As we try to defeat Russia's invasion of Ukraine, don't let people use manipulation of the "Definitions" section to define a Russian victory over Ukraine as a Russian defeat to fool America into thinking we achieved glorious nuanced victory. That might be the best hope of Russian victory from a new offensive.
The war that Putin began with his attempt to conquer all of Ukraine in a rapid parade through Ukraine's cities to kill off Ukraine's rulers and replace them with pliant Russian puppets failed. Russia is enduring horrific losses to keep fighting. The Ukrainians believe a Russian offensive is looming:
Russia is MASSING men and arms for a new offensive. As soon as January, but more likely in the spring, it could launch a big attack from Donbas in the east, from the south or even from Belarus, a puppet state in the north. Russian troops will aim to drive back Ukrainian forces and could even stage a second attempt to take Kyiv, the capital.
ISW thinks Russia will launch an offensive in winter 2023, possibly aimed at Kiev and maybe including another thrust from Belarus. ISW thinks it is unlikely to succeed and that Belarus won't send in its army.
But the Russian effort to portray Putin as a competent leader taking charge of his military will put pressure on the Russian ground forces to do something dramatic, no? It may fail spectacularly. Yet Russia has to try something to reverse the trends against Russia on the battlefield. And then what will the Russians who've said "if only the czar knew!" as an excuse for battlefield losses say?
Reigniting the war will certainly stir Ukraine's allies from the complacency of a stalled--and partially reversed Russian invasion. But it will stir voices for ending the war with Russia retaining its conquests.
I'm fine with figuring out what outcome in the war is in America's interest:
What should the United States do in response to this Russian invasion? In any adversarial relationship, strategic thinking requires aligning means with ends. Any proposal of means–shipment of offensive and/or defensive weapons, economic sanctions, activation of alliances, supply of foreign aid, expressions of indifference, withdrawal of support, or other actions–should start with the articulation of the specific ends sought. ...
Regarding Ukraine: What exactly is the goal of the U.S. intervention? What is the outcome that we believe serves our national interests? Regrettably, neither American nor allied Western politicians have clearly answered this question.
Preventing Russia from quickly overrunning Ukraine and getting a cheap victory unified NATO. As NATO and its allies succeeded in that mission, the objective has become murkier. And the willingness to pay a price to get whatever that objective is becomes shakier.
I've noted that issue of defining what our victory should mean. Indeed, I do think we have to be careful about how Russia is defeated. But don't dare assume Russia will lose this war as an excuse to believe we can calibrate Western aid to Ukraine to get the perfect sort of win we need before Ukraine actually defeats Russia. That kind of nuanced effort risks rescuing Russia and giving Putin the chance to win by even marginally tipping the trends of a war on the knife's edge in Russia's favor.
First, "trading" Ukraine for a Russia alliance is immoral and a sucker's game. Russia would be no ally if it sees threats as a way to get land. That just whets Russian appetites. Russia has to have a bout of clarity for a needed alliance with America.
And saying supporting Ukraine "distracts" us from achieving other more important objectives has a long history as an excuse to lose a war. Once the existing war is lost, the "more important" issue fades away. Some people are perpetually looking for Mister Good War.
Not that the authors of that initial piece agree with the initial two options. Yet the siren song surface allure of these options can put America on the rocks. I eagerly await honest debate on this issue. Which I'm for, as a rule.
The details are important, of course. But don't abuse that need in order to justify and hide a Western diplomatic move that ratifies Russian victory. The basic form of the end of Russia's invasion of Ukraine must be that Russia loses its war of aggression and Ukraine wins.
UPDATE (Tuesday): Sure:
ISW has extensively reported on the fact that the Wagner Group uses convicts to build out its fighting force and that Wagner Group forces are serving a largely attritional role in operations near Bakhmut, failing to take significant ground but effectively pinning Ukrainian forces in the defense of surrounding territory.
But why does Russia keep battering away at these defenders?
To keep the Ukrainians pinned so Russia can attack elsewhere?
To reduce Ukraine's ability to gather forces for counteroffensives?
To kill Ukrainians in the belief that Russia is better able to endure losses? Ukrainian soldiers on the front since Russia invaded are under great stress. Does Russia think this is the objective notwithstanding heavier Russian deaths?
Or does Russia need to be able to say Russia is still attacking somewhere?
UPDATE: I think this is a good indicator of the stress the Ukrainian defenders are under:
President Volodymyr Zelensky on Tuesday visited the eastern frontline city of Bakhmut, now the epicentre of fighting in Russia's nearly 10-month invasion of Ukraine.
Zelensky met military officials and handed out awards to Ukrainian servicemen, who have been holding back a fierce and months-long Russian campaign for the city.
UPDATE (Wednesday): ISW:
Negotiations, ceasefires, and peace deals are not off-ramps but rather on-ramps for the Kremlin to renew its attack on Ukraine in the future under conditions that advantage Russia. They are means to the same ends—full control of Ukraine and eradication of Ukraine’s statehood and identity.
Let's help Ukraine make gains this winter before the window of opportunity closes.
UPDATE (Saturday): Russia is battering itself against Ukraine's Bakhmut in the Donbas.
More than 6 months ago I compared the course of Russia's invasion to the 1941 and 1942 German campaigns against Russia. I wondered it the war was "reaching" the 1943 Kursk stage, when Russia batters itself against Ukraine's defenders and loses the initiative for good.
Maybe. Ukraine has begun to push the Russians back. But there has been no destruction of a Russian army in the field. Maybe the Russian push on Bakhmut is still within the 1942 lens as Russia elevates Bakhmut to a major objective. Hence my comment recently that Ukraine should rename the city "Zelenskygrad."
Mind you, this war is this war. I'm only making the comparison as a means to broadly judge weakening Russian offensive power and wondering when Ukraine can--if it can--sustain a counteroffensive that drives the invaders out.
Heck, maybe the war goes from the Eastern Front 1942 to the Western Front 1918, with Russia repeating Germany's last gasp offensive that gained ground but broke their army.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here.
