I sometimes think I must really be awful in writing about defense issues when I read a piece like this by someone who actually has books under his belt on defense issues, as his bio says. This is just ridiculous:
China's air and naval forces are ‘being modernized to deal with possible US intervention in a Taiwan scenario,’ Cole says. But it's not clear that the US military is even strictly necessary for the defence of Taiwan. The very nature of a cross-Strait attack amounts to Taiwan's best defence.
An amphibious landing is, for the attacker, among the most complex and dangerous of military operations, especially in today's globalized and media-rich world. The attacker must move forces across open water, while under fire, secure a beachhead then sustain an influx of supplies and reinforcements—all while ignoring international outcry. All the defender must do is hold ground, keep shooting and loudly object in the world's embassies, international bodies and in the media.
Taiwan's defensive advantage is even mentioned in the same Pentagon report that warns of a fast-developing Chinese military. ‘An attempt to invade Taiwan would strain China’s untested armed forces,’ the report points out. ‘China’s combat force attrition and the complexity of urban warfare and counterinsurgency (assuming a successful landing and breakout), make amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk.’
That's the case with or without US and allied intervention—and regardless of China's growing wealth or the ongoing stresses on the US economy. Any reforms resulting from AirSea Battle would likely not significantly alter the calculation. The concept could be rendered moot before it even becomes a reality.
The man says that the budding AirSea Battle doctrine against China is pointless since China can't invade based on the inherent difficulties of launching an amphibious invasion. One, while I'm not familiar with the specifics of the doctrine and am not commenting on it, if the inspiration is AirLand Battle, what's his beef? The idea that the Air Force and Navy should work closely is common sense and really a specific application of our long-standing emphasis on joint (or "purple" operations, reflecting a blending of service "colors.") operations. Remember the problems in the Grenada operation when ground forces had problems getting air support because radios were not compatible? Part of the solution is making sure the services aren't so insular that they can't work together. Training and proper equipment make sure all contribute to the fight and can help each other. That's really not so difficult to understand, is it? And is it really controversial and "pointless?"
As annoying as the basic problem with his apparent view on joint operations is, my real problem is with the quoted material that addresses a major incentive for the AirSea Battle doctrine--the question of whether China can invade Taiwan. The author thinks that the inherent difficulties make it too tough whether or not America intervenes and regardless of Taiwan's defense preparations.
Given China's focus on deterring or delaying American intervention in such a scenario, it must be quite a surprise to the Chinese that it isn't clear that American intervention is strictly necessary for Taiwan to defeat a Chinese invasion.
You see, an amphibious operation is so complex and dangerous that China couldn't execute it.
Why? Did the author do some calculations on relative capabilities and conclude that Taiwan would defeat anything China could throw at them?
Apparently not. You see, the very nature of a cross strait attack is Taiwan's defense!
But wait! There's more! You see, China would be attacking in a globalized and media-rich world!
One, China would have to move troops across open water! The solution would be ships. And that open water is but 100 miles wide.
Two, they'd be under fire all the way! Yes, all of those 100 miles, which could be traversed in what? Five or six hours? And that assumes that Taiwan can react quickly. And it assumes that the Chinese air force and missile arsenal (and cyber atttacks and special forces operations) don't cripple the Taiwanese ability to shoot in sufficient quantity or at least delay the onset of the barrage on the invasion flotilla. The real question is whether the attrition that Taiwan (no worries about considering American forces, too, since it isn't even clear we are needed, right?) can inflict is enough to cripple the invasion flotilla.
And they must secure a "beachhead." Is he really assuming a traditional Saving Private Ryan invasion on a real beach as the main effort? Because I see any over-the-beach operations as purely secondary. I think the real objectives of a bolt-from-the-blue invasion would be Taiwan's ports and airfields so troops unload at docks and fly into airheads.
As to moving supplies and troops as follow-ups? Is China so bereft of experience in shipping based on their export-based economy that they couldn't manage to do this? Oh, come on!
But here's the key, apparently. China would have to do all those things while ignoring the dreaded "international outcry!" Yes, it is true, for all Taiwan would have to do is "keep shooting and loudly object in the world's embassies, international bodies and in the media." How Taiwan would object in the world's embassies or international bodies is beyond me since Taiwan is not formally a recognized country. And the media is going to care?
In what world does China care that much about world opinion? They hold Tibet. They hold their Moslem west. The support the freaking psychopath regime in North Korea and the practitioners of genocide in Sudan, and count Burma and Zimbabwe among their friends. They shield Iran from international sanctions over their nuclear program. Peking gives a rip about what anyone would say if China can conquer Taiwan in two weeks? Really?
I don't know why the author even highlights the difficulties of break-out from the beachheads, urban warfare, and counter-insurgency when the "very nature" of invasion obviously preclude such operations in the first place.
The Pentagon does not say China can't invade. Past reports, when Chinese power was less, even said that China would have to be willing to endure the casualties to invade rather than focus on the technical difficulties. Now it says it would be a risk for China. Yes it would be. And part of that risk is the question of whether and how we would intervene.
Taiwan certainly needs to shoot at Chinese invaders to win. But it will win not by counting on nebulous bad publicity and international pressure (by countries that don't even recognize Taiwan's status as an independent nation). It will win by shooting and stopping a Chinese invasion from getting ashore. Because China doesn't even have to conquer the island in the initial invasion. If the Chinese simply get ashore and Taiwan can't drive them back into the sea, a ceasefire could leave Taiwan divided and vulnerable to a new war in a few years time after China consolidates their territorial gain.
Look, I'm not arguing that China would win a war. But China could certainly attempt an invasion, and I think that depending on the breaks and how the campaign unfolds, China could conquer all or part of Taiwan. AirSea Battle seems like a perfectly natural evolution of our thinking considering that jointness is our general goal; and advances in Chinese power makes it clear that our Navy alone is no longer sufficient to deter or defeat a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. That means our Navy needs Air Force help to fight China's increasingly capable air and sea power that can now project force out to sea, to include Taiwan and the areas to the east of the island.
Is that really such a difficult thing to calculate?
UPDATE: Thanks to The View from Taiwan for the link.
UPDATE: Thanks to Mad Minerva for the link.
