Ready and Set to Go

I've discussed the changing balance of power in the Taiwan Strait almost since the beginning of this blog back when it was on old Geocities. My basic point was that China was building the capacity to overrun Taiwan before we could effectively intervene. We are more powerful than China, but we are more distant from Taiwan than China is.

Over five years ago, I wrote of my hunch that summer 2008 would be a great time to spring a surprise invasion. In some circles, the idea was mocked as the "million-man swim," as Chinese amphibious capabilities were traditionally derided. I saw the trends and thought that at some point, by 2008 perhaps, China would be strong enough to take a shot at invading. I set forth my invasion scenario, too, in response to criticisms that our Navy would make short work of a Chinese invasion armada.

Strategypage writes that the Chinese sure think that they can do the job:

The chatter in China, and military deployments, indicate that the leadership believes they are now able to take Taiwan by force, before the United States can intervene. Such an attack would have to be without warning, because the United States would put forces in the way if there was any indication that an invasion was imminent.

This development comes as no surprise to those who have been watching military and political developments in China and Taiwan during the past two decades. At the end of the Cold War, China had three million troops on active duty, but their weapons, warships and aircraft were largely 1950s technology. They had no ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan, because the only missiles China had were equipped with nuclear warheads and aimed at Russia. The Chinese navy had miniscule amphibious forces and little confidence that the Chinese air force could attain air superiority over the Taiwan Straits, so that they could get troops across.

Twenty years later, the Taiwanese navy has declined while the Chinese force has expanded and been modernized. The Chinese now have nearly as many modern aircraft as Taiwan, and Chinese pilots are much better trained. Amphibious shipping has been greatly expanded, as have airborne forces and army units trained for amphibious landings.

Perhaps the most important change since 1991 is China's force of precision guided missiles and rockets.

And don't go minimizing this by arguing that Chinese leaders are deluded if they think they can win a war. I think they could. It would be no guarantee, but they have a shot at winning. But what do the Chinese think? We are not deterring the Chinese, either, with our implicit promise to defend Taiwan. The Chinese think they can beat us, too, and may expect to fight us:

In February, Colonel Meng Xianging promised a “hand-to-hand fight with the U.S.” sometime within the next 10 years “when we’re strong enough.” “We must make them hurt,” said Major-General Yang Yi this year, referring to the United States.

And last month, at the Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Beijing, a Chinese flag officer launched a three-minute rant that stunned the 65 or so American officials in the audience. Everything that is right with U.S. relations with China is due to China, said Rear Admiral Guan Youfei. Everything that is wrong is Washington’s fault. According to Guan, the United States sees China as an enemy.

Of course, such an attitude is exactly why our military has sought military-to-military contacts with the Chinese military:

The assumption in Washington has been that America was so powerful that we could integrate hardline Chinese leaders into a liberal international system they had no hand in creating. To this end, successive administrations sought, among other things, to foster ties between the American and Chinese militaries.

The Pentagon, therefore, pushed for port calls, reciprocal visits of officers, a hot line, and an incidents-at-sea agreement, with varying degrees of success. Admiral Timothy Keating even went so far as to offer to help China build aircraft carriers.

But I've never liked these exchanges and I'm happy enough they are cancelled. Despite the exchanges that took place, the Chinese clearly have not come away with an awe of our military strength. No, I'm guessing they simply think they've gained insights into our moral weaknesses and how to beat us. In short, they didn't learn what we were teaching.

And more important than precisely defining for ourselves what the balance of power is, if the question is simply whether there will be a war and not who will win it, all that matters is that the Chinese leaders believe they will win. Once they conclude they can win, they'll attack Taiwan and/or America and Japan to achieve their objective.

Don't be fooled by China's charm offensive against Taiwan that is lulling many analysts into believing war is less likely. China wants Taiwan, thinks they can conquer Taiwan, thinks we're at fault for strained relations, and believes they can make America hurt. Crazy? Don't count on it. Remember, Peking gets to define what is rational.