Wednesday, October 04, 2017

As It Turns Out, You Can Kill Your Way to Victory. What Next?

The opposition to Assad has been killed, driven abroad, gassed and tortured into submission, and cowed into ineffectiveness. What has Assad won and can he hold it?

Is this the final word?

It’s hard to swallow, but Assad has won the war. The mass bombing of civilians, the leveling of hospitals and clinics, the destruction of schools, the starving of civilians, and the gassing of children—everything that we in the United States and Europe correctly gasp at horrific evidence of war crimes and crimes against humanity—are the very same techniques that assisted the regime in clawing back territory.

Assad reigns over the destroyed remnants of Syria but does not rule, because his position behind the big desk relies on Iranian cash, advisors, special forces, the Shia foreign legion Iran recruited, and Iran's Hezbollah shock troops; as well as Russian air power, special forces, intelligence, diplomatic support, weapons, and logistics.

But Assad does sit behind the big desk. Despite President Obama telling him he had to step down.

Yet there are still areas to be recaptured from rebels in the north, south, northeast, and east.

Will Iran expend the efforts to help Assad take those regions if Iran has their overland route and new base inside Syria as the payment for what they've achieved thus far?

Will Russia expend the efforts to help Assad take those regions if Russia has their air and naval bases in the west plus a victory to bolster their reputation for standing by their man?

And if Iran and Russia won't expend the effort, can Assad with what he had scrape together enough military power and rebuild his military and political power at the expense of other Syrians on the winning side to retake those regions?

Do Arab states continue to support the weakened rebels in the north and south?

Do the Kurds stand their ground to be de facto independent of Assad's realm?

Does America and the coalition fighting ISIL bolster Syrian Arab militias in the areas once dominated by ISIL in the east to resist Assad?

Yes, as with the defeat of ISIL in Iraq, ISIL in Syria will still be able to carry out terrorist attacks even without their caliphate:

A double suicide bomb attack hit a police station in Syria's capital Damascus on Monday, state media said, with a monitor saying at least 11 people were killed.

But with the potential end to rebel threats to unseat Assad, do Syrians in what seems like a decentralized almost feudal Syria turn against each other? Surely there are scores to settle or rewards to be collected that were deferred while the rebellion in the multi-war forced the Assad factions to hang together lest they hang separately.

Remember that when Assad was reeling and seemed on the verge of defeat, America refused to exert limited power by supporting Assad's as-yet non-jihadi enemies in the farcical belief that we didn't want to further militarize the conflict.

That refusal to affect the war was about 400,000+ dead ago, an Iranian and Russian penetration of Syria for their own purposes, and a destabilizing migration surge to western Europe.

Indeed, our major diplomatic role--with the failed chemical weapons deal--was in saving Assad. Do we still call our role Smart Diplomacy (see the update)?

Iran and Russia intervened in what was considered by Westerners as a hopeless mission; and Westerners opposed to American decisive--if indirect--intervention (as opposed to our policy of doing our enemy Assad a small harm; and then effectively allying with Assad by attacking ISIL in Syria) said Russia (and by inference Iran) were just getting into a "quagmire," which is a code word for an incorrect reading of the Vietnam War as a costly and doomed war effort.

In a related issue, Assad's ability to claw back ground despite a much worse position than the Iraqi government faced following our defeat of Saddam demonstrates why I was never in a panic during the Iraq War from summer 2003 when the insurgencies began to summer 2007 when the Surge and Awakening showed real progress in defeating the insurgencies. You work the problem. No war's outcome is pre-ordained even if the odds are heavily weighted one way or the other.

The multi-war may be over in the sense that the rebellion is unlikely to drive Assad from power absent a major collapse of the pro-Assad power structure. Which is conceivable once the prospect of rebel victory recedes.

So how does the war evolve going forward? I don't think the multi-war is over yet.

UPDATE: The fighting is surging:

Syria is in the throes of its worst fighting since the battle for eastern Aleppo last year, with heavy air strikes causing hundreds of civilian casualties, aid agencies said on Thursday.

Hospitals, schools and people fleeing violence have been "targeted by direct air strikes" that may amount to war crimes, the United Nations said, without apportioning blame.

The question is whether this is a surge from the pursuit to mop up defeated enemies or reflects the ability of rebels to continue resistance despite the American-led defeat of ISIL in the east.