So it has boggled my mind that so many have opposed siding with "warlords" in Afghanistan. That's how we overthrew the Taliban in 2001, why not use them now?
And how can we get the numbers of troops to police the country, provide security to the people, and provide eyes and ears to see Taliban movement, given the cost of a national force and the difficulty of putting Western forces into the place?
So this is good to see. We are hiring and organizing local defense forcess to fight our common enemy:
The American and Afghan officials say they are hoping the plan, called the Community Defense Initiative, will bring together thousands of gunmen to protect their neighborhoods from Taliban insurgents. Already there are hundreds of Afghans who are acting on their own against the Taliban, officials say.
The endeavor represents one of the most ambitious — and one of the riskiest — plans for regaining the initiative against the Taliban, who are fighting more vigorously than at any time since 2001.
Risky? Please. It's risky to try to win the war without trying to bring in more locals on our side. How can we argue it is too risky to arm the people we are defending from the Taliban?
We can't just use such low quality forces to win--but they are essential to winning since only Afghan local defense forces can be in every village.
UPDATE: Strategypage addresses this change:
U.S. and NATO commanders have given up on the Afghan national government, which is more interested in stealing than healing. So, the new strategy is to deal with the tribes, and exploit the very real disputes between the tribes. The biggest beef is the pro-Taliban tribes attempt to take control of the country again. Not only do most Afghans not want this to happen (again), but they are also angry at the bloodthirsty tactics the Taliban are using. A third beef is the alliance of the drug gangs and the Taliban. While the drug business makes a few Afghans rich, the gang related violence and growing number of addicts makes a lot more Afghans miserable and angry. So foreign commanders are going to increase backing for tribal militias that are most enthusiastic about driving the Taliban away.
Remember that going local should not mean that we stiff the central government--just that we go around it when it is an obstacle rather than an asset.
But at least this may be putting to rest the ridiculous notion that Afghan central government corruption is an excuse to give up the fight if we can't transform the central government into a model outfit before we send additional troops.
