Wednesday, October 30, 2013

Iron Duh

Israel's (or anyone's) rocket defense system cannot cope with the cheaper rockets that can be launched at the targets those defenses protect. Ultimately, the best defense is to occupy the rocket launch sites.

This story about the limits of Iron Dome isn't really news:

In a piercing, informative and opinionated article based on data, Dr. Nathan Faber criticized the Israeli missile-defense concept ("tiered defense") this week. The conclusion of Dr. Faber's article, published on the Magen Laoref ("Homefront Shield") foundation's website, is that if Israel finds itself in an all-out war on several fronts facing enemies that are showering it with hundreds of missiles a day (perhaps over a thousand), this concept could crumble due to financial, operational and technological reasons.

To be fair, the critique is for the entire system of defenses being built to shoot down everything from tactical rockets to ballistic missiles and not just the Iron Dome system. So that is a newer angle.

For the most likely rocket defenses, Iron Dome can't really protect civilians. It just wasn't meant to do that.

To defeat the tens of thousands of rockets that Hezbollah can launch (and add in Hamas in Gaza), Iron Dome can only buy time for Israeli ground forces to occupy the rocket launch sites and stop the launches at the source.

That's the only way the Allies could halt German V-1 and V-2 launches at Britain in World War II, and that's still the surest way of stopping rocket launches.

Of course, when you are talking about missiles launched from Iran, occupying the launch sites isn't possible unless you are talking engineering a coup so new leaders don't fire the missiles. I don't assume that is possible in the midst of a fight.

Passive defenses (shelters, evacuations, blast protection, rescue and medical response), anti-missile missiles, and efforts to knock out enemy missiles before they are launched will be important. As will missiles and air strikes launched back at the firers to remind them of what they risk by this course.

Those larger missiles aren't cheap, however. While cheaper than the anti-missiles, Iran still won't have huge numbers of long-range ballistic missiles. And with conventional warheads they won't be that awful to endure before they run out. In the Iran-Iraq War, the "wars of cities" were intermittent events during the war. And no missile defenses were present.

Missile and rocket defenses are good to have. But at best they buy time for other means to stop the attacks. Israel has the ground power to put a stop to Hezbollah and Hamas launches from Lebanon and Gaza.

Iran is the big problem. There is no ground option.

And inconveniently enough, Israel's possession of nuclear weapons won't deter Iran from firing conventional missiles at Israel. So Israel will have to rely on other means to endure the barrage and hurt Iran enough to stop and make them cautious about doing it again.

I'm thinking strikes on Iran's Kharg Island oil export facilities might be the best response to this threat.