't airlift a bunch of light stuff in record time back in September 2002 and then just waited for March 2003 to start the war because we thought heavy armor was not deployable. We had the time, sent our heavy armor, and reaped the benefit of this "Cold War" relic on the battlefield.
This war, far from being an argument for lightening our Army, argues for heavying up our light forces. Sure, we can still experiment with the Stryker brigades, since technology may yet make heavy armor obsolete (but we've heard that before). But for the near term, listen to what we learned in the streets of Iraq. The Abrams/Bradley team is awesome. Attach a tank battalion or a tank heavy task force to each of our light brigades. Perhaps they can be National Guard separate battalions for the most part. Give them to the light infantry, paratrooper, and air assault divisions. Depending on the war, they can be left behind or sent along as appropriate. Then, our spearhead heavy divisions won't need to strip armor to support supply line battles or urban combat. It sure worked for us in World War II when every American "infantry" division had a tank battalion and a tank destroyer battalion attached—making them the equivalent of German armored infantry divisions.
For the ground component of a joint force, heavy armor rules for now.
Permalink to this post: http://www.geocities.com/brianjamesdunn/TDRDIarchives.html#TDRDI15APR03A
"Marine Expeditionary Force" (Posted April 6, 2003)
In the current war, the Marines are acting like a second Army. The Marines need new equipment for their new role.
The Marines should have the role of reacting fast to a threat where we do not already place Army troops and/or equipment. Where possible, they should be able to defeat small local threats, deploying battalions, regiments, and maybe an entire division, before calling on the Army for help. If a division is unable to win, we have reached the level of a war and the Army is needed. This rapid reaction Marine Corps role does not require amphibious capabilities.
In an article in Joint Force Quarterly, I argued that the Marine Corps should focus on an expeditionary role and urban warfare role instead of amphibious warfare. The traditional storming of the beaches, even updated with deep inland assault in V-22s, should be downgraded (although not abandoned). This expeditionary role, I argued, would allow the Army to avoid being lightened up too much as the current plans call for, in order to get troops to a theater quickly. Transformation apparently has no place for the Army M-1A2s that have crushed their opponents while heavily outnumbered on the road to Baghdad. The sight of Alpha Company of 3-7 Cavalry crushing an Iraqi armored battalion a couple days ago in ten minutes with just its organic weapons-and suffering no losses-should be instructive of the value of our heavy armor. We discard it at our peril.
Let the Marines focus on the smaller threats and retain the Army for high intensity warfare.
So how should the Marines equip themselves for this role?
First of all, the armored amphibious vehicles (AAVs) of the Marines are being stressed in the deepest inland advance in Marine Corps history. They are designed to get Marines ashore under armor and then get them off the beaches. They are large, too. Why shouldn't the Marines have Bradleys? Against a tougher opponent, the AAVs might be large casualty generators-more vulnerable, with more infantry capacity, and just plain not designed to advance a few hundred miles. Since 1991, the Marines have already adopted the M-1 based on their non-amphibious role in that war. In the Persian Gulf War, the Marine M-60s were deemed too old, and the Army loaned the Marines a tank brigade to bolster them in their non-amphibious mission of pinning the Iraqis in Kuwait.
Perhaps the lesson of this second major non-amphibious mission-this time deep inland driving all the way to Baghdad-is that the time to replace the AAV has arrived. The AAVs should be kept in case they are needed for an amphibious assault-you never know-but a drive inland like the '03 campaign calls for different and better equipment. The Marines need another infantry carrier
Plus, the role of the Marines has probably been less than ideal. The Army has had to use 82nd AB and 101st AB troops to secure their supply lines. If a Marine Corps focused on urban warfare had been used with the Army instead of next to the Army, V Corps could have marched north with a 2-division strike force of the 3rd ID and 101st AB while Marine regiments secured Najaf and Samawah and Karbala after the Army bypassed them. Marine infantry with armor, helicopters, and organic air support would have been ideal. If the Air Force and Navy air had also been striking the Republican Guards mercilessly as V Corps drove north, west of the Euphrates, maybe the Army pause to regroup would not have been as long. (I freely grant that even if we did have to pause longer than necessary, we are doing great to be at the Battle for Baghdad stage as we start the third week of war.)
This line of supply, urban role still would have left another Marine division equivalent of mechanized forces able to push north in a diversionary thrust. Equipped with M-1s, Bradleys for the riflemen, and LAVs for the recon elements as they have now, this force would have been better prepared to push north.
The British Basra role would remain unchanged.
Perhaps the Marines fear looking too much like a second, redundant, Army, if they adopt too much Army equipment. But the difference would be that in ordinary circumstances, the Marines would have the lead in responding to small crises (with Army airborne forces supporting) and in the early stages of a major war (again, supported by Army light forces and Stryker units). The Army would use the time purchased to move its heavy forces into place to be supported by the Air Force. Once the Army was in place, it would take the lead in winning the war. The Marines would then have the modern equipment to support the Army in a war of maneuver and firepower, able to deliver riflemen deep inland to battle in the cities or in supporting attacks as the Army knifes its way toward the ultimate objective to win the war.
The Marines have Abrams tanks already. Give them the Bradley too. If the Marines feel guilty, they can draw comfort from the fact that the Army took their LAVs (and added lots of nifty, expensive stuff).
As long as the Army and Marines take on complementary roles that create a potent combined force, there is no reason not to use the best equipment available.
Permalink to this post: http://www.geocities.com/brianjamesdunn/TDRDIarchives.html#TDRDI06APR03A
"The Army and Marines Flow to the Gulf" (Posted March 4, 2003)
We are about to start a major theater war (MTW), the building block war around which we determine what is 'enough' to defend America. The second MTW, North Korea, looms over us even as we flow to the Gulf.
So we really have enough ground troops?
First Cav and 1st Armored divisions are alerted to move. Plus 2nd Cavalry Regiment (Light). Clearly, we do not need these units to invade Iraq. Still, it is good to have them in the pipeline ("flowing") just in case we run into difficulties. It would not do to have an invasion force run into problems, request reinforcements, and then wait six weeks while the units ship to the Gulf. I imagine the two heavy divisions will fall in on equipment in the Gulf and be in action quickly if needed.
An article in the Washington Post today says this latest announcement commits 5 of our 10 active divisions. Let's see, 82nd AB is in Afghanistan and Kuwait; 3rd ID is in Kuwait. 101st AB is in Kuwait. 1st ID is in Kosovo and heading for the Gulf. 4th ID has its equipment floating off of Turkey; 1st CAV is going to the Gulf; 1st Armored Division is going to the Gulf; 10th Mountain Division will probably go the Gulf. I count eight. That leaves 2nd ID to watch the North Koreans and 25th Infantry (Light) (part of both are transitioning to Stryker Brigades, I believe). That's ten. I sure hope the Guard getting called up includes combat divisions. Nor do we have many Marine line units outside of Kuwait, it seems. So how small do we want our ground components to be? Will Rumsfeld really kill two Army divisions?
When we went to ten active Army divisions, people scoffed that we'd need to fight Iraq and North Korea at the (nearly) same time. That doesn't seem so ridiculous now. Plus we have to babysit the Balkans. Sure, people said we could just bug out if more important needs arose, but does that seem so wise now? When in one crisis we should pull out of another area and risk it exploding too? Nor does the established force of five Army divisions and 1 or 2 Marine Expeditionary Forces seem so assured of quick and decisive victory now that we go to war. Now, all or elements of eight Army divisions are heading to the Gulf plus three other brigade-sized separate units (2nd and 3rd ACRs and 173 AB Brigade), plus 24 Marine line battalions—eight brigade equivalents!
Quantity has a quality all its own, the old saw goes. We can't rely on technology and lightness to send small units of super troopers against masses of the enemy. Numbers matter. Remember the British Expeditionary Force in 1914? A superb force to be sure, it blistered the Germans as they advanced toward Paris. But at the end of the campaign, the German army stood while the British army was decimated. Just what would we do if we faced dedicated enemy soldiers and not the demoralized Iraqi conscripts?
What if we faced the North Korean, for example? How many American divisions would be flowing into the Korean peninsula to overcome adversity and still fight on to victory?
Or are we really willing to use nukes? That's a Hell of a choice to have. Let's not ever get to that point.
Enlarge the Army. There are no shortages of missions for our troops. And this will be true for quite some time.
Draft Note (Posted January 3, 2003)
Just a note with two U.S. Representatives calling for a draft because they believe African American military personnel will die in disproportionate numbers. Actually, they oppose war and hope that highlighting their belief will derail the war. Actually, as the article buries deep in the story, whites and Hispanics are clustered in combat units where the great majority of casualties will be endured. And even in Vietnam, based on simple percentages of the population, it was at most, 20% more than their percentage of the population. If I remember my demographics correctly, if you consider the draft-age population only (and counting white grandmothers to make it seem that young African American men were dying at higher rates does seem rather unfair), African Americans were actually under-represented in deaths during Vietnam.
Just writing that galls me. Especially now when the military is voluntary. I cant imagine poring over demographics of dead soldiers and looking for slights: how many left-handers? How many Michiganians? Gee, did too many whites die in Somalia? I cant imagine anyone getting away with asserting they dont want Irish soldiers dying for this or Italian soldiers dying for that. Sending our military to fight and die is a serious business and I value them all.
For those claiming that the Iraq war debate is suppressed they sure have difficulty arguing against the war. If they are against liberating Iraq, they should say so. And stop hiding behind pacifying and rebuilding Afghanistan, or bin Laden, or Kim Jong Il, or the budget deficit, or the false prospect of their own community dying in disproportionate numbers in war.
Maybe a draft of some sort is needed. But it certainly isnt needed to staff the military for the most part. This draft proposal is just the latest in the string of things we supposedly must do first before we strike Iraq.
I certainly hope that these two Representatives wont be relieved that their concerns on race are false. Im disturbed enough that it is a concern. Remember, our soldiers are all green. I value them for that color.
"A New Draft?" (Posted January 1, 2003)
I have not been terribly sympathetic to the idea of a new draft. Yes, I value my (limited) military experience. There is merit to having people of varying socio-economic groups get their lumps together in the cause of defending America. I'd say the most interesting example was me-the white Detroit "old man" of the platoon sparring with Frear-the son (or was it nephew) of a Motown star. For the life of me I can no longer remember who she is. He had graduated from Brown University. I was a University of Michigan graduate. We each claimed superiority and belittled the other's school. He carried his silver spoon in his mess kit! (I liked him, actually. I have to respect someone who had no reason to join, yet still did) A lot of people could benefit from Army Basic Training.
Yet our volunteer military does not need conscripts. We are an information age military and not an industrial age mass production military. Our military does not need massive numbers of cannon fodder.
Nor am I persuaded by our war on terror to support conscription for the sole reason of calling on our people for "sacrifice." If even the modest efforts our government has made thus far lead critics to cry "police state!" how would they react to a needless draft? I think we are fortunate to live in an age when going to war does not require us to eat beans and put off all major purchases until after the war because every factory has to produce war material. Why do advocates of sacrifice think we have to mimic World war II conditions in the twenty-first century?
Yet maybe conscription would be a good idea. Oh, not to staff our regular military-unless we must fight a peer competitor like China (if Chinese power and hostility grow over the decades-neither are guaranteed, however) or anything like that-we just don't need masses of infantry for our high tech wars against small powers.
But in a decades-long war on terror, mass conscription could serve valuable purposes. The fact that we do not need conscripts to wage the war actually makes it easier to start universal conscription. If we wanted to use a draft to man our actual fighting military, we would need to take only a small percentage and exemptions would undermine the leveling effect. Making a draft nearly universal is a key to providing the socializing aspect a reality.
So how would we use draftees in a Homeland Defense Corps?
We could train medics whose skills are obviously of use in coping with a terror attack even before they are mobilized. Such skills diffused throughout the population would save lives.
We could train security personnel who could augment military police type formations guarding our borders, bases, or civilian infrastructure in their communities during emergencies. This might be a pool of reservists available to the military services and the new Homeland Defense Department.
We could also train draftees in basic squad-level infantry skills so that there is always a pool of troops who may be mobilized for additional training should we need infantry for war or peace operations.
Recruits would need basic training, some advanced schooling for their skills, and civics education. This should take no more than four or five months. This will hardly be an onerous duty of citizenship. Of course, anybody could volunteer for any of the services as civilians do now for the higher pay and benefits of those services instead of doing the minimum draftee service.
Other skills might also be of use such as vehicle drivers, supply specialists, and other jobs that would allow individuals to fill out active units or augment them for war tasks.
For their term of Homeland Defense Corps reserve service, we could exploit online or distance learning for refresher training every three months to validate their training.
We could require two years duty maximum in the homeland defense reserves, or four or more for medic duty (if you get the easier, less dangerous duty, you should serve longer). Nor should such service be considered the equivalent of military service for benefits unless the troops are mobilized by a military service. We don't want this easier service to draw away recruits from the traditional services.
Establishing a new draft would mean we would have to gear up the training establishment to crank out graduates at a high rate without interfering with traditional force training. I don't know whether basic training should be integrated or done separately.
A draft with these attributes might have merit. It avoids foisting unwilling draftees on the military yet provides citizenship training with reasonable sacrifice and trains our people with actual useful skills should they be needed by the nation. Establishing such a draft-filled Homeland Defense Corps is worth a thought, anyway. And given that many of those calling for a draft are on the left, maybe it will silence those others on their side who bemoan the idea that our military recruiters visit high schools.
"Carriers" (Posted December 25, 2002)
Hanson had a nice piece on our aircraft carriers. It is a stirring piece yet misses the impact of the changing environment. A few years ago, in '99 I believe, Naval Institute Proceedings purchased an article I wrote about the role of carriers in a network-centric environment. Basically, I wrote that as our network-centric navy is built, the value of carriers will decline; and as enemy networks are built, our carriers' value will decline. The very logic of the network will inevitably lead to their demise. Sadly, Proceedings has not actually published this article (or another one they bought earlier on Army-Marine Corps cross-attachment). On a personal note, for an author still trying to get my published works into double digits, having two bought but unpublished is frustrating. I've stopped even submitting to them (although part of that is my general focus on landpower issues).
Before carrier fans can write hate mail (and I actually count myself as a fan), I did not say they are obsolete. I did note that even as they became obsolete against networks, they would retain niche roles for use against enemies without networks (an Afghanistan scenario for example). In addition, since '99, the ability of Navy aviation to use precision weapons has leaped, making carriers more useful in the short run though they still are not immune to the logic of the network.
To explain, without rewriting the article here (and with some reflection looking back three years), network-centric warfare is a term that describes creating a sensor net that sees every enemy platform and instantly transmits their locations to the entire fleet's ships, submarines, and aircraft. The communications network allows this information sharing and allows the commander to allocate firepower distributed throughout the fleet to destroy targets. While firepower may be concentrated on a single target, their launch points are scattered. This is far different from the platform-centric fleet we have historically had. That is, to concentrate firepower, we needed to concentrate the firepower on a platform. Today that platform is the carrier and its battle group with its air wing, able to send massed missiles and aircraft against a target. It is the peak of the platform's development, surpassing the line of battleships that had dominated naval warfare for centuries.
The ramifications of fighting in a network-centric environment will kill the carrier. Most obviously, on the offense, with the ability to scatter launchers without diluting the ability to concentrate firepower, we no longer need the expensive platform of the large carrier. Yet operations like Afghanistan show that even in the missile age, carrier aviation is quite useful against an enemy without air and naval power. Indeed, even with a network-centric Navy, the usefulness of the carrier's air wing would have diminished little for this scenario. So what's my point, you may ask. If carriers remain potent concentrations of platform-centric power even in a network-centric force, why say they are obsolete?
The real challenge to carriers comes not from our network, where carriers become huge albeit needlessly expensive concentrations of power whose firepower is not diminished by the existence of the network; but on the defense against other networks. What happens when an enemy develops a network? The Taliban couldn't monitor their own airspace, but when an enemy builds a sensor and attack network that reaches out hundreds of miles, how will our Navy penetrate that grid, survive, and attack? Assuming we have scattered assets, losing some of them will not harm our fleet as a whole-other parts will fill in the gaps.
It may well be that a sensor/attack grid race will develop, with both sides (and this is hypothetical since no Navy appears able to challenge our Navy in the near future) engaged in a race to extend the range of their grids as we strive to be able to identify and attack the enemy before our own assets get hit. But if we cannot maintain such superiority and face a similar grid, any concentration of firepower becomes a priority target for the enemy. Our carriers will be hit and lost. The prestige value of losing them will offset the firepower that they carry on a single hull. The firepower can be distributed to smaller hulls and end the propaganda value to the enemy of killing carriers (egad, the Iraqis trumpeted their shooting down of an unmanned drone for heaven's sake).
Carrier defenders will counter that carriers have not been lost since World War II and that others sounded the death knell of the carrier when anti-ship missiles were deployed. They also note that airbases are subject to foreign government whims and regime changes while carriers can always be used.
But not losing any carriers in over 50 years is due to not fighting another navy, not from the invulnerability of carriers. Similarly, the advent of anti-ship missiles in a platform-centric environment limited the amount of firepower that the Soviets could mass against a single carrier had it come to war. Even with that limitation, our carriers were vulnerable though I would not have said missiles made carriers obsolete. But against a network-centric enemy, an enemy's ability to mass firepower against our carriers will not be a limiting factor that saves us. Unless defensive anti-missiles have the ability to defend a single target from all over the net, enemy offense will overwhelm a single platform's ability to defend itself. And even if we can use networked defenses to defend a carrier, why expend the huge sums of money to do it when such concentrated assets are not needed for offensive uses?
As to the sovereignty argument, how many times can we actually use that advantage of carriers--that they are sovereign assets and require no approval from host nations? First, except against coastal targets, we still need permission for overflight rights. Second, given the need for international support that even the obvious danger of addressing the Iraq problem imposes on us, how many times will we have just carriers? If we have allies, we will have Air Force bases. If we don't have enough support for the use of foreign air bases, will we really strike from the sea alone? And I'm talking about a sustained campaign, not a single retaliatory strike. If that is what we want to do, B-2s and Navy cruise missiles can handle those quick strikes. And if we do need a sustained campaign, carrier ammunition stowage isn't that great (although precision weapons do lessen this problem, aviation fuel is still a limiting factor). We'd need to rotate carriers to avoid stress accidents and to replenish carrier stores. Plus, even in Afghanistan where the Navy very impressively struck deep inland, the Navy strike aircraft relied on Air Force aerial refueling to carry out those missions--which required allies who let us use their air bases.
So, while the firepower that carriers have will not diminish as we build a network, the ability to have the same firepower on distributed hulls means that they are not crucial to generating offensive firepower. Against enemy networks, they will be tempting and irresistible targets. Although in such an environment we wouldn't build carriers, since we already have them it makes sense to keep them but to limit their use to environments that do not pose a threat to them. Like battleships before them, they will occupy a niche that will gradually narrow over the decades as our network and enemy networks develop and mature. Carrier defenders may not like to hear this, but the logic of networks spells their doom. Indeed, we will soon stop commissioning Nimitz-class behemoths, and the Navy is trying to figure out what the next carrier should look like.
Yet carrier defenders should not be disheartened. The Navy will always be crucial no matter what the main asset is. Navies have gone through ships of the line, pre-dreadnoughts, battleships, and carriers as the main platforms that defined a Navy's power. We do not mourn their passing. The new measure of power will be the network that joins scattered firepower from submarines, surface ships, land-based aircraft, and even Army and Marine Corps artillery (missile, rocket, and tube) and aviation assets into a seamless force. Nobody will care where the asset is located and what uniform is firing it-killing the target will be all that matters. Perhaps even small carriers will be part of the mix.
Large carriers will become part of the Navy's history. Keeping them beyond their usefulness will risk that glorious record and the lives of many sailors to hang on to legends. Our security is not well served by nostalgia.
“Transformation” (Posted December 12, 2002)
A couple interesting developments on the Army reorganization front. In one article, the Defense Department is on track to pay for four Stryker brigades. However, the problem of the organization is being noticed—it isn’t a heavy force and never will be. Even as some complain that the units are too heavy and that the Stryker vehicle itself can’t fit on a C-130, the Army has noticed the brigade lacks combat power. As to the Stryker being too heavy, hogwash. Yes, the Stryker vehicle has to have some of its protruding parts removed to get on the plane, and requires some time once offloaded to put together again, but so what? If those units have to fight their way off the plane onto the tarmac when they land, we’ve got more serious problems. As to the lack of combat power issue, well yeah. Take away the Abrams and Bradleys and load up with souped-up LAVs and what do you expect?
The article says the Department of Defense may take the money for brigades five and six and instead use it to add attack helicopters, more recon and targeting assets, and more firepower! Given enough time, DOD will start adding Abrams and Bradleys, I imagine. And why not? While there is a role for a medium weight force to bridge the gap between heavy forces that take weeks to arrive and light forces that can fly in days. But can the Air Force really airlift six of these brigades in faster time than it would take to start shipping heavy brigades? There are only limited scenarios for their use. If we don’t need to rush anti-tank forces to stop an invasion of an ally that catches us unaware and with no heavy forces in the area, why keep units too light to have staying power? But after adding more firepower, the unit will be too heavy to be airlifted rapidly anyway. It is already pretty darn heavy and it will get heavier even as the individual units remain light and vulnerable Strykers. I really have to ask, might it not be better to airlift a battalion task force of Abrams and Bradleys? Would the combat power suffer? Would that option be just as strategically mobile as an entire Stryker Brigade? Certainly, the smaller unit would be more survivable since its individual vehicles would be superbly protected and armed.
A related issue is the move to make the Army National Guard give up some of its heavy brigades to reconfigure four brigades to mobile light brigades—essentially motorized infantry outfits that have Humvees and 2-1/2-ton trucks to move the troops and towed artillery.
This Army National Guard Restructuring Initiative is intended to make the Guard a more relevant reserve force given that conventional foes are fewer these days and given 9/11. These units will be better suited to guard duty in homeland defense and will be able to carry out base defense overseas as well as peace-keeping, occupation, or rear area security missions. But unlike Stryker brigades, they will be far easier to airlift. In addition, they will have the infantry to take over the peacekeeping role that the infantry-heavy Stryker brigades are supposed to fill. Yet the Stryker brigade’s armored vehicles are probably excessively heavy for relatively benign peace operations. But on the other hand, they are too light to survive even RPGs in a combat environment so what real improvement would they provide over armored Humvees in peace ops?
Several years ago in an article, I argued that we should keep the Guard heavy units as is to guard against an unanticipated threat that is larger than an Iraq or North Korea scenario or an anticipated threat that turns out to be tougher than we expect. (I also wanted a warfighting orientation to counter the peacekeeping mentality that seemed rampant) See the synopsis if you like. But given that we are about to get rid of one of our two anticipated regional threats by taking down Iraq, and given the lack of other significant conventional threats (and given that fighting China outside of the Korean peninsula or on Taiwan would require massive mobilization on the scale of World War II if we hoped to have land forces able to enter the mainland and win), I have to admit this makes sense post-9/11. Previously I’d argued that if we need Bosnia-type occupation forces, we should expand the Military Police. Since Rumsfeld is resisting expanding the Army, we aren’t going to get more MPs. Motorized infantry will have to do, yet I worry about such a force in the reserves. Will we maintain 40,000 Army reservist mobilized indefinitely?
So, even with the two restructuring initiatives, we’ll still have heavy units. They will be around for twenty or thirty years even with no replacements for the Abrams and Bradleys. War with Iraq will again show their power. We’ll have mobile light brigades that will provide motorized infantry for peace operations, occupation duties, and homeland security, and we’ll have Stryker brigades that in theory provide a force that can arrive soon after light paratroopers or foot infantry arrive (as a tripwire) to give them some firepower and (hopefully) hold until the heavy stuff arrives. But the Stryker brigades may get heavier, killing that role. I still say a light, infantry-poor but anti-tank rich Stryker brigade makes more sense for this role. (see Defense Issue archives)
These brigades are also supposed to test how a light but lethal unit will operate paving the way for the wonder “tank” (the future combat system”) that will equip the Objective Force. Here’s my take in Military Review on that project if you are interested. I understand the FCS will have depleted-pixie-dust-armor that is light yet as solid as Abrams armor. Pretty cool, huh? Needless to say, I do worry about trying to abandon heavy forces prematurely as the Objective Force foresees. I hope DOD is right on this. I really hope a replacement for the Abrams main battle tank is on a drawing board somewhere in America just in case. We are appropriately building strategically deployable units but I don’t think the age of survivable heavy units is over yet.
Go Army!
"Stryker Brigades" (Posted October 23, 2002)
I'm not comfortable with the organization of the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (formerly Interim Brigade Combat Teams: IBCTs). Yes, we need something between walking infantry that is strategically mobile yet tactically immobile with little combat power and heavy armor that is strategically immobile but tactically mobile and highly lethal and survivable. The Stryker Brigades are the medium forces we are fielding that are supposed to bridge that gap.
Essentially a light mechanized brigade, a Stryker Brigade is more strategically mobile than a heavy brigade and has good tactical mobility. It has good firepower too, but lacks the survivability of heavy forces. It has lots of infantry for peace operations. Designed to be flown in after other forces have seized an airhead, the Stryker Brigades will provide significant firepower quickly; but will hand off the main battle to heavy forces when they finally arrive. How quickly is a question of debate since they are fairly heavy despite being lighter than a heavy brigade. And just how much Air Force airlift can the Army count on to get one overseas in a crisis? They will also be test beds for operating concepts for the Objective Force, the future army that will use light, lethal, and survivable combat platforms not even designed yet. I’ve already offered my thoughts at Military Review on this subject.
One problem is the different requirements for different operations foreseen for the brigades. Peace operations can be done at our leisure. We can basically ship over what we want on our time frame. The lightness of the Stryker Brigade is largely irrelevant to this mission. The wheeled vehicles and large infantry component are great for patrolling and will not stress the local roads and bridges, so this is one advantage. Yet the lightness is meant to allow the brigade to be rushed to a theater to deter or halt an invasion when paratroopers are the only alternative (which are just trip wires incapable of mounting serious resistance to an armored attack). Part of the problem of getting somewhere fast is sustainment. All that infantry has to be fed and provided with medical assistance, not to mention potable water, showers, ammunition, etc.
If we are trying to halt an armored assault with the Stryker Brigade, the high infantry component makes less sense. Why not add more of the 105mm-armed Strykers at the expense of the infantry carriers? Put TOWs on them too and now we're talking. Build the brigades with three battalion task forces each containing two 105mm companies and one infantry company. Or perhaps two smaller companies of each to allow each battalion to fight with two balanced task forces. Add the other recon and targeting, artillery, and support stuff already there, and we have a unit that can be airlifted fast yet better suited to stopping armor. I'd still rather have heavy armor but if we have to be there tomorrow, the heavy stuff just won't be there (unless we park it there well before the conflict).
The factors that make the brigades useful for peacekeeping could also be useful for urban combat. Lots of infantry, wheeled vehicles, superior communications and recon abilities, all are suited for city fighting. Indeed I’m wondering if one or two will debut in Iraq.
Still, long term we might want mix and match Stryker Brigades with anti-tank and infantry versions. I’m just not satisfied with the current unit.
“Enlarge the Army” (Posted September 4, 2002)
Mr. Webb is concerned that we could be in Iraq for thirty years and that we would be unable to respond to other threats, such as China.
What a bizarre argument. And I don’t think it is possible to have drawn a more wrong conclusion.
The German and Japanese occupation forces he spoke of were not combat formations initially. They were really constabulary forces ill-suited to large-scale combat. The poor initial showing of these American forces as they were rushed to Korea to stem the North Korean invasion clearly shows this. As for Germany-based troops, they did not become heavy combat forces until the post-North Korean invasion military build up by the United States. The forces in Japan never did become a potent combat force like the German-based military force. The difference lies in the external threat. No land threat against Japan, so the force was a logistics and air power-based force. A major land threat against West Germany, so the Army was beefed up considerably with large Air Force support. Within ten years of winning the Second World War, Japan and Germany were our allies. Mr. Webb takes the course of saying since it did work out, it was easy. Was it really easy to turn fanatical enemies who only succumbed to Atomic bombs or bunker-to-bunker combat in Berlin into friends? I dare say there will be few fanatics in Iraq who will fight to preserve Saddam’s regime.
What of external threats that could keep us in Iraq in significant strength for more than a decade? Certainly, external threats could do that. The external threat of Iraq has kept us in Saudi Arabia for more than a decade, annoying bin Laden in the process. So first of all, occupying Iraq will end our need to deploy in Saudi Arabia. So let’s not just talk about the additional duties. Second, what external threats are there? Kuwait? Saudi Arabia? Jordan? Syria? Turkey? There is Iran, but a revolution in that component of the axis of evil will likely end that threat. So, we will have to occupy Iraq with significant land power, gradually drawing down as in Bosnia over the course of the last seven years. Our allies should help too. Without an external threat, we could be down to a token force in a decade.
But what if an occupation really does hurt our ability to fight the Chinese? Or somebody else? Such is the folly of having only enough force to fight and beat one regional threat (a major theater war: MTW) such as North Korea or Iraq. The last quadrennial review in 2001 ended the much-mocked “two-MTW” standard. We never had an actual two war strategy since most people forgot the “nearly simultaneous” caveat in the pre-2001 post-Cold War strategy. The old theoretical standard at least stopped ridiculous arguments as Mr. Webb makes. With the ability to fight more than one MTW, we were not deterred from fighting one out of fear it was not the really threatening one! Just how secure did the South Koreans feel knowing they were under the lesser threat compared to Kuwait? If North Korea had invaded, we would have been hard pressed with the so-called two-war standard military to fight in Korea and still have enough to defeat Iraq. Now what would we do with a military judged so small that we count on only our most pressing potential enemy attacking us?
If we are deterred from going into Iraq, a state that is undoubtedly a threat to us, the proper response is to enlarge our military. Modernization is no substitute for numbers after a certain point. If we don’t have enough Army troops to occupy Iraq and still be prepared to fight another enemy on the ground, we’d better enlarge our Army. That is the correct conclusion to reach. Not that we should be frozen into inaction at anything larger than Grenada. And I guess I might as well pile on. If Mr. Webb’s contention is that by avoiding all combat we have enough land power to fight China now, he is sadly mistaken.
And further, is he seriously saying defeating Iraq would benefit China? I’d stack up our record in the Moslem world against China’s any day. Mr. Webb’s examples of Chinese success in courting the Islamic world are perplexing (Just what religious group is rebelling against China in the western part of that country?) First, who does Pakistan look to now? And what exactly has China gotten out of Libya? And finally, just how is sponsoring a failed coup against Moslem Indonesia considered courting the Moslem world? Honestly, hand wringers see any foe’s actions as part of an intricate long-term plan that will overwhelm us; and any action on our part as falling into their hands.
Expand the Army.
Take Baghdad.
"Air Supremacy" (Posted July 31, 2002)
I think the United States Air Force is far and away the best air force in the world. (Our Navy comes in second). Nobody else comes close. Our F-15 and F-16 aircraft are aging but they are still in the same league as the newest of anybody else's, and combined with command and control, training, targeting, electronics, and armament, are head and shoulders above the rest. The power of the Air Force is far greater than the sum of all its parts.
Which makes it difficult to see why the F-22 is needed. The high tech stealth fighter was supposed to fight the next generations of Soviet fighters and make them wet their pants at the thought of going up against Americans in the air. We're also building the F-35, the Joint Strike Fighter, which will be the low cost (relatively speaking) fighter-bomber that will have a world-wide appeal as other nations seek to replace F-16s. Now, I support the JSF. We'll build thousands of them. We need some new stuff. But the F-22? I'm not convinced we need it. Maybe in very limited numbers but even that is a hard sell for me. While the Air Force has been singing the praises of air power's ability to do it all, from Desert Storm through two campaigns in the Balkans, to Afghanistan, it has never faced more than token opposition in the air. If we need a high end fighter, why not reopen the F-15 line for the Air Force? That solves the aging airframe problem. Brand new F-15s. Shoot, the South Koreans just decided to buy them, they can't be that bad. It would sure undercut their accusations that they were unduly pressured to buy the F-15. With updated avionics and missiles, the F-15 will still be a hell of a fighter for another twenty years.
I suppose what really convinced me that the F-22 fighter is not desperately needed to own the skies is the article I read that said the prime contractors (Boeing and Lockheed Martin) argued they could configure the F-22 to carry bombs internally (so it won't mess up the stealth) so it can bomb stuff. First of all, this seems like an admission that air-to-air combat is not likely to be a strain on the F-22. Second, perhaps unfairly, I immediately recalled the Me-262 rolled out for Hitler, who was very impressed with this jet. He then said to make it a bomber. The world's first operational jet fighter was to be made a bomber. That would have been a waste had it been ultimately done (although to our benefit, it delayed the fighter) in World War II; and it would be a waste now to turn the latest fighter into a very expensive substitute for what our fifty-year-old B-52s are--bomb haulers. Plus, I hate to bank so much on stealth. It's been around a while and others claim to have built radar to detect it (and it still emits sound, who knows what you can do with that?). Maybe we've overcome that and are ahead in the game, but we no longer have the element of surprise with stealth. Shoot, in 1999 we inexplicably failed to bomb one into oblivion when it went down in Serbia. Who knows what we lost there? And what did they know that let them shoot it down? Was it just dumb luck? And if we are ahead in the stealth game, the F-22 is one plane that will not be sold to anybody else for a long time. It would be ridiculous to let that technology loose. So we're the only customer for it and it will be very expensive.
I do want an Air force second to none. Air power is indeed critical to success. But when we are head and shoulders more powerful than anybody else, why spend the money? Bottom line, as a hedge against the future I'd want some F-22s, but more than a couple wings would be a waste of resources. To be fair, here's the Air Force Association's arguments for these planes.
"The Future Army" (Posted on July 12, 2002)
I want the United States Army of 2025 to be able to march on an enemy capital and impose peace on our terms.
The Army's post-Cold War identity crisis seems to have hindered this goal. During the Cold War, the Army's very clear and very difficult role was to halt the Red Army in West Germany and stop the North Koreans from marching to Seoul. The collapse of the Soviet Union has left the residual mission of keeping the North Koreans at bay but the confrontation lacks the urgency of Fulda Gap due to the s maller stakes and because increasingly South Korea is capable of defending itself even without our help. The Gulf War of 1991 was like the last hurrah for the warfighting mission. Its very success, routing a large foe in 100 hours with amazingly few casualties, undermined its value as a war winner.
Clearly, for way too many observers, the Army was over-prepared for likely threats. The Army was called on to intervene in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo where major ground threats did not exist. Actual fighting was done with airpower and missiles, with the Air Force and Navy arguing over who did that mission better. The Army dealt with the less glamorous mission of suppressing disorder. Simply resisting employment as peacekeepers and the siren song of embracing such missions to remain "relevant" were full time jobs. The Marines at least had the warrior mystique of the Corps to sustain it despite occasional questions about why we have a "second army." With heavy armor viewed as a relic, and war apparently unlikely, the Army set forth to build medium brigades that could be airlifted into a conflict zone to quickly put under-armor forces on the scene to back up the painfully light yet strategically mobile paratroopers or light infantry. Heavy armor, if we even need it anymore, could be provided quickly in small numbers by prepositioning; and in larger numbers more slowly by sea. The Marines, of course, saw turf encroachment on their own specialty--placing small numbers of troops on the ground with more firepower than Army light infantry. Even Army paratroopers seemed to threaten the amphibious warfare mission. As the Army moved toward an expeditionary role as the Army shrugged off the old Cold War role in West Germany, the Army planned to abandon heavy armor completely in about 30 years as it develops and builds a "future combat system" that combines low weight with lethality and survivability.
Much of what the Army and Marines do or are planning to do make perfect sense if done in appropriate doses and if the services see themselves as complementing one another rather than competing with one another. The Army does war. The Marines do battle. For brush fires that will likely not need more than a brigade of troops, the Marines should take the lead. Organizing the Ma r ine Corps to place a brigade quickly on the scene to smother a small threat will keep the Army in the barracks. The initial stages of a war can be handled by Army light forces augmented by prepositioned equipment for the early stages and airlifted medium b rigades that hold the line until heavy armor can be shipped in to the theater. The Army can beef up the Marines with medium brigades or heavy armor if it turns out the battle the Marines are fighting is the first battle of a war rather than just a small s c ale incident. On the other hand, the Marines will have the numbers and skill to supplement the Army in a war that requires extra infantry or which drags on larger or longer than we hope. Both ground forces can contribute and even the Army's medium brigades, if limited in number for their bridging role, are no threat to the Marine Corps' missions.
The problem comes from the Army's determination to make the medium brigades (the Interim Brigade Combat Teams) the model for the future Army as a whole. The light armored vehicles are current-technology stand-ins for the future combat system that will equip the Army of the future, the Objective Force. As envisioned, the future combat system will not see the light of day. We simply cannot build a vehicle light enough to be airlifted in significant numbers yet as lethal and survivable as the Abrams main battle tank of today. Even if, with some magical breakthrough, we are able to do this, won't this same technology make tanks three times as heavy even more powerful than the Abrams and light future combat system? To work, such a magical future combat system would have to fight only 1990s-era armies.
If we insist on making all our armor light enough to be flown in to a distant theater, we will be creating an Army able to resist what we feared Iraq would do right after conquering Kuwait--march south immediately on Saudi Arabia. In practice, sacrificing power for speed will simply place vulnerable vehicles in combat outnumbered and on the defensive. Given the emphasis on overcoming distance, when we have to choose between maintaining the upper weight limits and providing firepower and protection for the vehicle, protection will suffer first. I guess all I'm saying is that speed of deployment was a unique need of 1990 (and one we did not have to meet) and the entire Army should not adapt to this scenario. A full spectrum military needs Army Rangers and paratroopers able to deploy quickly under fire, a Marine Corps capable of reaching a battle area quickly with its superior f irepower and forcing entry, Army heavy brigades that can crush a conventional enemy, Army medium brigades that can bridge the gap between early arriving Marines/Army light infantry and heavy armor, and Marine and Army riflemen for dismounted combat such a s urban warfare. Navy and Air Force support are of course crucial, and quite honestly, nobody out there can challenge us at sea or in the air. Such a threat is decades away at worst.
For the near term, ground threats are significant enough to keep the Army and Marines busy. Each has a role unique to its own capabilities despite some overlap in capabilities. With a real war underway and the likelihood of conventional war against Iraq soon, the Army at least does not need to search for reasons to exist. Winning wars is reason enough. As this sinks in, I imagine the chimeral future combat system will dissolve and instead we will get a new main battle tank to carry the burden of war, supplemented by a light fighting vehicle for speed of deployment and the occasional operation other than war. Go Army!
